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Introduction
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have revolutionized our
thinking about procedure.' Prior to the Rules' enactment in 1938,
the procedures adopted to resolve lawsuits were a function primar-
ily of the relief sought, and secondarily of the forum selected to ob-
tain that relief. The issue of relief was crucial because cases that
sought "legal" relief and cases that sought "equitable" relief in-
voked remarkably different procedural systems. 2 Once a case was
pigeonholed as legal or equitable, its form (or, to use the modern
concept, its "cause of action ' 3) was also important, both because a
1. Numerous recent symposia discuss aspects of the Federal Rules' remarkable
achievement. See Symposium, A Duty-Oriented Procedure in a Rights-Oriented Society, 63 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 597 (1988); Symposium, The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399 (1988); Symposium, The 50th Anniversary of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1938-1988, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1873 (1989); Symposium,
The Future of Federal Litigation, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 701 (1989); Symposium, Issues in Civil
Procedure: Advancing the Dialogue, 69 B.U. L. REV. 467 (1989); see also Maurice Rosenberg,
The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REV. 243 (1984) (discussing the civil
litigation process); Symposium, Modern Civil Procedure: Issues in Controversy, 54 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1991) (same).
2. In general terms, actions at law had a more rigid dance of pretrial pleadings, no
pretrial discovery, limited joinder rights, trial of a single issue to a jury, relatively swift
dispositions, and a heritage of procedural exactitude at the expense of the action's mer-
its. Suits in equity had simpler pretrial pleadings, limited discovery and joinder provi-
sions, trial (often bifurcated) of many issues to the court, a legendary slowness in the
docket, and a somewhat stronger heritage of doing justice on the merits. For discus-
sions of specific differences in pleading and practice in the two systems, see 9 WILLIAM S.
HoLDswORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 262-411 (1926); ROBERT W. MILLAR, CIVIL
PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 17-42 (1952); RONALD J.
WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 20-31, 44-46 (6th ed. 1985); Stephen N. Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspec-
tive, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914-21 (1987).
The theoretical difference between law and equity-that law operated only against
property while equity operated against the conscience of the person-hardly justified
the disparate procedures. Rather, the difference developed from common lawyers' slav-
ish distrust of the jury. Their goal was to narrow a case to a single issue for either the
judge or the jury to decide. Complicating factors, like multiple legal theories or numer-
ous legal issues within a single theory, were consequently eliminated by the strictures of
pleading rules. See S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 42-
44 (2d ed. 1981). Unencumbered by ajury and better trained in Roman law, the medie-
val Chancellors who developed the system of equity felt no need for similar procedures
for suits within theirjurisdiction. See F.W. MAITLAND, EQUIy 6-8 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J.
Whittaker eds., 2d ed. 1936).
3. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the recognition that law is comprised of sub-
stantive theories of liability and a separate set of procedures that enforce those liabilities
is a distinctly modern idea. Before the latter half of the seventeenth century, common
lawyers and judges did not conceive of law in terms of substantive theory, but in terms
of whether a particular plea fit the terms of a specific writ or whether a defensive matter
needed to be specially pleaded or lay within the general issue. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Pep-
per, 1 LD. Raymond 38 (1695); The Thorns Case, Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fo. 7, pl. 18 (1466). See
generally MILsOM, supra note 2, at 37-48 (reviewing common law writs); THEODORE F. T.
PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 379-83 (5th ed. 1956) (same).
Conversely, the Chancellor perceived that his task in equity was to "do justice"; not until
Cook v. Fountain, 3 Swanston 585 (1676), did the Chancellor disclaim the accomplish-
ment of individual justice in favor of adherence to general principles with the force,
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plaintiff often could litigate only one form at a time and because
each form came with its own finespun set of procedural rules and
distinctions.4 Regardless of the exact procedures that these two
choices dictated, the lawyers attended precisely to procedural nice-
ties, for a single miscue almost invariably was fatal to an action at
law and often so to a suit in equity.5
Today, only fifty-odd years after the Federal Rules were enacted,
this procedural framework seems quaint, formalistic, and largely ir-
relevant.6 Gone are the separate procedural rules for suits in equity
and actions at law. 7 Gone is the belief that a single dispute with
predictability, and texture of "law." See MILSOM, supra note 2, at 94-96; PLUCKNETT,
supra, at 702-0. By the latter half of the eighteenth century, English writers such as
Blackstone were beginning to conceive of substantive theory as independent of either
procedure or a sense of equity. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND *279-*385, *432-*434; WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW 78, 87-88 (1975).
4. At common law, joinder of claims arising out of one transaction was nearly im-
possible, thus forcing a plaintiff to try one writ after another until a proper recovery was
obtained. See Edson R. Sunderland, Joinder of Actions, 18 MICH. L. REV. 571, 573-82
(1920). The rule in equity was more generous, often overly so. See CHARLES E. CLARK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF CODE PLEADING § 67 (2d ed. 1947); FLEMING JAMES, JR. &
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 9.2 (3d ed. 1985). The ability to join
parties varied dramatically between law and equity, and also among the legal actions. See
OLIVER L. BARBOUR, LAw OF PARTIES TO ACTIONS AT LAW AND SUITS IN EQUITY (1864); 1
JOSEPH CHrITY, A TREATISE ON PLEADING, AND PARTIES TO ACTIONS 1-93 (Henry Green-
ing &J.C. Perkins eds., 15th Am. ed. 1874); CLARK, supra, §§ 56, 59. Finally, the plead-
ings in all actions and suits followed a similar format (a writ or bill serving as plaintiff's
initial statement, a responsive pleading or demurrer from the defendant, and then a
further response or demurrer by the plaintiff), but the precise requirements of the open-
ing plea and the highly technical rules for further pleading varied so dramatically among
the disparate legal writs and bills in equity that general similarities often were dwarfed
by specific differences. For the classic multi-volume treatment of the rules of pleading
various legal theories, see CHr-T, supra. For a treatment of pleading in equity cases, see
PHILIP T. VAN ZILE, A TREATISE ON EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1904). These com-
plicated and theory-specific sets of pleading and joinder rules not only created lurking
landmines over which the most experienced practitioners might trip, but also retarded
the development of a general code of procedure that operated independently of specific
substantive theories.
5. Although this rigidity of common law procedure has been somewhat overstated,
it is generally accurate to say that "[e]xcept in the simplest cases, the plaintiff can never
be quite sure that his demand will attain the stage of trial, the defendant that some
inadvertence will not see him cast in toto." MILLAR, supra note 2, at 36; see PLUCKNEiT,
supra note 3, at 680. Likewise, as the Chancery began to develop regularized proce-
dures, parties could no longer be certain that the Chancellor would ignore procedural
missteps in order to "do justice." See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence ofEquity, 5 COLUM. L.
REV. 20, 21 (1905).
6. The advent of British and American procedural reform during the nineteenth
century had lessened considerably the rigors of the ancient procedures. See JAMES &
HAZARD, supra note 4, § 1.6; Subrin, supra note 2, at 929-43. In this country, however,
reforms were not universally adopted, and even the "code pleading" that was a center-
piece of the reform movement contained ample theory-specific traps in the areas of
pleading and joinder. See CLARK, supra note 4, §§ 45-55, 57-58, 60-79. For a complete
discussion of pleading and practice, see CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVEL-
OPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN AMERICA AND ENGLAND (1897); WILLIAM A. SUTHERLAND,
A TREATISE ON CODE PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1910).
7. See FED. R. CIv. P. I ("These rules govern the procedure in the United States
district courts in all suits of a civil nature .... "); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 ("There shall be one
form of action to be known as 'civil action.' "). In federal court one significant difference
remains between actions at law and suits in equity: the Seventh Amendment's guarantee
of a jury trial in "[s]uits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars." U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see FED. R. CIv. P. 38, 39. That difference
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elements of contract, tort, and environmental law must be resolved
in three separate proceedings using different rules of formal proce-
dure.8 Gone are the beliefs that mastery of the arcane twists of
pleading "profert" and "oyer" is as important as mastery of the
facts, and that legal procedure must rely on procrustean rules to
protect a jury from hearing the rich factual intricacies of a dispute.9
Instead, we perceive procedure to be a body of "adjective law" in-
dependent of, and largely subservient to, the requested relief and
the merits of the substantive claim.10
Even as we have intellectually divorced procedure from its tradi-
tional framework of remedy and doctrine, we have married proce-
dure to new analytical constructs. One construct is obvious: Rules
of procedure in federal court are distinct from those in state court."
A second construct is more subtle. Although the formal assumption
of the Federal Rules is to the contrary, we intuitively understand
that the car accident at the comer and the massive securities case do
not require the same procedures.' 2 The difference between the two
generally is not thought to mandate other procedural distinctions; pleading, joinder,
discovery, and other requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply equally
to legal and equitable claims.
8. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 2.
9. See PLUCKNETr, supra note 3, at 379-83 (arguing that the ability to conceive of
cases in terms of the factual occurrences rather than procedural rules signals the transi-
tion to a mature legal system); S.F.C. Milsom, Law and Fact in Legal Development, 17 U.
TORONTO LJ. 1 (1967) (same), reprinted in S.F.C. MILSOM, STUDIES OF THE HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW 171 (1985). The device of profert (offer) and oyer (hearing) enabled
one party to learn the contents of some documents in the possession of another party.
For a treatment of its many technicalities, see CHrrrY, supra note 4, at 378-79, 446-53.
10. See F.W. MArrLAND, THE FORMS OF AcTiON AT COMMON LAW I (A.H. Chaytor &
WJ. Whittaker eds., 1936); Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L.
REV. 388, 389 (1910).
11. The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, see Act ofJune 19, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415,
48 Stat. 1064 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988 & Supp. 1990)), which empow-
ered the Supreme Court to adopt rules of procedure for the United States district
courts, replaced the Conformity Act of 1872, see Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17
Stat. 197 (repealed 1934), which had required the district courts to adopt the proce-
dures then in force in the states in which they sat. Although many states have incorpo-
rated aspects of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the majority of Americans live in
states with systems of procedure that differ in significant regards from the Federal Rules.
See John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State
Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin,
Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural
Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2026-31 (1989). The decidedly pro-Federal Rules bias
of law school curricula has not yet removed these disparities.
12. Formally, the Federal Rules are designed to be "trans-substantive," which
means that the same set of rules applies in all civil cases. The trans-substantive assump-
tion has come under increasing attack in recent years. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Of
Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 693, 718-19 (1988); Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE LJ. 718, 732-33 (1975); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudi-
catory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 547-48 (1986); Rosenberg, supra note
1, at 243-44; Linda Silberman,Judicial Adjuncts Revisited The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Proce-
dure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2175-78 (1989); Subrin, supra note 2, at 985. For defenses
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cases does not seem to hinge upon the substantive theory of the
case (the "cause of action"); two tort cases-one a car accident at
the corner and the other a products liability action involving
thousands of plaintiffs-also might require different procedural
rules. Just as equitable suits were once thought to require different
procedural rules than legal actions, we now perceive that "big"
cases might well demand different rules than "routine" ones.13
The perception is widely shared. For more than forty years,
courts and scholars have documented the course of the "big" case
and decried its excesses.14 Proposals to change the rules of the
game for "big" cases abound, with reformers suggesting everything
from minor procedural tune-ups,' 5 to major overhauls of existing
of trans-substantive procedure, see Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Mani-
festly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2068 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and
Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2237
(1989).
13. See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION SECOND (1985) [hereinafter MAN-
UAL] (recommending ways in which to proceed with complex litigation).
14. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, REVISED FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS (1989) [hereinafter COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS];
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDATIONS ON MAJOR ISSUES AFFECTING
COMPLEX LITIGATION (1981), reprinted in 90 F.R.D. 207 (1981) [hereinafter RECOMMEN-
DATIONS ON COMPLEX LITIGATION]; AMERICAN LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT
(Tent. Draft No. 1) (1989) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1]; AR-
THUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYSTEM: A CASE STUDY
(1984); RONALD J. BACIGAL, THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION (1990); WAYNE D. BRAZIL ET AL.,
MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS
(1983);JAMES KAKALIK ET AL., COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1983); MANUAL FOR COM-
PLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (1970) [hereinafter MCML]; MANUAL, supra note 13;
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION
(1991) [hereinafter REPORT ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION]; REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES ON PROCEDURE IN ANTI-TRUST AND OTHER PROTRACTED
CASES (1951), reprinted in 13 F.R.D. 62 (1952) [hereinafter PRETTYMAN REPORT]; REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES
(1979), reprinted in 80 F.R.D. 509 (1979) [hereinafter REPORT ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES]; PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986); THOMAS E. WILLG-
ING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1987); Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the
Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960) [hereinafter Handbook]; Leonard S. Janof-
sky, The "Big Case'" A "Big Burden" on Our Courts, 66 A.B.A. J. 848 (1980); Francis R.
Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199 (1976)
[hereinafter Kirkham, Good Intentions]; Francis R. Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litiga-
tion, 83 F.R.D. 497 (1980) [hereinafter Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation]; Breck P. McA1-
lister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L. REV. 27 (1950);
Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Circuit and District Judges, 21
F.R.D. 395 (1958); Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23
F.R.D. 319 (1959) [hereinafter Seminar]; Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case
Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 301 (1992); Leon R. Yankwich, "Short
Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41 (1952).
15. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending theJudiciary or
Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986); Sherrill P. Hondorf, A Mandatefor
the Procedural Management of Mass Exposure Litigation, 16 N. KY. L. REV. 541 (1989); Janof-
sky, supra note 14; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986); Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional
Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986); Robert F.
Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery
Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253 (1985); Sam C.
Pointer, Jr., Complex Litigation: Demonstration of Pretrial Conference, 6 REV. LrrIG. 285
(1987).
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constitutional, jurisdictional, and procedural doctrines,' 6 to replac-
ing "big" case litigation with alternate methods of resolution. 17 Re-
cently, Congress has added its voice. Without mandating any
specific procedural changes, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
requires courts to consider the development of special procedures
to handle complex cases.' 8
The failure of prior efforts to differentiate procedural rules on the
basis of remedy and doctrinal theory raises the question of whether
procedural differentiation on the basis of "bigness" will be viewed
through the lens of history as another quaint, formalistic, and
wrong-headed distinction. In this Article, I begin to answer the
question by examining whether it is possible to define complex liti-
gation in a way that meaningfully distinguishes "big" cases from
"routine" ones.
The development of this definition is crucial for several reasons.
16. Because there has been no significant sentiment to amend Article III, section 2
of the United States Constitution to permit federal jurisdiction in complex cases, the
primary constitutional issue under discussion has been the ability and need to circum-
vent the Seventh Amendment's guarantee ofjury trial in complex federal cases. See, e.g.,
Patrick Devlin,Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980); Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:
Let's Not Rush toJudgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68 (1981); infra notes 84-94 and accompany-
ing text. Proposals to reform diversity jurisdiction, removal and multidistrict provisions,
partyjoinder rules, and resjudicata principles recently have proliferated. See, e.g., AMER-
ICAN LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT (Tent. Draft No. 2) §§ 5.01-.05 (1990)
[hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 2] (advocating changes in removal
and claim preclusion rules); COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, supra note 14, at 4-9, 80-87;
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1, supra note 14, §§ 3.02-.09 (advocating
greater powers to consolidate cases within the federal system); REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 44-48, 93-95, 97, 99-100 (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITEE]; Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking
Plaintiff Autonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 809
(1989); Michael D. Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its Promise: An
Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70 IOWA L. REV. 141 (1984); Linda S. Mul-
lenix, Class Resolution of the Mass-Tort Case: A Proposed Federal Procedure Act, 64 TEX. L. REV.
1039 (1986); David Rosenberg, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons From
a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV. 695 (1989); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley,
Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, MultiforumJurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7 (1986). For
an overview and critique of legislative proposals to amend jurisdictional provisions, see
Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article IIIJurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM L. REV.
169 (1990) [hereinafter Mullenix, Complex Litigation]. Although it does not specifically
address the problem of complex litigation, Congress' recent enactment of supplemental
jurisdiction often will make the consolidation of a large case in a federal forum an easier
matter. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991).
17. See REPORT ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 27-35; Eugene R. Ander-
son et al., The Asbestos Health Hazards Compensation Act: A Legislative Solution to a Litigation
Crisis, 10J. LEGIS. 25, 27 (1983); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Do Mass Torts Belong in the Court-
room?, 74 JUDICATURE 237, 237 (1991); Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the
Law's Reaction to Disasters, 11 COLUM.J. ENvTL. L. 1, 32-36 (1986); cf. Stephen C. Yeazell,
The Salience of Salience: A Comment on Professor Hazard's Authority in the Dock, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 481,485 (1989) (noting that in other countries, many types of nonroutine litigation
are handled through the legislative or executive process rather than the judicial
process).
18. 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(1), (a)(3) (West Supp. 1991).
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Should it turn out that a definition of complex litigation cannot be
developed, the invitation of the Civil Justice Reform Act and the re-
formers to separate complex cases from routine ones must be re-
jected. On the other hand, should it turn out that a definition does
exist, a correct understanding of complex litigation might prevent
well-intentioned reform from paving the path to a procedural hell.
Without a proper definition, it is impossible to decide whether sepa-
rate procedural rules are necessary to cope with the reality, rather
than the myth, of complex litigation; to determine the content of
those rules; or accurately to assign the right set of rules to the right
set of cases. 19 Indeed, even a cursory reading of the literature on
complex litigation demonstrates that different commentators appear
to have very different conceptions of, and consequently very differ-
ent solutions for, the disease that everyone calls "complex litiga-
tion." A definition can provide clues about the nature of the
"disease," and thus assist in deducing appropriate treatments.20
A proper definition also can help to avoid placebos and poisons.
Without some understanding of what complex litigation is, it is im-
possible to evaluate whether a proposed "cure" will have side ef-
fects that far outweigh its benefits. A formal definition of "complex
litigation" might well suggest fundamental limitations on the range
of proper solutions.
This formal analysis, which seeks both solutions and their limita-
tions in an examination of complex litigation's essential attributes,
can be both criticized and defended.2 1 Thus far, however, such a
19. See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1127 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that no one has "yet spelled out definitive, reliable criteria on which to deter-
mine clear boundaries for 'simple,' 'complex but not too complex,' and 'too complex' ");
Burbank, supra note 12, at 717 (calling for the development of a system to identify com-
plex litigation).
20. I derive the analogy to a cure from Francis McGovern, who has advocated a
"Problem-Diagnosis-Prescription-Evaluation" methodology for resolving complex liti-
gation. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV.
659, 660 (1989); McGovern, supra note 15, at 449-56.
21. Not everyone believes that the game of finding a definition is worth the candle.
See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929
(1980) ("In answering the Seventh Amendment question, we believe that any test which
is dependent upon the complexity characterization of a case would be too speculative to
be susceptible of any type of jkractical application."); MARK A. PETERSON & MOLLY SEL-
VIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS at vi (1988) ("We do not attempt a precise definition of
mass litigation .... Rather than attempt to set out and defend the importance of various
issues as being necessary to define litigation as mass, the research explores the signifi-
cance of those issues for litigation involving multiple claims."); STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION RECOMMENDED BY THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL § 19(c) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION STANDARDS] ("Complex litigation is not capable of precise definition
.... ), reprinted in CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT 872 (West 1992) [hereinafter CALIFORNIA
RULES]; Peter W. Sperlich, The Case for Preserving Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 65
JUDICATURE 394, 397, 408 (1982) (contending that complexity "is largely in the eye of
the beholder" and that "there is no agreed upon definition of complexity"). On the
other hand, other commentators have recognized that, if special rules are to be created
for complex litigation, the problem of formal definition cannot be avoided. See Stephen
B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (1987) ("Not even those
charged with responsibility to devise procedures for complex cases in the federal courts
have essayed a definition worthy of the name .... [P]roviding definition to an area of
law represents perhaps the highest form of that enterprise as scholarship." (footnote
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formal analysis has never been attempted. The burden of this Arti-
cle, therefore, is to demonstrate that an inquiry into the form of
complex litigation provides a useful perspective on the hydra-
headed problem of complex litigation.
Part I begins the inquiry by describing the practical and theoreti-
cal factors that have led various courts and commentators to label
particular types of litigation "complex." Although all the defini-
tions provide important data about the nature of complex litigation,
none capture its full breadth. Thus, the task of the Article's next
two Parts is to develop a formal and inclusive definition. Part II
builds the theoretical framework for the definition by describing the
form of adjudication and the positive assumptions of modern civil
litigation.
Next, Part III demonstrates that complex litigation arises from the
friction between the real-world problems outlined in Part I and the
theoretical framework developed in Part II. Part III argues that all
complex cases initially involve at least one of four different modes of
complexity: the attorneys have difficulty in amassing, formulating,
or presenting relevant information to the decisionmaker; the
factfinder has difficulty in arriving at an acceptably rational decision;
the remedy is difficult to implement; or there exist procedural and
ethical impediments tojoinder. The unifying attribute of these four
modes is that the dispute can be resolved rationally only through
the accretion to the federal judiciary of powers traditionally as-
sumed by the other "actors" (parties, lawyers, jurors, and state
courts) in the litigation enterprise. This attribute alone, however,
omitted)); Subrin, supra note 2, at 985 (noting that the development of "different proce-
dural rules for different types of cases" requires us to "confront[] the demons of techni-
cality, line-drawing, and definition"); cf Robert A. Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and
the Goals of CivilJustice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893, 905
("What are the goals of the civil justice system?... Without some agreement about the
answers to such first order questions it is difficult to formulate policy for or evaluate civil
justice reform, because it is not even clear whether any need for reform exists.").
The debate over the legitimacy and utility of a definition of complex litigation is sim-
ply a specific manifestation of the much larger debate, begun by the legal realists, over
the validity of formal legal analysis. For the modern terms of that debate, see Symposium
on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990);
Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991); Roberto M. Unger,
The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 570-71 (1983); Ernest J.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). I
do not intend to enter that broader debate here; my limited goal in this Article is to
determine whether formal analysis, whatever its merits, can provide a useful perspective
on the issues of whether particular procedural rules are necessary for complex cases,
and if so, what are the boundaries of those rules. My goal also is minimal in another
respect. I do not purport to create a definition of complex litigation that can be useful
for all contexts in which the term might be used. See Walter W. Cook, "Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE LJ. 333, 340-41 (1933) (arguing that no term
has an immutable meaning). Rather, my search for a definition of "complex litigation"
is limited to the context of procedural reform: What meaning should we give to "com-
plex litigation" if we are going to create special rules to handle it?
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constitutes an overbroad definition of complex litigation; such
cases, although "complicated," are not truly complex. Complex liti-
gation also contains a second fundamental attribute: The increase
in judicial power needed to deal with these complications threatens
to overrun the deep-seated assumption of modem civil litigation
that similarly situated claims, parties, and legal theories should be
treated in procedurally similar ways.
Thus understood, the form of complex litigation adumbrates
some valid judicial solutions for the "big" case, and also suggests
certain limitations on the scope ofjudicial power. At one level, this
definition identifies certain "polycentric" cases that lie beyond the
scope of legitimate adjudication. At a different level, this form iso-
lates the key factors that must be considered in developing proce-
dures for resolving complex cases. At still another level, the
analysis suggests that the violence done to the egalitarian aspiration
of modem procedure constitutes a powerful, and generally ignored,
factor in the exercise of judicial power in the "big" case.
Part IV applies the insights gained from Part III to the future of
civil procedure. Complex litigation stands in the crossroads of the
thorniest issues in modern civil procedure: case management;
trans-substantivism; adversarialism; the wisdom of equitably based
procedural codes; the relationship between procedure and the law
and economics movement; and the involvement of courts in politi-
cally charged controversies. Part IV demonstrates that these issues,
and consequently the direction of procedural reform, can be under-
stood only against the backdrop of the four categories of cases (rou-
tine, complicated, complex, and polycentric) developed from the
definition of complex litigation.
L A Cacophony of Definitions
Other than the rich diversity of the proposals, the most striking
feature of the commentary on complex litigation is the lack of agree-
ment about a definition for the subject. Cases have been described
as "complex" when they are costly to litigate,2 2 when they involve
many issues,2 3 when they involve many parties,24 when they involve
22. See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 15, at 398 (describing "complex, resource-threatening
cases"); Irving R. Kaufman, Report on the Study of the Protracted Case, 21 F.R.D. 55, 63
(1957) (stating that the discovery phase in a complex case is "so costly, so time-consum-
ing, and so exasperating"); Peter H. Schuck, The Role ofJudges in Settling Complex Cases:
The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 338 n.7 (1986) (noting that complex
cases can be "very costly and time-consuming").
23. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CH. L.
REV. 823, 858 (1985); Schuck, supra note 22, at 338 n.7.
24. See, e.g., RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION at I
(2d ed. 1992); Dennis A. Kendig, Procedures for Management of Non-Routine Cases, 3 HoF-
sTRA L. REV. 701, 705-06 (1975); Resnik, supra note 12, at 511 (discussing "complex,
multi-party action (the 'Big Case')"); Rowe & Sibley, supra note 16, at 23 (regarding a
"number of parties" as a characteristic of complex litigation); Schuck, supra note 22, at
338 n.7.
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parties located in many forums, 25 when they involve legally thorny
issues, 26 when they are protracted, 27 when they develop voluminous
evidence,28 or when the outcome of the case might have nationwide
consequences. 29 To a person worried about the Seventh Amend-
ment implications of complex litigation, the nub of complexity is the
extreme difficulty a jury faces in resolving a dispute rationally.3°
When a case generates a large fund with many claimants, complexity
means the establishment of administrative structures to speed re-
covery to the recipients. 3 1 It seems that there is no such thing as
"complex litigation," only "complex litigations."
In order to discover whether a common theme unites the various
claims of complexity, the first step is simply to articulate the ways,
both practical and theoretical, in which courts and commentators
have defined "complex litigation." In general terms, those courts
25. See, e.g., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1, supra note 14, at 11 ("mul-
tiparty, multiforum litigation"); Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters and the Conflict of
Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 105, 108-09; Rowe & Sibley, supra note 16, at 15, 30.
26. See, e.g., Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, supra note 14, at 498 (includ-
ing cases with "specially complicated legal and factual issues" as complex cases);
Lempert, supra note 16, at 84 (noting with trepidation that either "voluminous evidence
or esoteric [legal] issues might be enough" to designate a case as complex); John K.
Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discov-
ery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569, 623 n.99 (1989) (stating that "[a] case might be legally
complex but factually simple").
27. See, e.g., Handbook, supra note 14; Peckham, supra note 15, at 257 ("complex and
protracted cases").
28. See, e.g., Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, supra note 14, at 498.
29. See, e.g., REPORT ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURE, supra note 14, at 522 (dis-
cussing the "sweeping nature of potential relief" as a component of complex antitrust
cases); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Paul R. Rice,Judicial Management of the Pretrial Process in
Massive Litigation: Special Masters as Case Managers, (describing the stakes involved in the
AT&T antitrust litigation) in BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 14, at 80, 86; Kendig, supra note
24, at 706 (stating that the "presence of large stakes" is one possible factor in complex
litigation); Rowe & Sibley, supra note 16, at 23 (identifying the "amounts at stake" as one
characteristic of complex litigation); Alvin B. Rubin, Complex Limitation: The Courts' View,
53 TUL. L. REv. 1395, 1396-97 (1979) [hereinafter, Rubin, Complex Limitation] (noting
that cases that "involve[] large amounts of money" can be complex); Alvin B. Rubin,
Mass Torts and Litigation Disasters, 20 GA. L. REV. 429, 429 (1986) (finding a similarity
among mass tort cases to be that "their total human and economic costs affect all of
society"); cf. Jack B. Weinstein, What Discovery Abuse? A Comment on John Setear's The Bar-
rister and the Bomb, 69 B.U. L. REv. 649, 653 (1989) (discussing the recent rise of
"high-value litigation, often national in scope").
30. See, e.g., Devlin, supra note 16; Lempert, supra note 16; Note, The Right to a Jury
Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898 (1979); infra note 85 and accompa-
nying text.
31. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1016-18 (2d Cir. 1973)
(rejecting fluid recovery concept in a class action), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156
(1974); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), subse-
quent proceedings, 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 818
F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, modified, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8697 (E.D. Va. July 29, 1988), aft'd, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
959 (1989); Schuck, supra note 22, at 338 n.7 (stating that "[i]n a complex case, any
judgment or settlement reached, even one for money damages, is likely to be difficult to
implement").
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and commentators that have defined complexity have done so by
claiming either that complex litigation is a function of a certain sub-
stantive theory; that complex litigation is a function of certain pre-
trial, trial, or post-trial procedural features; that complex litigation
possesses a certain conglomerate of attributes that must all be satis-
fied; or that complex litigation violates some fundamental norm of
traditional adjudication. Before turning to these four ways of articu-
lating the definition of complex litigation, however, another phe-
nomenon of complex litigation should be noted: the refusal of
many of the important sources to define the subject at all.
A. The "Non-Definers" Definition by Default
There are two fundamental methods to finding a solution to a
problem that presently has no answer. The first is to seek a defini-
tion of the problem and its causes, and then deduce solutions that,
in theory, should solve the problem. The second is to experiment
with various alternatives and then develop a solution from the ob-
served data. 32 Most of the methods proffered by present literature
on complex litigation fall into the latter, inductive camp.33 Rather
than seeking a definition of complex litigation and then reasoning
from first principles, the literature forgoes the attempt at definition
and proceeds to advocate experimental solutions to cure the ills of
some disease vaguely understood to be "complex litigation."
This failure to reason to a solution from the definition of complex
litigation infects even the most significant sources. For instance, the
Manual for Complex Litigation (Second) (hereinafter Manual) 34 -the
leading reference work on the subject-does not attempt a definition, but does
spend more than 450 pages detailing potential remedies for its symptoms. The
Manual's failure to define could hardly be an oversight; its immedi-
ate predecessor, the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, in-
cluded a definition within its first few pages.35 The techniques
suggested by the Manual to remedy complexity nonetheless hint at a
definition. Among the Manual's recommendations for complex
cases are frequent pretrial conferences; 36 appointment of lead or li-
aison counsel;3 7 judicial involvement in the early formulation of is-
sues38 and development of discovery plans;39 referrals to masters
and magistrates; 40 bifurcation of pretrial and trial proceedings;41 the
32. For a more thorough description of these methods, see JAMES D. CARNEY &
RICHARD K. SCHEER, FUNDAMENTALS OF LOGIC 157-58, 317-66 (2d ed. 1974); cf Bur-
bank, supra note 21, at 1463 (suggesting that it may still be premature to impose any
deductive intellectual framework on complex litigation).
33. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
34. MANUAL, supra note 13.
35. See MCML, supra note 14, §§ 0.1, 0.22. For a more detailed discussion of the
MCML's definition, see infra notes 137-42 and accompanying text.
36. MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 20.13, 21.2.
37. Id. § 20.22.
38. Id. § 21.3.
39. Id. § 21.4.
40. Id. §§ 20.14, 21.5.
41. Id. §§ 21.33, 21.632.
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use of settlement techniques such as mediation, arbitration, sum-
mary jury trial, and mini-trial;42 the adoption of narratives, docu-
ment summaries, and interim arguments and instructions during
trial;43 and the joinder of related cases through devices such as
class-action and multidistrict litigation.44 The second half of the
Manual then applies these principles to six areas of substantive liti-
gation: antitrust cases, "mass and other complex torts," securities
litigation, takeover litigation, employment discrimination litigation,
and patent cases. 45 In short, although it does not define complex
litigation, the Manual seems to imply that "complex" cases are those
that can benefit from certain case management principles or those
that involve certain substantive theories.
The same unwillingness to define also infected the original edi-
tion of the subject's leading casebook, Complex Litigation.46 The book
opened by observing that "the precise characteristics of complex
cases are uncertain" and that "nobody has devised a litmus test by
which one may decide whether a given case properly is labelled
complex." 47 It noted that "[a]rguably [complex litigation] is not
significantly different from other litigation, only larger," and that
"many of the problems of complex cases are symptomatic of all liti-
gation. ' 48 Nonetheless, the authors believed that complex litigation
was somehow distinct from its routine brethren, apparently because
the procedural problems of complex litigation "take on new dimen-
sions that change the complexion of litigation and, to a significant
extent, the role of the courts and lawyers in society." 49
42. Id. § 23.12.
43. Id. §§ 22.32 to .34, 22.43.
44. Id §§ 30.1 to .4, 31.12.
45. See id. §§ 33.1 to .6.
46. RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION (1985). Other
textbooks with limited treatments of complex litigation also attempt no definition. See
RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1331-48
(6th ed. 1990); MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 779 (5th ed.
1990).
Curiously, another textbook authored by Professors Marcus and Sherman briefly de-
fines complex litigation. See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 401 (1989).
For a discussion of that definition, see infra notes 73, 135 and accompanying text. An-
other textbook that defines complex litigation hastily is DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 1223 (6th ed. 1989). For further discus-
sion of that definition, see infra notes 70, 100, 116, 162 and accompanying text.
In the new edition of COMPLEX LITIGATION, the authors attempt briefly to define com-
plex litigation as possessing one of three or more characteristics: "difficult legal or fac-
tual issues," "the sheer number of parties," and "the amount of money involved."
MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 24, at 1-2. Those characteristics are considered infra
notes 73, 95, 114 and accompanying text. Although their definition ultimately proves to
be inadequate, it is interesting to note the second edition's change of heart, and its
recognition that a definition of the subject has some utility.
47. MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 46, at 2.
48. Id.
49. Id. According to the authors, the root causes of complexity were the injection of
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In their decisions not to attempt a definition of complex civil liti-
gation, these two sources are hardly alone. A preponderance of the
cases and literature discussing complex litigation never pauses to
consider what complex litigation is.50 Unlike the Manual and the
original edition of Complex Litigation, however, these proposals focus
courts into "inherently difficult and socially important" issues, "the amount of money
involved in litigation," and "the sheer number of parties involved." Id. at 5-7.
50. See N.D. ILL. R. 2.30(g); Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2635 (1991)(describing tax litigation as "complex"); Kansas v. Utilicorp United, 110 S. Ct. 2807,
2815 (1990) (denying standing to indirect purchasers in antitrust action, in part because
the "case was already quite complicated" and the "expansion of the case would risk the
confusion, costs, and possibility of error inherent in complex litigation"); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 633, 640 (1985) (rejecting "po-
tential complexity" as a reason to deny enforcement of an arbitration clause); Marrese v.
American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1162 (7th Cir.) (en banc)
(noting "the evolving concept of the district judge's managerial responsibility in com-
plex litigation"), rev'd on other grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); BROOKINGS INST.,JUSTICE FOR
ALL (1989) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL]; FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra
note 16; REPORT ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 14; Morris S. Arnold, A Historical
Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829(1980); Maxwell M. Blecher & Howard F. Daniels, In Defense ofJuries in Complex Antitrust
Litigation, 1 REV. LIrrG. 47 (1980); Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in the Pretrial Develop-
ment of Big Cases: Potential and Problems, in BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 14; Burbank, supra
note 21, at 1463 (acknowledging that "'[c]omplex litigation' means different things to
different people; the term captures a multitude of sins");James M. Carter,Judicial Control
of the Case and Limitation of Discovery, 23 F.R.D. 406, 406-07 (1959); Charles E. Clark,
Special Pleading in the "Big Case, " 21 F.R.D. 45 (1958); Hazard & Rice, supra note 29; The
Honorable Mr. Justice Kerr, International Arbitration v. Litigation, 10 J. Bus. L. 164, 180(1980); Lempert, supra note 16; William V. Luneburg & Mark A. Nordenberg, Specially
Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of
Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. REV. 887 (1981); Roy W. McDonald, Identification of "Big
Case" and Assignment to a Single Judge, 23 F.R.D. 587 (1959); McGovern, supra note 20;
McGovern, supra note 15; Pointer, supra note 15; Sperlich, supra note 21;Joan Steinman,
Law of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Liti-
gation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1987); Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural and Substantive
Problems Arising from Disasters, 5 ToURo L. REV. 1 (1988); James R. Withrow & Richard P.
Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean Labor, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1976)(noting that "[t]he definition of complexity has itself become more complex," but at-
tempting no definition); Douglas King, Note, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (1984); Timothy G. Little, Note,
Court-Appointed Special Masters in Complex Environmental Litigation: City of Quincy v. Metro-
politan District Commission, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 435 (1984). Similarly, the Civil
Justice Reform Act requires district courts to consider the creation of special rules for
complex cases, but fails to define complexity. 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(1), (a)(3) (West
Supp. 1991); cf CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 68607(c) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring establish-
ment of procedures for early identification of cases that might be "protracted," but giv-
ing no definition of the term).
Among writers who "define" complexity, extracting a definition is often a task akin to
pulling teeth. Many of these writers use one-phrase "throw-away" descriptions that are
so vacuous or circuitous as to amount to a virtual nondefinition. See, e.g., Kirkham, Good
Intentions, supra note 14, at 208 ("protracted and complicated suit"); Peckham, supra note
15, at 257, 271 ("complex and protracted cases" and "large-scale cases"); Resnik, supra
note 12, at 511, 521 ("complex, multi-party action" and "multi-party, multi-issue dis-
putes"); Constance S. Huttner, Note, Unfit for Jury Determination: Complex Civil Litigation
and the Seventh Amendment Right of Trial by Jury, 20 B.C. L. REV. 511, 511, 530 (1979)
("massiveness of the cases" and "factual complexity"). Other writers have sought to
define only one particular type of complex litigation, eschewing a more encompassing
description. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON MAss TORTS, supra note 14, at 5-11; PETERSON &
SELVIN, supra note 21, at vi-vii; David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 853 (1984); Ge-
orgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role for
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myopically on only one manifestation of complexity. No "big pic-
ture" solutions are attempted; in fact, there is no sense of any "big
picture" at all. Nor is there a sense of a dividing line between "com-
plex" cases and "routine" cases, as many of the proposed solutions
are equally valid in cases of all sizes. Although the breadth of the
problems posed by complex litigation emerges from the array of ar-
ticles, the combined message of these inductive "nondefiners" ap-
pears to be that the difference between complex and noncomplex
cases is only one of degree: In complex cases, the advocated tech-
nique is crucial especially to the resolution of the case; whereas in
routine cases, the technique is more of a luxury item.51
This failure to define is at the same time understandable and per-
plexing. It is understandable because the number of potential is-
sues that arise in complex cases would seem to require a definition
so amorphous as to render the exercise of definition meaningless.
At a deeper level, however, the lack of definition is profoundly per-
plexing. If complex litigation is so nebulous that no definition is
possible, then we should stop deceiving ourselves that there is such
a thing as "complex litigation." Rather, the various manifestations
of complexity identified by the commentators should be viewed as
independent conditions. The choice of appropriate procedural
tools in a "complex" case should be guided by the same principles
of justice, speed, and efficiency that guide all litigation.5 2
This conclusion conflicts with the deep-rooted belief, even among
the nondefiners, in a phenomenon called "complex litigation." 53
The issue remains, however, whether that belief is correct. The in-
ductive approach of the "nondefiners" has provided considerable
useful data with which to begin the process of inquiry. Procedural
features such as class actions, multidistrict litigation, and difficulty
of party joinder seem to be associated with complexity, as do
Federal Common Law, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 167, 167-71 (1985). If these brief descrip-
tions are added to the list of the nondefinitions, only a handful of truly descriptive ef-
forts survive for deeper consideration.
51. See MANUAL, supra note 13, § 10 ("The Manual is intended primarily for use in
complex civil litigation in federal courts. However, the principles of management and
many of the techniques it describes may be useful in criminal cases, in state courts, and
in routine federal civil litigation."); James A. Fee, Similarity of Techniques in Ordinary Civil
Cases and in Protracted Cases, 23 F.R.D. 380 (1959); Rubin, Complex Limitation, supra note
29, at 1409; Seminar, supra note 14, at 615 ("Pretrial, useful in every case, is indispensa-
ble in protracted cases."); supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52. Compare MANUAL, supra note 13, § 10 (setting forth "the basic principles that
characterize the fair and efficient resolution of complex litigation") with FED. R. Civ. P. 1
(stating that the rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action").
53. For instance, Professors Marcus and Sherman, who are unable to define pre-
cisely complex litigation, nonetheless believe that it exists. MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra
note 46, at 2; MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 24, at 1-2.
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problems of voluminous discovery and jury comprehension. Cer-
tain substantive theories are associated frequently with complex liti-
gation, as are certain case-management techniques. The nature of
the Federal Rules, the recent surge in the exercise ofjudicial power,
and the failings of the adversarial system also might have a role in a
proper definition.
The difficulty lies in finding a common theme that, on the one
hand, unites these disparate concepts, and, on the other hand, di-
vides "complex" cases from "routine" ones. Unless that theme ex-
ists, the energy devoted to the study of the subject called complex
litigation has been misspent.
B. Definition by Substantive Theory
Not all writers have despaired of a definition for complex litiga-
tion. The earliest attempts described complexity in terms of those
causes of action that generated peculiar management problems. Be-
cause the problem of complexity first was noted in antitrust cases,
antitrust cases and complex litigation quickly became synony-
mous.5 4 Subsequent writers expanded the list to include other legal
theories that, even today, are the grist of complexity's mill: securi-
ties and takeover litigation,55 commercial disputes, - 6 institutional
reform suits, 57 claims of mass employment discrimination, 58 prod-
ucts liability and mass torts, 59 and patent litigation. 60
Designation by substantive theory has two distinct advantages.
54. See AMERICAN BAR ASs'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH No. 3, EXPE-
DITING PRETRIALS AND TRIALS OF ANTITRUST CASES (1979) [hereinafter EXPEDITING ANTI-
TRUST CASES]; BRAZIL ET AL., supra note 14; MCML, supra note 14, § 0.22;
RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 211; PRETTYMAN REPORT,
supra note 14, at 65 (noting that antitrust cases fit the mold of protracted litigation);
REPORT ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 14; WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER,
MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION (1982); Handbook, supra note 14,
at 375, 434; McAllister, supra note 14; Seminar, supra note 14, at 584-613; William E.
Steckler, Preliminary Draft of Check List of Procedural Devices for Handling the Big Case (Civil),
21 F.R.D. 523, 524 (1957) (identifying "[a]ll antitrust cases" as worthy of big case proce-
dures); Leon R. Yankwich, Observations on Anti-Trust Procedures, 10 F.R.D. 165 (1950);
Yankwich, supra note 14, at 42. The local rules of at least two courts also have identified
antitrust cases as meriting the special treatment given in those districts to complex litiga-
tion. See W.D. Ky. R. 19(a)(1) (superseded July 1, 1987) (copy on file with author); N.D.
OHIO RULE FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2.01(f).
55. See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 33.3-.4; RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLEX LIT-
IGATION, supra note 14, at 211; Charles B. Arendall, Jr., Securities Cases Complex Litigation,
in PRACTICING LAw INST., NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGA-
TION (1973) [hereinafter NEw DEVELOPMENTS].
56. See, e.g., W.D. Ky. R. 19(a)(3) (superseded July 1, 1987) ("derivative suits")
(copy on file with author); MCML, supra note 14, § 0.22 ("individual stockholders',
stockholders' derivative, and stockholders' representative actions"); Brazil, supra note
15, at 398 ("massive commercial litigation"); Milton Kunen, Other Protracted Cases, 21
F.R.D. 483, 483 (1957) (noting "long and complicated cases in derivative stockholders'
actions, [and] ... in a substantial number of commercial cases").
57. See, e.g., MCML, supra note 14, § 0.22 (defining "cases involving requests for
injunctive relief affecting the operations of a large business entity" as complex); see also
infra notes 100-01.
58. See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 13, § 33.5.
59. See, e.g., OHIO C.P. SuPP. R. 8.01(B)(3) (designating product liability cases as
potentially complex); COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, supra note 14, at vii; MCML, supra
note 14, § 0.22; MANUAL, supra note 13, § 33.2; William F. Georghan, Jr., Multistate Torts,
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To the extent that different litigation tracks or different procedural
rules apply to complex cases, a substance-based definition greatly
simplifies the taxonomic task that clerks, judges, and lawyers must
perform.6 1 A substantive definition also allows the techniques nec-
essary to resolve a complex case to be applied with a sensitivity to
the substantive aims of the relevant body of law.
In spite of these advantages, a substance-based definition en-
counters three fatal criticisms. The first is the problem of underin-
clusion. Breach of contract claims, bankruptcy, and a host of other
substantive theories usually left off the list of complex theories can
generate cases as complicated as any case involving a "complex the-
ory." 62 The converse problem is overinclusiveness. Not all cases
asserting a particular theory are complex. The obvious example is
tort law, where only a fraction of tort cases generally are viewed as
"complex." The same is true of other theories more closely aligned
with complex litigation.63 The dual problems of underinclusion and
overinclusion mean that designation by substantive theory runs a
in NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 55; James A. Henderson, Jr.,Judicial Review of Manu-
facturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1534-
42 (1973); Juenger, supra note 25, at 108-09; Weinstein, supra note 17, at 3.
60. See, e.g., MCML, supra note 14, § 0.22 ("patent, copyright, and trademark
cases"); MANUAL, supra note 13, § 33.6 ("Patent Litigation"); PRETrYMAN REPORT, supra
note 14, at 62 ("patent cases"); Handbook, supra note 14, at 375, 434 (identifying as com-
plex a "patent case involving an unusual multiplicity or complexity of issues"); Frank A.
Picard, Special Problems in Criminal Cases and Patent Suits, 21 F.R.D. 462 (1957); Seminar,
supra note 14, at 519-51.
61. If no consequences flow from the designation of a case as complex, there is little
reason to worry about the definition of complex litigation. Judges and commentators
who write about complex litigation, however, invariably are faced with or advocate sub-
stantive or procedural proposals differentiating complex from routine cases. Because
substantive or procedural consequences might depend on the designation, there has
long been a concern with assuring that the classification can be performed both speedily
and accurately. See MCML, supra note 14, §§ 0.2-.23 (stating that prompt identification
of a complex case is the first problem); Handbook, supra note 14, at 375-77 (advocating
the use of an initial checklist by the clerk and an immediate pretrial conference to deter-
mine if the case actually is complex); Kendig, supra note 24, at 708-12 (promoting early
identification of complex cases); Steckler, supra note 54, at 523-24.
62. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 12, at 521 (suggesting that Chapter I1 bankruptcies
are complex); Rubin, Complex Limitation, supra note 29, at 1395-97 (designating admi-
ralty-limitations actions as complex); Setear, supra note 26, at 632 (opining that Chapter
11 bankruptcies are complex); cf Lon L. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator,
1963 Wis. L. REv. 3, 12 (contending that "complicated labor cases" should be consid-
ered "protracted cases" within the meaning of the Handbook, supra note 14). Obviously,
if the list is expanded to encompass all theories that might in some cases result in com-
plex litigation, the list of complex theories probably would be far larger than the list of
routine theories, and therefore would lose its utility as a predictor of complexity.
63. One example of overinclusion is a securities claim asserted on behalf of several
million persons who failed to buy a stock after the publication of a materially misleading
prospectus. As the complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss, see Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), this securities class action actually
would be less difficult to litigate than a car accident with a two-day trial. Cf Holmes v.
Securities Investor Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992) (finding no proximate cause
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tremendous risk of causing inappropriate consequences in signifi-
cant numbers of cases.
Third, a substance-based definition cannot be justified simply be-
cause it is more sensitive to substantive theory. Although some
awareness of, and sensitivity to, the goals of the relevant substantive
law arguably might be desirable in the application of procedural
rules,64 the formal development of separate procedural rules in cer-
tain classes of cases risks the reintroduction of the repudiated writ
system. 6-5 That possibility does not necessarily require rejection of a
substance-based definition of complexity, but the reestablishment of
procedural divisions based upon substantive theory a mere fifty
years after their abolition should give us reason to pause.66 Funda-
mentally, a definition by substantive theory smacks of arbitrariness.
Without some external criteria for judging complexity, any argu-
ment that securities cases are complex and car accidents at the cor-
ner are not is ipse dixit.
In fact, the "complex" substantive theories appear to share two
common characteristics. The first is malleability of doctrine. Con-
cepts such as "fraud" in a securities case, "discrimination" in a de-
segregation case, "negligence" or "defect" in a tort case, and
"market share" and "conspiracy" in an antitrust case frequently are
incapable of "bright-line" definition, and usually require an intricate
examination of the surrounding facts. Because a car accident at the
corner relies on the same concept of "negligence" as an environ-
mental tort, however, malleability of doctrine cannot be the only rel-
evant characteristic. "Complex" cases also demonstrate a second
essential ingredient: The information needed to answer the amor-
phous question of "fraud" or "conspiracy" is massive in quantity or
in RICO case brought by non-purchasers of stock attempting to recover for misrepre-
sentations).
The danger of overinclusion has long been recognized. See McDonald, supra note 50,
at 588 (observing that an American Bar Association report "rejects the theory that every
antitrust case necessarily is protracted or complicated"); Comment, Observations on the
Manualfor Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 68 MICH. L. REv. 303, 306 n.21 (1969) (not-
ing that "both trademark and products liability actions frequently are small and should
be handled under the usual civil procedures"); Letter from Stuart A. White to Walther
E. Wyss (June 11, 1968) ("Automatically to invoke the cumbersome procedure set forth
in the [MCML] in relatively simple patent cases would be like using a sledge hammer to
drive a thumb tack."), quoted in Comment, supra at 306 n.22. The typical remedy sug-
gested for the problem has been an early pretrial conference and decision by the court
about whether a prima facie complex case is actually complex. See Handbook, supra note
14, at 376-77; McDonald, supra note 50, at 588. Under this arrangement, however, the
initial substantive definition begs the question; "the judge must develop criteria for de-
ciding which of the many cases in these categories are complex." Comment, supra, at
307.
64. See Cover, supra note 12, at 732-40.
65. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 985. See generally supra notes 2-10 and accompanying
text (discussing the writ system).
66. For instance, designation by substantive theory may lead to pleading artifices
designed to manipulate the rules for complex cases. Plaintiffs who wish to take advan-
tage of the rules for complex cases will find a way to plead "complex" substantive theo-
ries, while parties who want to avoid the rules will shun a valid "complex" allegation.
The intricate dance of pleading and pretrial dismissal that our jurisdictional statutes
already impose will be replicated, with equally time-consuming and merit-frustrating
results.
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highly technical in nature.6 7
Taken together, these two characteristics locate the definition for
complex litigation in process, not substance. Substance remains rel-
evant, but only because amorphous doctrine makes it difficult to di-
gest information before trial or comprehend it during trial. Thus,
definition by substantive theory acts only as a crude surrogate for a
definition that-if it exists at all-appears to be procedural in
nature.
C. Definition by Procedural Feature
Courts and commentators who define complexity in nonsubstan-
tive terms isolate one of four procedural features as the benchmark
of complexity: intractable pretrial proceedings; difficulties of proof
and comprehension at trial; complications in the implementation or
administration of a remedy; or the number of parties. Frequently,
writers list two or more of these features and claim that complexity
exists whenever any of the listed features are found. They do not,
however, look beneath the surface to see if a single theme unites all
of these procedural manifestations of complexity.
1. Complexity in Pretrial Proceedings
The most popular procedural description of complex litigation
concerns the difficulty of defining issues and discovering facts in the
pretrial process. The precise formulation of this description varies.
Most writers find the key to "pretrial complexity" lies in the type of
discovery that complex cases engender-discovery that has been de-
scribed alternately as "voluminous," 68 "massive [and] compli-
cated," 69 "broad-ranging," 70 "extensive," 71 or requiring "[the]
production of voluminous documents[,] . .. more than five (5) pre-
trial depositions[,] . . .or more than twenty-five (25) interrogato-
ries. ' ' 72 A different description focuses on the underlying reason for
67. Even complex cases involve a certain amount of routine work. See Bernardi v.
Yeutter, 942 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that, although "civil rights cases
may be characterized as complex," certain motions filed in the case "did not involve
complex work" sufficient to justify higher attorneys' fees award).
68. Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, supra note 14, at 498.
69. Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass
Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 475, 525 (1991) ("Complex civil litigation involv-
ing multiple parties and multiple claims gives rise to massive, complicated discovery.").
70. LouISELL ET AL., supra note 46, at 1223 ("Complex cases can be identified by the
fact that they involve large stakes, broad-ranging discovery, and sometimes multiple
parties.").
71. See Kendig, supra note 24, at 704 ("extensive pretrial preparation by the liti-
gants"); Resnik, supra note 12, at 521 ("extensive and burdensome").
72. Martin I. Kaminsky, Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Litigation, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 907, 916, 997 (1980). A somewhat different quantitative definition of
a complex case, proposed by Judge Rubin, is "one that, in the view of counsel for any
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large-scale discovery: the "unusual multiplicity or complexity of
factual issues."73 Finally, some of the commentary speaks in terms
of the consequences of large scale discovery: the "protraction" of
complex cases in relation to routine ones.74
Obviously, there is a great deal of overlap among these defini-
tions, and some cases will generate pretrial complexity of such pro-
portions that they satisfy each of these descriptions. The lack of
agreement about the precise nature of pretrial complexity, however,
creates significant difficulties. Different perceptions of the problem
suggest different solutions. For instance, protraction suggests that
procedures that accelerate discovery are appropriate, 75 whereas vo-
luminousness points in the direction of bifurcation, a process that
often slows the proceedings. 76
Finally, all of the definitions suffer from either excessive rigor or
undue pliability. Procrustean quantitative requirements, such as
twenty-five interrogatories or 2,000,000 pages of documents, risk
the miscategorization of large numbers of cases. Qualitative defini-
tions such as "voluminousness" or "protraction" lack specificity-
and consequently utility-without some benchmark against which
they can be measured. If the benchmark is determined by the cost
of discovery in proportion to the stakes of the litigation, then even
the massive and lengthy discovery in antitrust cases like the AT&T 77
or IBM 78 litigations was hardly complex. If the benchmark is an
absolute number-such as discovery which will exceed six months-
then the problem of procrustean misclassification surfaces again.
It is important, therefore, to search for a common, unifying
thread among these competing descriptions of pretrial complexity.
Two points stand out. First, cases that are legally complicated are
party, will involve more than two or three days of discovery." Rubin, Complex Limitation,
supra note 29, at 1396.
73. Kirkham, Problems of Complex Litigation, supra note 14, at 498; see MARCUS & SHER-
MAN, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that one characteristic of complex litigation is "difficult
legal and factual issues"); MARCUS ET AL., supra note 46, at 401 (listing various manifesta-
tions of complex cases, including "intricate legal and factual issues").
74. See, e.g., N.D. OHIO RULES FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2.01-.04; Handbook, supra
note 14; Peckham, supra note 15, at 257; Seminar, supra note 14.
75. Compare MANUAL, supra note 13, § 21.422 (identifying informal discovery and au-
tomatic disclosure as ways to save time and expense) and Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137
F.R.D. 53, 87-106 (1991) (proposing early mandatory disclosure of basic documentary
and factual information in all civil cases) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft] and William W.
Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV.
703, 721-23 (1989) (same) with Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Infor-
mal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991) (questioning the
appropriateness of early mandatory disclosure).
76. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 473(a)(3)(B), (a)(3)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1992) (requiring courts
to consider the possibility of bifurcating trial or ordering staged discovery in complex
cases); MANUAL, supra note 13, § 21.632 (noting possible "increased cost and inconven-
ience" with bifurcation); 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2388 (1971) (describing risks and benefits of bifurcation); Preliminary
Draft, supra note 75, at 85, 87 (requiring courts to consider bifurcation and separate trial
at preliminary pretrial conference).
77. See United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978).
78. See United States v. IBM, 76 F.R.D. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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not truly "complex" unless they also involve an intricate factual
fabric. Even the simplest factual situations can generate wonder-
fully difficult legal issues. 79 Although the resolution of these cases is
not an easy matter, the type of rational analysis in which lawyers are
trained ultimately yields an acceptable conclusion. There is no im-
pediment like "voluminous" or "protracted" discovery that pre-
cludes the lawyers from performing their adversarial task-the
crafting of persuasive and comprehensive arguments.80
Second, the existence of a factually intricate dispute does not, on
its own, create problems of pretrial complexity. If broad and judi-
cially unmanaged discovery results in simple, clearly defined issues
for trial, there is little reason to call the case complex; instead, the
discovery system is simply doing the job for which it was designed.
The real problem of pretrial complexity is that messy pretrial pro-
ceedings beget messy trials-at least without significant intervention
by thejudge. Left to their own devices, the parties appear unable to
shape a case for resolution: The issues in the case cannot be defined
until the facts have been discovered, but the discovery will be free-
wheeling and chaotic until the issues have been defined.81 A strong
79. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d
454 (N.Y. 1972).
80. A few commentators have suggested that difficult legal issues are sufficient to
make a case complex. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. Court rules that set up
special procedures for complex cases also occasionally designate legally complex cases
as complex. See NAPA CTY. R. 202 ("stating that [p]rotracted cases" can involve "difficult
legal questions"), reprinted in CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 21, at 901; SAN DIEGO CTY.
COMPLEX LITIGATION RULES (introduction) (same), reprinted in CALIFORNIA RULES, supra
note 21, at 956; SANJOAQUIN Cry. R. 6-107a (same), reprinted in CALIFORNIA RULES, supra
note 21, at 984; OHIO COMMON PLEAS SUPP. R. 8.01(B)(4) (defining "related cases in-
volving unusual multiplicity or complexity of factual or legal issues" as complex); JUDI-
CIAL ADMINISTRATION STANDARDS, supra note 21, § 19(c) (noting that complex litigation
can involve "difficult or novel issues"). At present, it is important to note only that these
commentators and rules seem to have an erroneous impression of the factors that make
a case complex; in subsequent sections of the Article, I demonstrate that complex litiga-
tion does not include cases in which the only type of complexity is legal complexity.
I do not mean to suggest, however, that legally difficult cases can never be complex
litigation. Complex cases frequently involve new and complicated legal issues. See, e.g.,
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding no federal
question jurisdiction), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1982); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1650 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (establishing criteria for claiming against
settlement fund); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (discussing choice-of-law principles to be applied in mass tort); In re "Agent Or-
ange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (developing criteria for
nascent "government contractor" defense). When a voluminous factual record is joined
with uncertainties over the state of the law, the uncertain relevance of the facts can fuel
problems of pretrial complexity by creating an even greater demand for discovery of all
material and an even greater counter-tendency to resist disclosure. See Abraham D.
Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On the Limited
Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680, 722-23 (1983).
81. For discussions of the insoluble "chicken-and-egg" dilemma posed by the simul-
taneous need to define legal issues before discovering the facts and to know all the facts
before defining the legal issues, see Tcherepnin v. Franz, 461 F.2d 544, 548 (7th Cir.)
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dose of "iron-hearted" 8 2 judicial control during pretrial proceed-
ings is necessary to avoid-or at least ameliorate-the paralysis
caused by the unholy matrimony of the adversarial process and our
liberal pleading and discovery rules.
These two common themes suggest a necessary role for case man-
agement in complex litigation. Because nothing in the themes sug-
gests that case management is associated exclusively with complex
cases, however, the existing writing on pretrial complexity fails to
provide a comprehensive yet exclusive definition of complex
litigation.
2. Complexity During Trial
The failure of pretrial complexity to capture the full scope of com-
plex litigation is underscored by those commentators who have
found complexity to inhere in the trial process as well. One aspect
of this "trial complexity" is the management of large amounts of
evidence in a constrained, pressure-filled situation. This problem-
which focuses on the difficulties faced by lawyers in accomplishing
their adversarial task of presenting evidence to the factfinder and by
the judge in maintaining general custody and control over the evi-
dence-is largely a technological one. The typically discussed rem-
edy is the "courtroom of the future," in which the availability of
computers will allow attorneys either to communicate information
such as objections to the judge or to retrieve rapidly trial testimony,
exhibits, and other relevant information.8 3
A distinct description of trial complexity concerns the inability of
lay decisionmakers-usually juries-to comprehend voluminous or
highly technical evidence.8 4 The literature ascribes various causes
to these comprehension problems: the issues might be beyond the
technical comprehension or beyond the life experiences of the jury;
(upholding the resolution of critical legal issues in advance of discovery against a chal-
lenge that the method violated the Due Process Clause), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1038
(1972); EXPEDITING ANTITRUST CASES, supra note 54, at 62 (noting that "legal issues are
[often] so interrelated with the facts relevant on the ultimate issue of liability, that they
cannot be segregated and decided in advance of trial"); MANUAL, supra note 13,
§§ 21.31, 21.41; Withrow & Larm, supra note 50, at 26-36.
82. Withrow & Larm, supra note 50, at 5.
83. See MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 22.12-.14; Jessica Copen, Courts of the Future, 77
A.B.A. J. 74 (June 1991); Diane Knox, Phoenix's Courtroom of the Future, in AM. LAw. at 4
(Technology Supp. 1991).
84. Some commentators have stated that a lengthy trial is, in and of itself, an indicia
of complex litigation. See JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION STANDARDS, supra note 21, § 19(c)(noting that complex litigation may involve "extended trial times"); Resnik, supra note
12, at 511 (stating that the "Big Case" holds "the prospect of a lengthy trial" in addition
to months of discovery); Rubin, Complex Limitation, supra note 29, at 1396 (regarding any
trial exceeding five days as complex). Far more prevalent, however, are commentators
who do not find a long trial to be complex per se, but instead to be a harbinger ofjury
comprehension problems. As trials become extended, jurors' memories can fade, and
well-educated, employed persons are less willing to serve on the jury. See infra note 85
and accompanying text.
It is interesting to note once again how these different perceptions of complexity lead
to different solutions. Extensive use of issue-narrowing and bifurcation techniques ade-
quately addresses the problem of length, whereas interim instructions and argument
often are sufficient to address the problem of fading memory.
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the length of trial might cause highly competent jurors to be unwill-
ing to participate or might dim the memory of early, important testi-
mony; the law (and consequently the instructions) might be
inaccessible to lay people; or the vast array of evidence on the claims
and crossclaims might defy the decisionmaker's ability to organize
and consider issues logically.85 Whatever the precise cause, the def-
inition of trial complexity that emerges is "any set of circumstances
which singly or in combination render [sic] a jury unable to decide
in [a] rational manner."'8 6 Adjudication instead becomes "an arbi-
trary process based on speculation. '8 7 A wide array of proposals
designed to close the gap between the evidence and its rational
comprehension have been advocated, including allowing jurors to
take notes,8 8 permitting interim instructions and argument to the
jury,8 9 limiting trial to discrete issues or parties,90 using court-ap-
pointed experts or masters, 91 trying the case before a blue-ribbon
85. See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1073-75 (3d Cir.
1980); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 198 1-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,114,
at 76,702 (S.D. Tex.), aft'd, 659 F.2d 1337 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976); AuSTIN, supra note 14, at 6-7, 80-104; Warren
Burger, Thinking the Unthinkable, 31 Loy. L. REV. 205, 210-11 (1985); Kirkham, Good In-
tentions, supra note 14, at 208; Luneburg & Nordenburg, supra note 50, at 942-50; Mont-
gomery Kersten, Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 99 (1979); Note, The Case for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE LJ.
1155, 1157-58 (1980); Note, supra note 30, at 906-11. For a more general discussion of
juries' inability to understand instructions, see Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G.
Thornburg,Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C. L. REV. 77 (1988).
86. In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1079.
87. See Note, supra note 30, at 910. Speculative and irrational resolution can occur
in one of two forms. First, the jury simply might be unable to remember or understand
the evidence, and thus need to resort to guessing to resolve the case. Second, massive
information and lay decisionmaking might dictate a trial strategy that forces parties to
sacrifice meritorious but confusing claims. Just as serious political debate cannot occur
in thirty-second sound bytes, the intricacies of a case often cannot be packaged in a
manner easily digestible by six persons. Although this problem inheres in all trial advo-
cacy, complex cases risk a far greater factual myopia-far more dissonance between ac-
tual reality and courtroom re-enactment. This second aspect of irrational resolution
creates a result as unrelated to the merits of a case as a verdict based on a guess.
88. AuSTIN, supra note 14, at 103; MANUAL, supra note 13, § 22.42; SCHWARZER, supra
note 54, § 7-2(B)(7); Kersten, supra note 85, at 117-18.
89. See EXPEDrrING ANIrrrrusT CASES, supra note 54, at 136-37; MANUAL, supra note
13, §§ 22.34, 22.431-.432; SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 7-2(c).
90. E.g., EXPEDrING ANTITRusT CASES, supra note 54, at 137; MANUAL, supra note 13,
§ 21.33; SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 2-3(B)(4); Mullenix, supra note 69. Subject only to
arguable constitutional restraints, see In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989), the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow for the
separate trial of issues, FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Of course, when separate trials will not
result in a more sensible resolution, the court is under no obligation to separate issues
or parties. United States v. IBM, 60 F.R.D. 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Myers v. Celotex
Corp., 594 A.2d 1248 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), cert. denied, 600 A.2d 418 (Md. 1992).
91. Courts have the power to appoint experts under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence and comparable state provisions. FED. R. EvID. 706; see, e.g., Az. R. EVID.
706; In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 495 F. Supp. 1185 (W.D. Okla.
1980) (appointing experts in non-jury case); COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, supra note 14,
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jury,92 or- most drastically-eliminating the jury.93
Like pretrial complexitym-which concerns the difficulties lawyers
have in garnering, organizing, and appreciating the legal signifi-
cance of information-the first aspect of trial complexity is quintes-
sential lawyer's work. The other aspect of trial complexity, however,
shifts the focus from the difficulties of the lawyer to those of the
factfinder, who cannot comprehend the evidence, arguments, and
instructions. In this latter aspect of trial complexity, the judge and
jury become key players, and ultimately inject a new concern into
the problem of complexity: difficulty in achieving a principled reso-
lution of a case through the application of facts to existing law. 94
at 62-63; MANUAL, supra note 13, § 21.51; E. Donald Elliott, Toward Incentive-Based Proce-
dure: Three Approaches for Regulating Scientific Evidence, 69 B.U. L. REV. 487, 501-05 (1989);
Mullenix, supra note 69, at 545-50; Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court
Experts in Asbestos Litigation, 137 F.R.D. 35 (1991); cf. Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811
(2d Cir. 1976) (discussing propriety of bench subpoenas issued against expert unwilling
to testify for either party).
The power to appoint masters derives from Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and comparable state provisions. FED. R. Civ. P. 53; see, e.g., Az. R. Civ. P.
53. For commentary generally favorable to the use of masters in complex cases, see
RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 224-26; BRAZIL ET AL.,
supra note 14; MANUAL, supra note 13, § 21.52; Brazil, supra note 15; Kersten, supra note
85, at 116-17; McGovern, supra note 20; McGovern, supra note 15; Mullenix, supra note
69, at 540-45; Special Project, The Remedial Process in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978). The court's power to appoint masters in complex trials is
not unlimited, see LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), and can be criti-
cized for its ad hoc approach to the problems of complex litigation, see Silberman, supra
note 12.
92. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 91, at 505; Luneburg & Nordenburg, supra note 50;
Note, supra note 85; cf In re Richardson-Merrill, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig.,
624 F. Supp. 1212, 1217 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (discussing option of blue-ribbon jury with
counsel), aff'd, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
93. A great deal of attention has been paid to the authority and wisdom of sus-
pending jury trial in complex cases, with cases and commentary generally supporting
suspension in some situations. See, e.g., In rejapanese Elec. Prods. Litig., 631 F.2d 1069
(3d Cir. 1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-49 (N.D.
Cal. 1978), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures, 79 F.R.D. 59
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976);
Devlin, supra note 16; Thomas M. Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial of Anti-
trust Issues, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1981); Douglas W. Ell, Note, The Right to an IncompetentJury:
Protracted Commercial Litigation and the Seventh Amendment, 10 CONN. L. REV. 775 (1978);
King, supra note 50; Note, supra note 30. There is a strong minority view. See, e.g., In re
U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980);
Arnold, supra note 50; Blecher & Daniels, supra note 50; Patrick E. Higginbotham, Contin-
uing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the Allocation ofJudicial Power, 56 TEx. L. REV. 47 (1977);
Lempert, supra note 16; Huttner, supra note 50. See generally Symposium, The Jury in Com-
plex Litigation, 65 JUDICATURE 393 (1982) (discussing the use of a jury in complex litiga-
tion). When the factfinder is a judge who likewise is unable to resolve the dispute
rationally, the logical disposition of the case would be to dismiss it. The literature gen-
erally is silent on the circumstances under which this result might be necessary. See
EXPEDrIING ANTITRUST CASES, supra note 54, at 135 (comments ofJudge Higginbotham);
cf SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 7-2(A) (noting that "judges are not necessarily better
prepared to resolve unaided the questions complex trials raise" and that "the less disci-
plined presentation of the case by counsel in a bench trial can compound the difficulty of
the judge's task").
94. As the Third Circuit observed:
The law presumes that a jury will find facts and reach a verdict by rational
means. It does not contemplate scientific precision but does contemplate a
resolution of each issue on the basis of a fair and reasonable assessment of
the evidence and a fair and reasonable application of the relevant legal rules.
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3. Complexity in the Remedy
A third procedural feature that has been used to define complex
litigation is difficulty in the implementation or administration of a
remedy. For instance, the Handbook singled out for special treat-
ment cases either involving "an ad damnum of $1,000,000 or more;
[or] involving [a] request for injunctive relief affecting the opera-
tions of a large business entity." 95 The Handbook's direct descen-
dent, the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, eschewed the
former description, but retained the latter description concerning
injunctive relief.96 Numerous authors have noted that a case in
which the relief might have consequences on the national economy
is complex; 97 Francis McGovern has discussed the administrative
problems associated with the implementation of settlements in the
Dalkon Shield case;98 and Peter Schuck has detailed the opening
rounds of remedial problems in the Agent Orange litigation.99
Curiously, however, most of the literature specifically addressing
the subject of complex litigation has ignored the problem of
In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980); see also
Note, supra note 30, at 906-09. I develop a somewhat more refined description of"prin-
cipled resolution" later in the Article. See infra note 246 and accompanying text.
95. Handbook, supra note 14, at 375, 434; see also MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 24,
at 2 (stating that "the amount of money involved may prompt litigation efforts of such
dimension that a case that would otherwise not be complex becomes complex").
96. MCML, supra note 14, § 0.22.
97. See supra note 29.
98. McGovern, supra note 20; see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th. Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989) (affirming class certification and settlement orders);
BACIGAL, supra note 14 (detailing history of the Dalkon Shield litigation and settlement).
99. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), subse-
quent proceedings, 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 818
F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987); SCHUCK, supra note 14; Schuck, supra note 22.
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remedy. Although the literature on the problems of remedial imple-
mentation is vast,10 0 and the cases struggling with the administra-
tion of remedies are legion,' 0 ' neither the Manual for Complex and
Multidistrict Litigation nor the Manual for Complex Litigation discusses
the issues involved in the implementation of a settlement, consent
decree, orjudgment.l0 2 Marcus and Sherman's casebook largely ig-
nores the subject.10 3 The American Law Institute's Complex Litigation
Project notes only in passing that "the administration of certain
'complex' forms of relief" is a "case management problem[] often
associated with complex litigation."'' 04
Although these practical "matters of trial administration"'10 5
might not be as conceptually interesting as the shaping and trial of
100. See, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); OWEN M. FIss &
DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 1-58, 528-827 (2d ed. 1984); M. KAY HARRIS & DUDLEY
P. SPILLER, JR., AFTER DECISION: IMPLEMENTATION OF JUDICIAL DECREES IN CORREC-
TIONAL SETTINGS (1977); DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977);
LIMITS OF JUSTICE (Howard I. Kalodner & James J. Fishman eds., 1978); RAYMOND
WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN (1984); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Inte-
gration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976);
CurtisJ. Berger, Away from the Court House and into the Field- The Odyssey of a Special Master,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing
Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (1992); Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organiza-
tional Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265; Robert F.
Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661
(1978); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1355
(1991) [hereinafter Sturm, Public Law Remedies]; Susan P. Sturm, The Rhode Island Prison
Decree, excerpted in LOUISELL ET AL., supra note 46, at 1243 [hereinafter Sturm, The Rhode
Island Prison Decree]; Special Project, supra note 91; Diane S. Kaplan & Richard M. Zucker-
man, Note, The Wyatt Case: Implementation of a Judicial Decree Ordering Institutional Change,
84 YALE LJ. 1338 (1975) [hereinafter Note, The Wyatt Case]; Little, supra note 50; Note,
Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 HARV. L. REV. 428 (1977). See
generally Fiss & RENDLEMAN, supra, at 827-30 (containing a bibliography of literature con-
cerning structural injunctions).
101. See, e.g., Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Spallone v. United States, 493
U.S. 265 (1990); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklen-
burg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955); In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); United States
v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460
U.S. 1001 (1983); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. New-
man v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
102. The Manualfor Complex and Multidistrict Litigation suggested techniques to resolve
only pretrial complexity, although its recommendations for the final pretrial conference
raised certain issues concerning the trial itself. See MCML, supra note 14, §§ 4.0-.13.
The MCML never discusses post-settlement or post-trial problems. The Manualfor Com-
plex Litigation includes techniques that judges might use to settle cases and to obtain a
meaningful jury verdict, see MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 22.45, 23.1, but likewise does not
consider remedial issues involved in administration of a settlement or judgment.
103. There is a short section concerning judicial control of class action settlements.
MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 24, at 507-38. The materials concern only the initial
responsibilities of assuring notice and evaluating the negotiated settlement under the
proper legal criteria; they do not delve into the problems of implementation or adminis-
tration. Similarly, there are brief materials on the judge's role in encouraging settle-
ment, id. at 674-89; and the award of attorney's fees, id. at 771-807. The authors spend
less than seven pages on the specific problem of remedial implementation and compli-
ance. Id. at 765-71.
104. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1, supra note 14, at 2-3.
105. Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 219, 221 (1953).
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complex claims, the consideration of "remedial complexity" is abso-
lutely critical to understanding the problem of complex litigation.
Even when a case ultimately does not result in the creation of a rem-
edy, potential difficulties in remedial compliance can dictate pretrial
and trial strategies. 0 6 Moreover, should a remedy be declared, the
remedial phase in complex cases often lasts far longer, and is far
more costly in terms of judicial and attorney resources, than the
high-profile pre-remedial phase.'0 7 Unless interested in attaining
only a moral victory, a lawyer must consider-from the very first
moment a complex case enters the office-the real-world problems
that a remedy might create.
Our present experience suggests that complex remedial issues
take one of two forms. The first is difficulty in determining the
scope of the remedy in the face of an amorphous declaration of enti-
tlement. Ajudgment stating that a school system unconstitutionally
has segregated its students or an admission by a company that it has
wrongfully exposed residents to a hazardous chemical does little to
define the nature of the remedy. Although almost all lawsuits in-
volve some uncertainty about the extent of the remedy, remedial
complexity involves either inordinate expense in obtaining and
managing the information needed to choose a proper remedy, or
the necessity of solomonic, creative, and somewhat unprincipled so-
lutions to intractable remedial questions. 08
The other form of remedial complexity concerns its administra-
tion. Even when the scope of the remedy has been declared, it may
be costly to identify the claimants who meet established criteria, or
106. The defendant faced with massive liability to a great number of persons-all of
whom want a first bite at the defendant's limited resources-will often resistjoinder. See
Mark A. Peterson & Molly Selvin, Mass Justice: The Limited and Unlimited Power of Courts, 54
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 227, 231-33 (1991). Courts also might consider problems of
remedial complexity in deciding whether to allowjoinder. See Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacque-
lin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1016-18 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that difficulties in distribution of a
potential recovery made a Rule 23(b)(3) class action unmanageable), vacated and remanded
on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Similarly, remedial problems create an under-
standable incentive for courts to decide liability issues in an initial trial, with the hope for
a negotiated settlement in the event of a defendant's loss at trial. See MANUAL, supra note
13, § 21.632.
107. See, e.g., Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318
(M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978); In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991); WOLTERS, supra note 100 (describing 30 years of efforts to desegregate
the four school districts involved in Brown v. Board of Education); McGovern, supra note
20, at 686-88 (describing early results of Dalkon Shield remedial plan).
108. See SCHUCK, supra note 14, at 143-91; Berger, supra note 100; Chayes, supra note
100, at 1296-303; Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44-56
(1979); see also Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison Conditions, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 626, 626 n.1 (1980) (quoting L. Sargentich, Complex Enforcement 23, 29 (Mar.
1978) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harvard Law School Library)) (defining
complex enforcement remedies to be those remedies that are "complicated, detailed,
prolix" and also involve a "unified system of prescriptions").
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to distribute funds to those claimants.' 0 9 The possibility of non-
compliance might require the ongoing involvement of judges and
quasi-judicial officials.' 10 Just as the problems involved in determin-
ing the scope of the remedy require the court to function as a para-
legislature, remedial administration transforms the court into a
para-executive agency-complete with staff and enforcement
capabilities. I
At first blush, the relationship between remedial complexity and
pretrial or trial complexity is tenuous. Remedial complexity may in-
volve the same information management problems that plague pre-
trial and trial complexity, but these problems do not arise
inevitably.' 12 Unlike pretrial or trial complexity, remedial complex-
ity focuses on the difficulties faced by the parties and interested
nonparties in complying with a judicial decision, rather than on the
difficulties of lawyers and jurors. If some fundamental theme unites
these three types of complexity, it is not readily apparent.
4. Complexity Caused by the Number of Parties
A final feature that frequently emerges in procedural definitions
of complexity is the existence of multiple parties. The single label
of "numerous parties," however, masks two distinct ways in which
the commentary has related multiple parties to the issue of com-
plexity. The first, and more typical, way is to assert that the sheer
number of parties renders a case complex. The Western District of
Kentucky, for example, included in its definition of complex litiga-
tion all class actions, all derivative actions, and all other cases "hav-
ing more than five defendants, more than five counterclaim
defendants, or more than five third-party defendants."' '1 Similar
descriptions look either for significant numbers of parties ,in a suit
or for a procedural feature-such as a class action, a derivative suit,
or multidistrict litigation-that serves as an indicator of numerous
109. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 754-62 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250, 1257-60
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,114, at 76,718 (S.D. Tex.) (approving use of"share-and-share-alike" formula for
distribution of antitrust settlement proceeds due to the "overwhelming" complexities
and costs of developing an accurate weighted-distribution formula), af'd, 659 F.2d 1337
(5th Cir. 1981).
110. See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 91, at 821-37; cf United States v. Michigan,
940 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1991) (detailing numerous contempt and monitoring issues that
arose after entry of consent decree in prison litigation).
111. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.), vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 F.2d 1042 (1983); United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th
Cir. 1972); supra note 108.
112. For example, a court may determine that the appropriate remedy for a segre-
gated school system is busing, but either the trenchant opposition of parents, adminis-
trators, and legislators or their refusal to take the initiative may make implementation of
the remedy a dicey matter. The problem here is not managing information; it is wield-
ing power effectively against private and bureaucratic decisionmakers with significant
residual authority. See Colin S. Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending
Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43, 93-94 (1979); Robert A.
Katzmann, Note,Judicial Intervention and Organization Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Behav-
ior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513 (1980).
113. W.D. Ky. R. 19(a)(5) (supersededJuly 1, 1987) (copy on file with author).
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parties. 114
Standing alone, however, the number of persons cannot serve as a
useful description of complexity. Consider a disappointed offeree
who files a securities class action because of a material misrepresen-
tation in a securities offering on behalf of millions of other, similarly
situated persons who never bought stock. Because securities fraud
can be maintained only by buyers and sellers of stock,1 15 the exist-
ence of a class action magically does not transform this legally sim-
ple case into a complex one. A typical class action is complex,
therefore, not because of numbers per se; complexity is rather a
function of the additional information and the consequent problems
of pretrial, trial, or remedial complexity that great numbers often
generate. Thus, like substance-based complexity, "multiple-party
complexity" is not a separate type of complexity, but rather a fairly
accurate barometer for the presence of other problems of
complexity.116
There is also a second, and very different, way in which complex-
ity and multiple parties have been linked. Best articulated by the
American Law Institute's Complex Litigation Project (hereinafter Pro-
ject), this definition focuses on repetitive litigation involving the
same or similar factual and legal claims:
As used in this project .... "complex litigation" refers exclusively
to multiparty, multiforum litigation; it is characterized by related
claims dispersed in several forums and often over long periods of
time .... [C]omplex cases share two defining characteristics:
They all involve duplicative relitigation of identical or nearly iden-
tical issues, and consequently, they all involve the enormous ex-
penditure of resources. 117
Under this description of complexity, the issues in any given case do
114. See, e.g., D. ARIZ. R. 36 (identifying multidistrict litigation as a "probable com-
plex case"); N.D. OHIo RULE FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 2.01(d); OHIO COMMON PLEAS
Supp. R. 8.01(B)(1); COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, supra note 14, at 6 (torts with damages
exceeding $50,000 by "at least one hundred persons"); RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLEX
LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 211; MARCUS ET AL., supra note 46, at 401; JUDICIAL ADMIN-
ISTRATION STANDARDS, supra note 21, § 19(c); Hondorf, supra note 15, at 545 ("enormous
number of persons"); Kendig, supra note 24, at 705-06; Thomas J. Wylie, Use of the Man-
ualfor Complex Litigation-The Defendant's Viewpoint, 15 F. 163, 163 (1979). See also au-
thorities cited supra note 24.
115. See, e.g., Holmes v. Security Investors Protection Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
116. Several commentators have noted this relationship between multiple parties and
other first-order procedural complexities. See, e.g., LOUISELL ET AL., supra note 46, at
1223 (observing that "[c]omplex cases can be identified by the fact that they involve
large stakes, broad-ranging discovery, and sometimes multiple parties"); Mullenix, supra
note 69, at 525; Resnik, supra note 12, at 509; Schuck, supra note 22, at 338 n.7.
117. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1, supra note 14, at 11-12. For other
commentators adopting the same description, see Kendig, supra note 24, at 708; Chris-
topher P. Lu, Procedural Solutions to the Attorney's Fee Problem in Complex Litigation, 26 U.
RICH. L. REV. 41, 41 n.2 (1991); Mullenix, Complex Litigation, supra note 16, at 174 n.15;
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not necessarily lead to intractable pretrial, trial, or remedial
problems; rather, complexity develops from the burden that the
sheer volume of cases imposes on the court system.
Like so many other definitions, however, the Project's definition
fails to capture the right set of cases. First, the definition seems un-
derinclusive. There is simply no reason to conclude that complex
cases must be both multiparty and multiforum. For instance, two
parties may engage in wasteful and costly re-litigation of identical
issues in more than one forum," 18 whereas hundreds of parties may
litigate their related claims in separate lawsuits within a single fo-
rum.' 1 9 Multiparty and multiforum litigation certainly leads to du-
plication and expense, but so do two-party multiforum and
multiparty single-forum litigation.
Conversely, the definition seems overinclusive. Even simple cases
can be multiparty and multiforum. For example, Finley v. United
Statest 20 involved multiple parties-one plaintiff and three defend-
ants. After the Supreme Court's decision, the case was also mul-
tiforum-the case against the United States proceeded in federal
court, while a case against the remaining defendants lay in state
court.12 1 The entire case, however, turned on a relatively straight-
forward question: Who, if anyone, was negligent in failing to main-
tain a runway light. 122 Finley is hardly the material of which complex
cases are made, 123 but it is complex nonetheless under the Project's
definition. 124
In defense of the Project, a case such as Finley might be screened
out of the definition of complexity not by the formal requirements
of a multiparty, multiforum dispute, but rather by the "two defining
characteristics"-duplicative litigation and enormity of resources
expended-that undergird the definition. Even these characteris-
tics, however, may result in the erroneous classification of cases.
Rowe & Sibley, supra note 16, at 10. The Manual for Complex Litigation likewise recog-
nizes, and briefly addresses, the problem of related-case litigation. MANUAL, supra note
13, § 31.
118. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976); Kerotest Mfg. v. C-0-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180 (1952); Kahn v. General
Motors Corp., 889 F.2d 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Semmes Motors v. Ford Motor Co., 429
F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970).
119. For example, unless another state with an "open courts" provision offered dis-
tinct procedural or substantive advantages, a mass environmental exposure in which all
plaintiffs and all defendants are residents of a single state and in which all claims arose in
that state most likely would be resolved exclusively by the courts of the state. See Ferens
v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990); Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674
(Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
120. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
121. See id. at 555.
122. See id. at 546.
123. The case seemingly presented no problems of vast discovery, jury comprehen-
sion, or remedial implementation. For other acknowledgements that run-of-the-mill
multiparty, multistate cases involving duplicative litigation of issues are not necessarily
complex, see Freer, supra note 16 at 850-51; Rowe & Sibley, supra note 16, at 23, 30. In
1990, Congress rejected the Court's result in Finley and created, in many instances, a
grant of supplemental jurisdiction over parties whose claims are related to claims prop-
erly in federal court. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991).
124. See text accompanying supra note 117.
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The latter criterion simply is not useful. Does "enormity" refer to
an amount relative to potential recovery? If so, then a simple mul-
tiforum car accident might be complex, whereas the asbestos litiga-
tion-in which several billion dollars have been spent in an effort to
stave off claims that are orders of higher magnitude125-would not
be. Alternatively, is "enormity" an absolute number, say $500,000,
spent on the proof of identical issues in separate cases? If so, then
the Project should identify the threshold level, and defend it against
the inevitable criticism of arbitrariness.
The first "defining characteristic" of complex litigation-the du-
plicative litigation of issues-also is not helpful sufficiently in sepa-
rating the routine from the complex. The amount of factual and
legal overlap needed to make the re-litigation of issues "duplica-
tive" is unclear. Would a medical malpractice case be complex if it
arose from the use of a surgical procedure identical to the surgical
procedure involved in unrelated actions against other physicians?
Do two unrelated employment discrimination cases become com-
plex when they raise similar issues on the uses and limitations of
statistical testimony? The resources devoted to re-litigation of these
and a myriad of other issues in "unrelated" cases far surpass the
resources spent on the re-litigation of issues in related "multiparty,
multiforum" cases. 126 Even though the Project's "defining character-
istics" suggest that transactionally unrelated cases are complex, the
Project nonetheless limits its definition to "related claims."' 27
125. One estimate puts the total legal fees in asbestos cases as of 1986 at well over
one billion dollars. David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos-Carnage,
Cover-up, and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1694 (1986) (reviewing PAUL BRODEUR,
OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCr: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985)); see also REPORT
ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 13 (noting that one asbestos defendant spent
$119.7 million on legal fees and litigation costs during 1989). At the same time, how-
ever, projected wage losses (exclusive of pain and suffering and punitive damages) and
medical expenses from asbestos litigation were projected to exceed thirty to forty billion
dollars, with additional billions in property damage; in fact, Johns Manville estimated
claims against it alone to be in excess of fifty billion dollars. Rosenberg, supra, at 1693 &
n.6.
126. A court may not use collateral estoppel to prevent the re-litigation of similar
factual issues in unrelated cases. Cf Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979)
(allowing use of collateral estoppel only against a party bound by a prior judgment);
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 5.05 (arguing for extension
of collateral estoppel only to those persons with related claims who had knowledge of
prior suit and an opportunity to participate in it). Until finally resolved by a court of
highest authority, the re-litigation of legally identical issues also is likely to occur among
factually unrelated cases. Consider, for instance, the enormous sums spent thus far to
litigate the meaning of one single term-"defect"-in products liability cases in each of
the fifty states. Although it is impossible to estimate the total amount spent proving the
same facts or arguing for the same legal standard in unrelated cases, it is safe to say that
the amount far exceeds the legal fees generated in the complex cases that meet the
Complex Litigation Project's definition.
127. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1, supra note 14, at 11. Subsequently,
however, the Project recommended that the federal courts be given the power to transfer
and consolidate federal cases that "involve one or more common questions of fact or
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The failure of the Project to develop a comprehensive definition
stems in part from its deliberate modesty. The Project candidly ad-
mits that multiparty, multiforum complexity is an inadequate de-
scription; complexity also can arise from substantive rules, from the
scope and management of discovery and trial, from the administra-
tion of "certain 'complex' forms of relief," and from protraction.' 28
The consequence of the decision not to seek a global definition,
however, is the creation of less-than-global solutions. As the Project
recognizes, the obvious remedy for multiparty, multiforum com-
plexity is the abolition of existing impediments to consolidation
found in jurisdictional, venue, and party joinder rules.' 29 The huge
cases created by assembling all the parties in one forum, however,"--k UI LI-,d* _" t ies: __ ' •_ as-
might generate the pretrial, trial- and remedial difcules often
sociated with multiparty suits.130 The Project concedes as much, and
consequently provides the court with discretion to deny joinder in
the event of undue problems of pretrial or trial complexity.' 3 '
This recognition that other problems of complex litigation are
different than-and may even trump-the specific problem of mul-
tiparty, multiforum litigation highlights the dissonance between the
Project's definition of complex litigation and the other procedural
definitions we have examined. Systemic burdens on the court sys-
tem appear at best to be a distant cousin of the individual, case-
specific problems of pretrial, trial, and remedial complexity. Viewed
from the narrow perspective of individual case adjudication, it is dif-
ficult to see how the sum total of cases can be complex when no
individual case is complex. Indeed, the lack of any evident relation-
ship between the Project's "re-litigation complexity" and the other
types of procedural complexity seemingly means one of two things:
that re-litigation complexity is in fact a spurious form of complexity;
or that no common thread runs through all of complex litigation.
Arguing that " ' [c]omplex litigation' has no uniform definition," the
Complex Litigation Project adopts the latter view.' 32 The question re-
mains whether there might exist a third possibility: that re-litigation
law." Id. § 3.01. The extent to which the Project intends the power to apply to unrelated
cases is unclear; it seems to contemplate some overlap of legal claims in order for there
to be consolidation on factual issues; and there must be factual overlap in order to con-
solidate on legal issues. Id. § 3.01, at 56-58. The Project's later proposals to allow re-
moval into federal court of state cases and preclusion of nonlitigators both require that
the removed or precluded claims arise from "the same transaction, occurrence, or series
of transactions or occurrences" as an existing federal case. COMPLEX LITIGATION PRO-
JECT Draft No. 2, supra note 16, §§ 5.01(a), 5.05(a)(1). Thus, the Project contemplates n6
sweeping powers to dispose of similar factual and legal claims in unrelated cases.
128. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1, supra note 14, at 2-3.
129. See AMERICAN LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT (Tent. Draft No. 3) 1-2
(1992) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 3]. For other proposals to
eliminate the restrictions that frustrate joinder of related cases, see supra note 16.
130. See supra note 116 and accompanying text; see also City of Philadelphia v. Ameri-
can Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.NJ. 1971) (certifying some classes in antitrust cases but
denying certification of another class that was so large as to be unmanageable).
131. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 3, supra note 129, at 235-36, 241-43;
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 2, supra note 16, §§ 5.01, 5.03, 5.05; COMPLEX
LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1, supra note 14, § 3.01(b) & cmt. d.
132. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1, supra note 14, at 11.
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complexity is related to other types of procedural complexity in
ways that the commentary on procedural complexity has not
perceived.
5. "Laundry List" Definitions
Before considering the various efforts to develop an inclusive def-
inition, a final observation about procedural and substance-based
definitions should be made. Many writers-perhaps sensitive to the
problem of underinclusion-have developed definitions that include
more than one form of procedural or substantive complexity. For
example, in its local rules, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio has developed a list of complex cases that
mirrors the list developed by the Handbook in 1960.133 Ohio's Court
of Common Pleas has developed a somewhat different list.134 Other
courts and commentators-many of whom were discussed in con-
nection with a particular aspect of complexity-have also developed
lists.135
With the exception of underinclusion, "laundry list" definitions
are subject to the criticisms already discussed. The flaws in using
substantive theory to define complex litigation are not removed sim-
ply by tacking the "complex" legal theories onto a list containing
the various types of procedural complexity. "Laundry list" defini-
tions run a great risk of overinclusion-improperly designated cases
under any category on the list will now be deemed complex. Finally,
these lists smack of a certain arbitrariness; without any apparent re-
lationship among the various elements, the reason for their inclu-
sion on a single list is unclear. The lack of uniformity among the
133. A comparison of NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO RULE FOR CoMPLEX LITIGATION
2.01 with the Handbook, supra note 14, at 375, reveals that both lists include antitrust
cases; cases requesting relief in excess of $1,000,000; cases requesting injunctive relief
affecting a major business entity; cases involving many parties or an association of large
membership; and patent cases involving "an unusual multiplicity or complexity of is-
sues." Other than minor stylistic and semantic differences, the only disparity between
the lists is the Northern District of Ohio's inclusion of an additional catch-all category of
complex cases: a suit that "may otherwise be a protracted case." N.D. OHIO RULE FOR
CoMPLEX LITIGATION 2.01(f).
134. The factors used to identify complex litigation in Ohio's Courts of Common
Pleas are the number of parties; the presence of a class action; the existence of a prod-
ucts liability claim; the presence of "other related cases involving unusual multiplicity or
complexity of factual or legal issues"; the extent of discovery; and the "[n]umber or
availability of parties and witnesses for trial." OHIO COMMON PLEAS Supp. R. 8.01(B).
135. See, e.g., W.D. Ky. R. 19(a) (superseded July 1, 1987) (copy on file with the au-
thor); RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 211; MARCUS &
SHERMAN, supra note 24, at 1-2; MARCUS ET AL., supra note 46, at 401; JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION STANDARDS, supra note 21, § 19(c); Kendig, supra note 24, at 703-04; Rubin,
Complex Limitation, supra note 29, at 1396-97; Schuck, supra note 22, at 338 n.7; AndrewJ.
Simons, The Manual for Complex Litigation: More Rules or Mere Recommendations?, 62 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 493 (1988); Steckler, supra note 54, at 524; Wylie, supra note 114, at 163.
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various laundry lists confirms this sense of irrational eclecticism.' 3 6
D. Descriptive Definitions of Complexity
A few commentators have sought to develop an inclusive descrip-
tion of the criteria that every complex case must meet. These com-
mentators have proceeded in one of two fashions: either by
observing cases that are considered complex in order to find com-
mon features, or by developing a normative model of adjudication
from which certain cases-the "complex" cases-deviate in theory.
The succeeding Section discusses these latter, normative definitions
of complexity; this Section examines three positive descriptions of
complex litigation.
1. The Generic Definition of the Manual for Complex and
Multidistrict Litigation
The first attempt at a catholic description of complex litigation
comes from the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation:
"'Complex litigation,' as used in this Manual, includes one.., or
more related cases which present unusual problems and which re-
quire extraordinary treatment, including but not limited to the cases
designated as 'protracted' and 'big.' "137 Because neither "unusual
problems" nor "extraordinary treatment" is a self-defining term,
this description has evident difficulties. A reading of the treatise
gives at least some sense of the meaning of the terms. The
problems that are considered "unusual" include pretrial complex-
ity, related cases (re-litigation complexity), and some aspects of trial
complexity. 138 "Extraordinary treatment" is the use of case man-
agement principles that include, among other things, consolidation,
bifurcation, and phased discovery.' 39
Although ambiguous, this definition is significant. For the first
time, a source on complex litigation has made explicit the link which
had been made implicitly by many of the "nondefiners": the exist-
ence of a necessary relationship between complexity ("unusual
problems") and case management ("extraordinary treatment").1 40
Unfortunately, the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation fails
to explore the reason that this link is necessary. Consequently, this
description of complexity has the same problem of arbitrariness,
vagueness, and breadth that plagues substantive and laundry-list
136. No two laundry lists are identical, nor is any feature common to all of the lists.
137. MCML, supra note 14, § 0.11 (emphasis added). The United States District
Court for the Western District of Washington employs the MCML definition. W.D.
WASH. R. 102.
138. See MCML, supra note 14, §§ 0.3-3.53 (describing pretrial difficulties raised in
complex civil cases); id. §§ 4.1-.13 (discussing problems of trial which should be ad-
dressed at a final pretrial conference or during trial); id. §§ 5.1-.5 (examining problems
of related civil cases).
139. See MCML, supra note 14, §§ 0.3-5.5.
140. See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
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definitions of complexity.' 4 1 The authors seem tacitly to acknowl-
edge these deficiencies-three sections later they offer a laundry list
of the types of cases that may require "special treatment."'' 42
2. Schwarzer's Criteria of Principled Resolution
The next universal definition of complexity also proves insuffi-
cient, but again holds the promise of deeper insight. In Managing
Antitrust and Other Complex Litigation, Judge William Schwarzer out-
lines four factors that serve as the indicia of complexity: (1) "com-
plicated and unfamiliar practices, developed over a period of years,
requiring extensive oral and documentary evidence on both sides";
(2) "proof of a pattern of conduct consisting of numerous seemingly
unrelated acts or events"; (3) "rules of law stated with constitution-
like generality, leaving the courts with little reliable guidance for
judging the relevance of evidence and placing policy-making re-
sponsibility on the trier of fact"; and (4) "technical and economic
issues foreign to [the] experience" of courts and juries. 143 Accord-
ing to Judge Schwarzer, only the latter two criteria are necessarily
present in complex cases; the first criterion, however, "often" oc-
curs, and the second one "may" occur. 144
Much of this definition is familiar. The "constitution-like general-
ity" of the law and the massive evidence bearing on this law corre-
spond to the common threads uniting complex substantive
theories. 145 The bulk of evidence often amassed in these cases calls
to mind the "voluminous" discovery that gives rise to pretrial com-
plexity.' 46 The problem of juror and judicial comprehension, as
well as the related problems of trial proof, match aspects of both
pretrial and trial complexity. 14 7
Nonetheless, some key ingredients are missing. Problems of com-
plicated factual discovery and proof are described as possible-but
not essential-attributes of complex litigation. Problems of com-
plexity in the remedial phase are never mentioned; nor, for the
most part, are the strains that related cases put on the court
141. See supra notes 62-67, 133-36 and accompanying text.
142. MCML, supra note 14, § 0.22. As mentioned above, the successor to the MCML,
the Manual for Complex Litigation, abandoned the search for a universal definition alto-
gether. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
143. SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 1-1. The four criteria Schwarzer develops in this
treatise largely systematize and generalize the reasons of the Attorney General's Anti-
trust Commission that antitrust cases are usually complex. See REPORT ON ANTrrusT
LAWS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 14, at 521-22. In another writing, Schwarzer declines
to define complex litigation. See William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Juiy Trials, 132 F.R.D.
575, 575-76 (1991).
144. SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 1-1.
145. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
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system. 4148
The description or omission of these ingredients can be defended
in theory. 149 Schwarzer's essential criteria-ambiguous doctrine
that gives little guidance and adds problems of comprehension of
evidence-concern the problems of judges and jurors in resolving
cases during the trial phase of a lawsuit. The theme uniting these
criteria is a concern for rational deliberation and decision in an ex-
isting dispute. Because the presence of other suits or the adminis-
trative headaches of implementing a remedy do not directly
threaten the roles of rational deliberation and decision assigned to
the judge and jury in any given suit, re-litigation and remedial com-
plexity are not inherent aspects of complexity. The same is true of
pretrial complexity, which creates no threat to the decisionmaking
functions of a judge or jury until the first day of trial. Of course,
without a modicum of pretrial management, reasoned decisionmak-
ing at trial might sometimes be impossible; in those cases, pretrial
management preserves the rationality of later deliberation. Thus,
although pretrial complexity and case management are often as-
pects of complex litigation, they are not necessarily present in every
complex case.
This justification for Judge Schwarzer's definition creates, for the
first time, a useful and universal "form," or definition, of complex-
ity: Cases are "complex" when the existing rules of pretrial, trial,
and substantive law make the principled deliberation of a dispute
highly problematic. Indeed, this "form" provides the missing link-
the need to assure rational deliberation of a pending dispute-that
unites pretrial and trial complexity. 150 The same missing link ex-
plains the reason that complexity and case management are neces-
sarily related: Judges must employ case management techniques
when necessary to protect rational deliberation.- 51 In addit-on, this
"form" provides the benchmark against which to test any solution to
complex litigation: whether the solution advances the principled
deliberation of a dispute.
This "form," however, has substantial problems. First, it proves
too little: The narrow focus on rational deliberation in a single case
fails to account for the observed problems of re-litigation complex-
ity and remedial complexity, both of which are unrelated to judicial
and juror decisionmaking in a pending lawsuit. Second, the "form"
of rational deliberation proves too much. For example, the "consti-
tution-like generality" of negligence law makes the rational deliber-
ation of every malpractice case involving technical medical evidence
148. Schwarzer devotes a short chapter to the management of class actions.
SCHWARZER, supra note 54, §§ 9-1 to -7. He does not, however, discuss its utility as a
device for the consolidation of numerous pending or potential lawsuits.
149. I do not contend thatJudge Schwarzer actually had this argument in mind when
he developed the criteria for complexity. It is, however, a plausible explanation for his
omission of certain aspects of procedural complexity.
150. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
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problematic. Finally, it is not at all clear that Schwarzer would ac-
cept this "form" as the guide for solutions to complex litigation.
According to Schwarzer, "[m]anagement is a process, pragmatic
rather than platonic," designed to achieve "the just, speedy and ec-
onomical disposition of the litigation."' 52  When a conflict arises
between the needs of economy and the goal of rational deliberation
of individual disputes, Schwarzer recommends that a balance be
struck among competing goals.1 53 His willingness to sacrifice ra-
tional deliberation to efficiency strongly suggests that other princi-
ples not explicit in his four criteria enhance his definition of
complex litigation.
3. Chayes' Morphology
A third description of complex litigation is Professor Abram
Chayes' discussion of "public law" litigation. 54 According to
Chayes, the role of the modem lawsuit-and consequently the role
of the modem judge-has evolved during the past century. No
longer are suits two-sided affairs in which the litigation process is
party initiated and party controlled. 15 5 No longer is litigation fo-
cused retrospectively on private wrongs, where the violated right
logically dictates the remedy and the effects of the remedy are con-
fined to the participants.' 56 No longer is the trial judge a passive
arbiter, a disinterested umpire instructing the jury in legal principles
deduced scientifically from existing appellate precedent. 157
Rather, Chayes argues, the nineteenth century's "private law"
model of litigation is in the process of being supplanted by a new,
"public law" model. Chayes proposes a "morphology," a list of
"the crucial characteristics and assumptions," associated with this
new litigation. 58 They are: (1) "the scope of the lawsuit is not ex-
ogenously given but is shaped primarily by the court and parties";
(2) the party structure is not bilateral, "but sprawling and amor-
phous"; (3) the factual inquiry is "predictive and legislative"; (4) the
relief is forward-looking, flexible, ad hoc, and significant to "many
persons, including absentees"; (5) the remedy is negotiated; (6) the
remedy's implementation requires continued judicial involvement;
(7) the judge has significant responsibility for fact evaluation and
case management; and (8) the controversy concerns "a grievance
152. SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 1-1, at 8.
153. Id. at 8-9.
154. Chayes, supra note 100. A further explication of Chayes' public law theme can
be found in Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1982).
155. Chayes, supra note 100, at 1282, 1289-92.
156. Id at 1292-96, 1298.
157. Id. at 1283, 1296-302.
158. Id. at 1302.
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about the operation of public policy."' 59 In short, as the nature of
disputes has become more "public," the trial judge claims a larger
role in the litigation at the expense of the parties, their attorneys,
and the appellate courts.
Nowhere does Chayes claim that his morphology constitutes a
definition of complex litigation. 160 Nonetheless, Chayes claims as
examples of "public law" litigation the types of cases-such as se-
curities fraud, antitrust, and desegregation litigation 61 -that are
often identified by other writers as complex. Indeed, some com-
mentators have treated Chayes as describing at least a rough outline
of complex litigation. 62
Regardless of whether Chayes intended to develop a definition of
complex litigation, 63 his contribution to its understanding is enor-
mous. The empowered judge unites the seemingly disparate con-
cepts of pretrial, trial, remedial, and re-litigation complexity. In
each of these areas, the judge exceeds the strictures placed upon her
by the traditional adversarial model. In all aspects of the litigation,
she is no longer passive, but active; no longer above the fray, but the
central figure in it. The reason for judicial activism is the political
nature of the controversy. Faced with political branches and large
business entities unwilling or unable to perform their legal obliga-
tions, the judge must assume certain powers in order to give broad
effect to entitlements frequently unpopular among the established
authorities in society.' 64 Thus, complex cases seem to be wide-
ranging, politically charged situations in which the judiciary's need
to effect justice does not allow the judge to respect the limited pre-
trial, trial, remedial, and joinder roles established for the court
under the adversarial theory of umpireal judging.' 65
159. Id.
160. Chayes occasionally uses terms such as "complex forms of ongoing relief,"
"complex, ongoing regime of performance," and "case of any complexity." Id. at 1284,
1298. He also cites the 1973 version of the Manualfor Complex Litigation in connection
with a discussion of the problems created by the volume of material in complex litiga-
tion. Id. at 1298 n.77.
161. Id. at 1284. Other substantive categories mentioned by Chayes include employ-
ment discrimination, prisoner civil rights cases, bankruptcy and reorganizations, union
governance litigation, consumer fraud, housing discrimination, electoral reappointment,
and environmental management. Id. It is interesting to note that Chayes, having es-
chewed a formal definition of public law litigation, see infra note 163, nonetheless
chooses to provide a descriptive list of substantive theories that meet his conception of
"public law litigation."
162. See LOUISELL ET AL., supra note 46, at 1203-08 (using excerpts from Chayes' arti-
cle in its introductory section of materials on complex litigation); MARCUS & SHERMAN,
supra note 24, at 3-5 (same).
163. The use of the morphology as a measuring stick of complex litigation would
probably strike Chayes as wrong-headed. He concedes a lack of interest in replacing old
forms with new ones. He never worries about whether the judge's role is legitimate in
the narrow sense of exceeding the appropriate "form" of adjudication. "Public law"
litigation exists, Chayes proclaims, regardless of whether it should exist in theory or not.
Thus, formal analysis acts as more of a hindrance than a help, for it diverts attention
from the important question-"Are judges effective when they participate in policy-mak-
ing roles?"-to the more trivial question-"Should they participate in those roles?" See
Chayes, supra note 100, at 1307-09, 1313-16.
164. Id. at 1304, 1314-16.
165. See id. at 1315-16. Geoffrey Hazard has recently described certain cases that
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Nonetheless, Chayes' "definition" of complex litigation suffers
from two critical defects. The first is that his analysis suggests virtu-
ally no limits on the political role of the judiciary, or presumably on
the procedures that a court could implement in order to accomplish
its goals. Except to the most strident advocates of judicial power,
this lack of apparent limits should be unsettling. Second, "public
law" litigation is unique not just because, as Chayes acknowledges,
it thrusts judges into the realm of political discourse; it also is
unique because, as Chayes fails to acknowledge, the increase in the
judge's power occurs at the expense of other players who otherwise
would have had a larger role in informing that discourse. Viewed
from this perspective, Chayes' arguments for the legitimacy of the
judicial role in political debate seem wide of the mark. In effect,
Chayes succeeds in proving two points: As a positive matter, judges
are claiming a larger role in "public law" litigation than they had
claimed in "private law" cases,1 66 and as a normative matter, the
judge's increased power is legitimate with respect to the political
branches.1 6 7 Chayes fails to demonstrate the normative legitimacy
of the judge's power with respect to the jury, the parties, and the
lawyers. Given that litigation over public rights is inevitable, why
might be regarded as "complex" in language similar to that of Chayes. Hazard's "defi-
nition" suggests a dichotomy between "routine" litigation and "salient" litigation. See
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Authority in the Dock, 69 B.U. L. REV. 469, 471 (1989). "Routine"
litigation involves claims of ordinary citizens with conflicting expectations under largely
agreed-upon legal norms; the conflicts are those for which society has not developed
means of resolution other than litigation. Id. at 471-73. In contrast, "salient or high-
profile litigation [is] litigation that significantly perturbs established systems of authority
and to which adjustment has not yet been made." Id. at 474. Formerly muted interests
are given voice, defendants "regard the intrusion of litigation as unfair or illegitimate,"
and "a cultural lag" has not yet resulted in absorption of the "challenging interests into
revised patterns of conduct." Id. Novel legal theories, the use of existing legal theories
in novel contexts, and the claim of "new 'rights " with correlative new limitations on the
existing "legal autonomy" of "constituted authority" are aspects of this type of litiga-
tion. Id.
Although Hazard's more skeptical appraisal of the efficacy and legitimacy of salient
litigation distinguishes him from Chayes, compare id at 476 with Chayes, supra note 100,
at 1313-16, the content of Hazard's "salient" litigation and Chayes' "public law" litiga-
tion seems largely to overlap. As a definition of complex litigation, however, Hazard's
description of salient litigation falls short. In the first instance, the procedural implica-
tions of the "form" of "saliency" are unclear. Furthermore, one can envision a mass
tort-perhaps an airplane crash or a product-defect suit-that would raise significant
issues of pretrial, trial, remedial, or re-litigation complexity. Although such a case might
have been "salient" thirty or forty years ago, the present acceptance by airlines and
manufacturers of their obligations in tort and the widely accepted right of tort victims to
claim compensation appear to make these complex cases "routine" in Hazard's nomen-
clature. Hazard's recognition that adjudication does not necessarily entail application of
facts to established legal principles is nonetheless an important normative confirmation
of Chayes' descriptive, non-normative observations that modern adjudication does not
exclusively involve disputes over established rights. For the relevance of this insight to
the definition of complex litigation, see infra notes 244-52 and accompanying text.
166. Chayes, supra note 100, at 1288-304.
167. Id at 1307-16.
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should the judge, and not the other players in the litigation enter-
prise, be the ones to shape the political-juridical debate? 68
The answer to this question is the missing piece in the puzzle that
Chayes so niftily assembles. Because it might also be the key to un-
derstanding the limits on the court's powers, the answer is crucial.
Less concerned with form than with description, however, Chayes
aborts the search before it has begun.
E. Normative Definitions of Complexity
The missing piece in Chayes' description might be found in an
analysis concerned, as Chayes is not, with the proper form and lim-
its of adjudicatory behavior. Although neither purports to provide
a normative definition of complex litigation, two writers, Mirjan
Damaska and Lon Fuller, have developed principled descriptions of
a proper adjudicatory system. Starting from different premises,
both Damaska and Fuller find that certain cases poorly fit the form
of adversarial adjudication prevalent in the United States today.
Their somewhat differing descriptions of these ill-fitting cases de-
velop two final pieces of data-the array of possible roles for the
participants in adjudication and the notion of party participation
through proofs and reasoned arguments-needed to assemble a
form for complex litigation.
1. Damaska's Forms ofJustice
In The Faces ofJustice and State Authority, 169 Mirjan Damaska argues
that procedural systems are a function of two independent variables:
the nature of the authority exercised by the adjudicatory tribunal
and the political objectives of the state. The first variable can corre-
spond to either a "hierarchical" or a "coordinate" ideal.170 In the
hierarchical ideal, the official before whom the case is placed initially
is a bureaucratic functionary executing the will of hierarchical super-
iors who make all critical decisions on the basis of summaries pro-
vided by the functionaries and who thus are immunized from the
168. The issue is hardly academic. As Chayes recognizes, courts are not precluded
necessarily from consideration of political issues merely by the formal incantation of
separation of powers; each branch of government exercises "a large and messy admix-
ture of powers," id. at 1307, and courts in particular have a complex relationship with
the legislature, id. at 1314. The same can be said of the judicial branch itself: It is a
"messy admixture" of litigants, interested bystanders, juries, lawyers, and judges. The
assertion by judges of additional powers often comes at the expense of at least one of
these other participants, thus invoking concerns of autonomy (when the traditional
rights of parties and bystanders are altered), democratic participation (when the tradi-
tional role of the jury is disturbed), and adversarial procedure (when the role of the
lawyers is reduced). Given our country's historical antipathy to the imperial Chancel-
lor-who is in modern dress the public-law trial judge, compare MILLAR, supra note 2, at
39-42 (discussing the historical emergence of equitable relief in federal courts) with
Chayes, supra note 100, at 1292-96 (noting the increasing importance of equitable re-
lief)--Chayes' failure to justify the judge's assertion of power ought to prevent an un-
qualified embrace of the public-law judge whom Chayes so optimistically portrays.
169. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OFJUsTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986).
170. Id. at 17.
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particulars of individual cases.' 7l  The officials are professional,
strictly organized into levels of authority, and "legalistic" in the
sense of following the technical terms of the law rather than assur-
ing individual justice.'7 2 The coordinate ideal, on the other hand,
envisions a single but "amorphous" stratum of decisionmaking with
"few sharp and obvious lines that separate its officials and its atti-
tudes toward decisionmaking from the rest of society."'17 3 The offi-
cials are amateurs who perform their roles for a limited time; there
is a wide distribution of authority among "roughly equal lay offi-
cials"; and decisions accord with common sense and a feeling of
substantive justice that distrusts legalistic solutions and elitist
norms. 1
74
Damaska plots the second variable-the political aspirations of
the state-on a different axis. Here too he divides the world into
two models: reactive states and activist states.' 75 The reactive state
is largely laissez-faire, intruding into citizens' lives only to
"provid[e] a supporting framework within which its citizens can pur-
sue their chosen goals."'176 Because the state consequently has "no
notion of separate interest apart from social and individual (private)
interests," it finds its functions largely limited to the protection of
order through the resolution of disputes. 177 The law is designed to
facilitate and support "autonomous regulation" by the citizens
themselves, and individual rights are strongly preserved against
state encroachment.17 8 The administration of justice reflects this
aim, and is consequently party-driven combative in motif, and con-
cerned only with the development of formal rules to ensure a fair
fight. 179 The decisionmaker is neutral, and dependent upon parties
for information; the lawyer is simply an assistant to the client.'80
Damaska labels this type of system "conflict-solving process."' 8 '
In contrast, the activist state "espouses or strives toward a com-
prehensive theory of the good life," and develops government pro-
grams to implement its vision. 8 2 Social institutions and practices
can be reshaped to conform to the governmental ideal; individual
autonomy commands little deference.' 8 3 Law "springs from the
171. Id. at 18-23.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 23-28.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 72.
176. Id. at 73.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 76-77.
179. Id. at 77-80, 97-135.
180. Id. at 135-45.
181. Id. at 80.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 80-81.
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state and expresses its policies.... [Ilt tells citizens what to do and
how to behave."' 8 4 Consequently, the administration ofjustice con-
siders the resolution of disputes irrelevant to its task of ensuring the
realization of state policy.' 8 5 Procedures are controlled by state offi-
cials rather than by parties, are investigative rather than combative,
and obviously are concerned with achieving the correct policy out-
come.' 8 6 The decisionmaker is not neutral, but active and inter-
ested in advancing the appropriate substantive outcome; the
lawyers' roles are much reduced, and a tension exists between their
role as advocate and their desire to realize state programs.' 8 7
Damaska labels this system "policy-implementing process."' 88
Damaska then merges the two concepts, and creates four possible
procedural scenarios: the policy-implementing process of hierarchi-
cal officialdom; the conflict-solving process before hierarchical offi-
cialdom; the conflict-solving process before coordinate officialdom;
and the policy-implementing process of coordinate officialdom. He
then derives the type of procedural system that normatively should
be associated with each scenario, and attempts to validate his hy-
pothesis by examining existing civil and criminal procedural systems
to determine the degree of overlap between the predicted and the
actual procedures.' 8 9 His study finds a high degree of correlation.
The relevance of Damaska's work to the problem of complex liti-
gation lies in the intriguing possibility that some cases (i.e., the
"complex" cases) within our society might not fit the dominant
mode of process, and must therefore be resolved under procedures
different than those governing the vast majority of cases. In his final
pages, Damaska essentially makes this claim for complex litigation.
Not surprisingly, Damaska considers the dominant mode of Ameri-
can procedure to be a conflict-solving process of coordinate official-
dom; its characteristics of adversarialism, neutral judges, lay juries,
single episode of trial, and lawyer control of issues and proceedings
are precisely the features that this model would predict. 190
Nonetheless, the United States is not an entirely reactive state;
"the polity is an unstable mixture of activist and reactive impulses in
which the latter still predominate."' 9 1 The procedural system to re-
solve these "activist" disputes has remained coordinate-still char-
acterized, Damaska says, by "amateurism, decentralization, [and]
hostility toward legalism."' 92 In these cases, which involve numer-
ous parties contesting public rights, 93 the apt procedural model is
the policy-implementing process of coordinate officialdom. This
184. Id. at 82.
185. Id. at 84.
186. Id. at 84-88, 147-68.
187. Id. at 168-78.
188. Id. at 88.
189. Id. at 181-239.
190. Id. at 214-22.
191. Id. at 231-32.
192. Id. at 232.
193. Id. at 237 n.122.
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model maintains some of the features of the conflict-solving pro-
cess, such as the need for the existence of a dispute, the filing of a
complaint, and adversarial steps. The judge, however, can be more
aggressive in shaping the case, the trials are "less the climactic cen-
terpiece of a lawsuit than the occasion for bringing issues of public
policy into focus," and the court has power to fashion a remedy be-
yond the scope of the parties' request.194 Therefore, like Chayes-
upon whom Damaska relies for his description of this process 15-
Damaska finds a lessening of adversarialism and an increase in judi-
cial power to be essential aspects of the American complex case.
Unlike Chayes, however, his analysis suggests a reason for the asser-
tion of judicial power and inherent limitations on that power: The
power is needed to respond to a new political orientation in which
the state wishes to protect its policy interests, and the activist and
coordinate characteristics of this model combine to impose certain
limits on the judge's power.'9 6
Damaska's compelling analysis still has several flaws. First,
although remedial complexity necessarily is an aspect of the policy-
implementing process of coordinate officialdom, his analysis does
not predict adequately the problems of pretrial, trial, or re-litigation
complexity. Although these latter three complexities, which are
widely acknowledged to be aspects of complex litigation,' 97 might
surface on occasion, there is no sense that these complexities inhere
in the policy-implementing process of coordinate officialdom. Nor
does Damaska claim that these complexities can never occur in cases
for which the conflict-solving process of coordinate officialdom is
still the mode of resolution.'9 8 Conversely, factually simple but po-
litically significant cases-such as a controversy involving abortion-
rights protestors or a refusal to issue a check due under a welfare
program-do fit into this policy-implementing process of coordi-
nate officialdom. Overall, the fit between the observed manifesta-
tions of complexity and the policy-implementing process of
coordinate officialdom seems less than perfect.
Second, there remains a significant question whether the increase
194. Id. at 237-38.
195. Id- at 237 n.122.
196. Id. at 237-39. Damaska does not claim that American civil procedure has any
strains of hierarchical officialdom. If it did, those strains presumably also would suggest
similar rationales for and limits on judicial power.
197. See supra notes 68-94, 116-32 and accompanying text.
198. Although Damaska suggests that re-litigation complexity occurs in the various
types of complex litigation that he apparently believes to fit within the policy-imple-
menting process of coordinate officialdom, see DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 237 n.122, he
makes no claim that re-litigation complexity can occur only in those types of cases.
1992] 1725
in judicial power effectively can accomplish any policy-implement-
ing ends. As Damaska recognizes, the mix of reactive and active as-
pects of American society means that the state often cannot
determine the appropriate policy to implement.1 99 It is fatuous to
give a judge the power to implement a societal policy when the pol-
icy is nonexistent. Even if she could divine a policy, however, the
coordinate nature of authority makes it difficult, if not impossible,
for a single judge to have an impact beyond the persons most di-
rectly affected by the dispute.
More generally, there are obvious tensions between coordinate
authority and policy-implementing process. Coordinate authority
suggests lay decisionmakers; policy-implementing process suggests
a decisionmaker associated with the state. Coordinate authority
suggests the accomplishment of individual justice, which might be
inconsistent with the official declaration of entitlements; policy-im-
plementing process suggests adherence to social policy. In this
clash, the precise limits of judicial authority are poorly outlined;
there is no evident reason that judicial authority and adherence to
social policy should win. Thus, Damaska's claims for the primacy of
judicial power are somewhat arbitrary. Unlike his analysis of the
other three forms of process, in which he begins with a prediction of
what the procedural system should be, he begins his analysis of the
policy-implementing process of coordinate officialdom with the de-
scription of the procedures that public-interest cases are in fact us-
ing. He then seems content to assume, in the policy-implementing
process of coordinate officialdom, that the current system is the cor-
rect one. But other reconciliations of the conflict are equally possi-
ble. For instance, the jury, assisted by lawyers who owe some
obligation to assure that state policy is considered, could be the in-
stitution to implement state policy.
By assuming that what public law litigation is also is what it should
be, Damaska inverts formal analysis, and thus ultimately leaves open
the question also unanswered by Chayes: Why should the judge in
complex cases be entitled to assert power reserved in the traditional
model of American procedure to the lawyers, jury, and parties?
2. Fuller's Forms of Adjudication
When Lon Fuller wrote The Forms and Limits of Adjudication in
1959,200 the concept of complex litigation was in its infancy, its full
scope still dimly understood. 201 Fuller's article attempts to derive
199. Id. at 238-39.
200. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353 (1978)
[hereinafter Fuller, Forms and Limits]. Although written in 1959 (and possibly revised in
1960, see id. at 394 n.27), Fuller's article was not published until after his death in 1978.
See id. at 353. The ideas in the article were known among the faculty at Harvard, includ-
ing Abram Chayes. See Chayes, supra note 100, at 1299 n.82. Fuller also presented the
ideas from the article in somewhat different fashion in other published works. See LoN L.
FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAw 84-112 (1968) [hereinafter FULLER, ANATOMY OF LAW];
LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 168-78 (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter FULLER, MO-
RALrrY OF LAW]; Fuller, supra note 62.
201. For a sampling of articles discussing the problems of complex cases in the
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the fundamental form of adjudication, to determine the procedural
features that best advance that form, and to establish the limits of
that form. He first posits the two basic forms of social ordering:
organization by common aims and organization by reciprocity. 202
Elections and contract are the respective mechanisms used to re-
solve disputes in these two forms of ordering. He then posits adju-
dication as a third method "of reaching decisions, of settling
disputes, of defining men's relations to one another."203 Adjudica-
tion guarantees the affected persons a different mode of participat-
ing in the ultimate decision. That mode is the "[p]resentation of
proofs and reasoned arguments." 20 4 For Fuller, then, this ability to
present proofs and reasoned arguments is the essence, the form, of
adjudication. Adjudication is the device, and the only device,
"which gives formal and institutional expression to the influence of
reasoned argument in human affairs."' 20 5
Fuller next examines the role of rationality in adjudication. He
argues that the assertion of a claim of right is not an essential attri-
bute of the form of adjudication. Nevertheless, because meaningful
participation through reasoned argument logically implies that the
litigant must "assert some principle or principles by which his argu-
ments are sound and his proofs relevant," these principles are easily
converted into claims of right.206 Thus, Fuller derives the most fun-
damental limit on adjudication as a form of social ordering: it can-
not be used "in those areas where the effectiveness of human
association would be destroyed if it were organized about formally
defined 'rights' and 'wrongs.' "207
Fuller then turns to "the optimum and essential conditions for the
functioning of adjudication." 20 8 Three matters are essential. He
finds that "the integrity of the judicial process itself depends upon
the participation of the advocate" because adversarial procedure
1950s, see supra note 14. The early cases and articles concerning complex litigation
were only a trickle which anticipated the flood of cases and commentary in the following
three decades.
202. Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 357.
203. Id. at 363.
204. L
205. Id at 366.
206. Id. at 369.
207. Id. at 371. Fuller gives as examples the reluctance of courts to enforce agree-
ments between spouses about the "internal organization of family life" and a court's
inability to run a coal mine or any other enterprise in which "successful human associa-
tion depends upon spontaneous and informal collaboration." Id.
208. Id at 364. A more empirical description of the attributes of adjudication can be
found in HoRowrrz, supra note 100, at 33-56. There is a high degree of correlation
between Fuller's normative and Horowitz's descriptive discussions of adjudication.
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best assures that "impartial judgment can attain its fullest realiza-
tion." 20 9 Moreover, he contends that the arbiter must be impartial
yet knowledgeable about the matter involved in the dispute,210 and
finally, that adjudicatory decisions must be retrospective.2 11 Among
the nonessential but optimal conditions, he specifically mentions
that arbiters should almost never act on their own motion in initiat-
ing a case, should generally (but not necessarily) provide a state-
ment of reasons to accompany the decision, and should generally
(but again, not necessarily) rest the decision on grounds urged by
the parties.212 He concludes by arguing that adjudication is not nec-
essarily a power of government, but may be exercised by private in-
dividuals in arbitration proceedings.2 13
After articulating the form of adjudication, Fuller explains the
limits that this form imposes on adjudication. Having already men-
tioned the inapplicability of adjudication to those areas in which de-
cision by application of proofs to principles would be destructive or
ineffective, he now suggests a second limitation: "polycentric" dis-
putes. To Fuller, polycentric disputes are "many centered" situa-
tions in which any decision has significant rippling effects far beyond
the parties who present reasoned proofs and arguments.21 4
Although rapidly changing circumstances and a multiplicity of par-
ties are not inevitably aspects of polycentrism, these situations are
likely to be instances in which meaningful participation through
proofs and reasoned arguments is impossible to achieve. Fuller rec-
ognizes that the line dividing polycentric disputes from those sus-
ceptible to adjudication is not a bright one,2 15 but argues that one of
three results is likely to occur when a polycentric matter is submit-
ted for adjudication: the adjudicatory solution fails; the arbiter ex-
periments with techniques that exceed her power under the form of
adjudication; or the arbiter "reformulate[s] the problem so as to
make it amenable to solution through adjudicative procedures. '2 16
209. Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 382-85. Unfortunately, Fuller's origi-
nal text simply referred the reader to a report he had co-authored on the subject of
professional responsibility; the editors inserted excerpts from the earlier work into the
article published after Fuller's death. See id. at 382 n.22. Because the earlier work was
written with a somewhat different purpose, see LON L. FULLER &JOHN D. RANDALL, PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE, reprinted in 44 A.B.A. J.
1159 (1958), it is not clear whether Fuller viewed adversarial process as an essential
attribute of adjudication, or simply as an optimal condition. The language of the Report
and Fuller's insistence on a party's ability to participate through proofs and reasoned
argument strongly suggest, however, that Fuller viewed the adversarial system as an es-
sential attribute of the form of adjudication.
210. Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 385-91.
211. Id. at 391-92.
212. Id. at 385-91.
213. Id. at 392-93.
214. Id. at 394-95. Fuller's strongest examples of polycentric disputes are the use of
adjudication to set wages and prices throughout society or the attempt to adjust the
wages of various categories of workers in a textile plant. In each case, one decision will
affect certain persons, whereas a different decision will affect another group of persons.
It is difficult for all the affected persons to participate through reasoned proofs and
arguments.
215. Id. at 397 (noting that "the distinction involved is often a matter of degree").
216. Id. at 401.
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Because these solutions are not faithful to adjudication's form,2 17
the only permissible solutions to polycentric disputes are manage-
rial direction or contract, which are associated with the other two
forms of social ordering.218
From the perspective of complex litigation, Fuller's normative
work adds two key elements. First, he establishes a baseline-partic-
ipation through proofs and reasoned argument-against which all
procedural arrangements can be tested.21 9 Second, Fuller creates
the concept of the "polycentric" case, which seems to embody some
of the features often seen in complex cases: multiple parties creat-
ing difficult problems of proof and comprehension; remedies affect-
ing broad segments of society; and judges experimenting with novel
management techniques to whittle cases down to adjudicatively di-
gestible size. If "polycentric" and "complex" cases are equated,
Fuller's article also suggests the following definition for complex
cases: those cases in which the interests of all persons significantly
affected by a controversy cannot be definitively resolved through the
parties' adversarial presentation of proofs and reasoned argument
to a neutral arbiter.
In spite of its apparent appeal, this definition has significant draw-
backs. The first is an empirical critique. One consequence of using
this definition is to declare that no complex case can be resolved
through the adjudicatory process, an assertion that ignores the fact
that judges and lawyers have, at least on occasion, successfully adju-
dicated "polycentric" disputes. 22 0 Another consequence is that this
definition establishes, to use Damaska's phrase, a "conflict-solving
process of coordinate officialdom" as the only legitimate model of
adjudication. 22 I Not only does this definition de-legitimize the pro-
cedural systems under which most of the world operates, but it also
fails to account for Chayes' observations of the changes in even the
217. See supra notes 205-13 and accompanying text.
218. Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 398-99. Fuller later demonstrates that
some types of "adjudication" are actually a mix of adjudication and other elements of
social ordering. Id. at 405-09. He does not necessarily condemn all instances in which
adjudication is used as a tool or a cloak to accomplish these other types of social order-
ing. Id. at 405.
219. A version of this baseline has appeared in some prior descriptions of complex
litigation, most particularly in that aspect of trial complexity that concerns lack ofjuror
comprehension and in Schwarzer's criteria for complex cases. See supra notes 84-94,
143-53 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); In re Richardson-Merrill,
Inc. "Bendectin" Prods. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 857 F.2d
290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab.
Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
221. Fuller's description of party-driven adjudication with a neutral arbiter resolving
private disputes corresponds precisely to Damaska's predicted form for a conflict-solv-
ing process before coordinate officialdom.
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American procedural system.222 Although Fuller might respond to
these empirical observations by asserting that most of the world
does not engage in true adjudication, the obvious Anglo-American
ethnocentricity of Fuller's ideal form is a basis for questioning
whether he might have drawn too narrow a definition.
Second, Fuller's definition may be too broad in one particular:
his belief that adjudication can occur beyond the auspices of govern-
ment. Because adjudication typically is considered a matter of state
prerogative, 223 Fuller's reliance on a single element for adjudication
(participation through proofs and reasoned argument) may cast too
wide a net and permit private dispute-resolution mechanisms, such
as arbitration, to be regarded as adjudicatory.
Third, the opportunity to present proofs and reasoned arguments
and the rationality of decision are not as intricately tied together as
Fuller suggests. On the one hand, we can visualize an inquisitorial
system in which judges accumulate all the evidence, shape the case,
and rationally resolve the appropriate issues without party participa-
tion.224 On the other hand, we can visualize an adversarial system in
which the parties are given the chance to present proofs and argu-
ments, after which the decisionmaker, locked away from view, flips a
coin and then writes a statement of reasons to mask an obviously
irrational resolution. If there are other methods to achieve a ra-
tional resolution, and if party presentation of proofs does not neces-
sarily guarantee one, then rational resolution and party
participation truly are distinct concepts. Of the two, rational resolu-
tion seems more crucial to the form of adjudication. 22 5
Finally, Fuller's list of optimal procedures-that arbiters generally
should not initiate a case, should rest a decision on grounds as-
serted by the parties, and should provide a statement of reasons for
a decision-fails to ring true. Assuming that these procedures best
advance Fuller's norm, the use of these procedures cannot be de-
rived from Fuller's norm itself. Any set of procedures that fulfills
222. See supra notes 154-59 and accompanying text.
223. "Adjudicate" derives from the Latin "adiudicare," which literally means "to
award as judge" or "to divide (a case) in favour of." OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 44
(P.G.W. Glare ed., 1983). The English definition is "to adjudge; ... [t]o try and deter-
mine judicially; to pronounce by sentence of court." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 158
(J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner eds., 2d ed. 1989); see also AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTION-
ARY 79 (2d coll. ed. 1985) ("[t]o hear and settle (a case) by judicial procedure"); BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 42 (6th ed. 1990) ("[t]o settle in the exercise ofjudicial authority"); cf
WJ. Habscheid & P. Schlosser, Improvement of Civil Litigation by Lessons Derived from Arbitra-
tion, inJUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY 153 (Dr. W. Widekind ed., 1989) (discussing the "almost
unanimous and categorical" rejection by "national reporters" from Austria, Sweden, the
Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and Argentina of a proposal that parties to litigation be al-
lowed to appoint their own judge, for the stated reason that "normal administration of
justice would not appear to tolerate that parties appoint as 'their'judge whatever mem-
ber of court they desire").
224. See DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 174-76.
225. For discussion of this point, see infra notes 244-47 and accompanying text. It is
interesting to note that Professor Subrin has found Fuller's claim for rational decision-
making, not Fuller's claim for presentation of proofs and arguments, to be the central
aspect of adjudication. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 988 ("As Lon Fuller and others have
taught us, it is resolving disputes through reasoned and principled deliberation, based
on rules, that is at the heart of adjudication.").
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the norm of party participation is valid; Fuller's further assumption
that procedures that better advance the norm are somehow "more
valid" does not seem to be required normatively. 226 In any event,
under Fuller's own analysis, all of the essential and optimal attrib-
utes of adjudication simply seem to be means to the end of assuring
party participation, and cannot be justified when other means better
accomplish the same objective. When this conclusion is combined
with the prior conclusion that rational resolution appears more sig-
nificant than party participation, it suggests that Fuller's essential
and optimal attributes are not necessarily the ones that best advance
adjudication.
None of these critiques impugns Fuller's methodology. By work-
ing from within the notion of what an adjudicatory system should
be, he was able to derive a description of cases that predicted at
least some aspects of complexity. If complex cases are demonstra-
bly different than routine ones, then the best place to begin might
well be a re-examination of the fundamental nature of adjudication.
That nature might reveal the similarities among cases, as well as the
specific ways in which complex cases put a strain on the normative
and the optimal operation of an adjudicatory system.
F. Summary
The initial inquiry finds no universal description of complex liti-
gation; instead, it finds many competing "definitions." Some defini-
tions are mundane, while others are theoretical. Some definitions-
like those that tie complexity to particular legal theories-are inac-
curate. This lack of an obvious synthesis seemingly vindicates the
numerous writers who simply decline to supply a definition.
As long as the label has no special relevance, there is no reason to
insist on precision in the definition of complex litigation. All of us
operate with a common and roughly equivalent sense of what words
mean. For example, we generally can agree on whether the object
we are observing is a car, and have little trouble distinguishing it
from a truck or a boat. Borderline objects will always force us to
confront our disagreements on the precise contours of a defini-
tion-think of a jeep-like vehicle owned by a suburban family. We
are unlikely to care much about conflicting nuances until it matters,
226. Elsewhere Fuller argued that "[w]hatever protects and enhances the effective-
ness of [the parties'] participation, advances the integrity of adjudication itself.
Whatever impairs that participation detracts from its integrity." Fuller, supra note 62, at
19. Because Fuller recognizes that even "bad" adjudication is still adjudication, this
claim for the choice of the "better" or "more valid" procedure logically cannot be de-
rived from the form of adjudication without an additional utilitarian assumption not in-
herent in Fuller's form.
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as it does, for instance, when the family has to decide whether to
license the vehicle as a car or as a truck.
We now have arrived at the point where the definition of complex
litigation matters. Proposals to create special rules for complex
cases abound. 227 One proposal's meat can be another proposal's
poison. For example, the preferred solution to re-litigation com-
plexity-joinder of all interested claimants in one case-might well
create insurmountable problems of complexity in the pretrial, trial,
and remedial phases. 228 A blue-ribbon jury 2 29 might stand in the
way of the stronger assertion of judicial control desirable from a
"public law" perspective. Indeed, a focus on micro-solutions to
specific manifestations of complexity ignores the effect of a solution
on the larger whole,230 and precludes a complete evaluation of a
solution's merit.
The issue remains whether these micro-manifestations of com-
plexity are tied together by a single thread. If not, then complex
litigation should perhaps be viewed as the sum total of all the differ-
ent types of complexity. Thus, complex litigation would exist when
there is (1) a need for case management; or (2) pretrial complexity;
or (3) trial complexity; or (4) remedial complexity; or (5) multiparty,
multiforum litigation; or (6) "public law" litigation; or (7) deviation
from the conflict-solving process in our laissez-faire state; or
(8) polycentrism; or (9) any other manifestation of complexity. The
solution to competing definitions of complexity would be to include
everyone's definition: To adopt, in other words, the "laundry list"
approach pioneered by the Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the
Trial of Protracted Cases and other writers. 23'
Although this eclectic approach has the virtue of easy compila-
tion, its vices are prohibitive. First, it provides no mechanism for
excluding "crazy" definitions. To return to the example of the car,
suppose that one person's definition of a car is "anything with a mo-
tor and two axles." We would clearly want to reject the definition as
overbroad because it includes motorcycles, go-carts, farm tractors,
and a host of other vehicles. But an approach that simply compiles a
list of all possible definitions of a "car" is powerless to exclude these
definitions from the list. The only way to exclude the "crazy" (and
usually overinclusive) definition is to admit that the fundamental
form of an object (whether it be a car or complex litigation) inher-
ently rejects the claim of some definitions to validity. To make that
admission is also to concede that the enumerative approach is
misguided. 232
227. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
230. See McGovern, supra note 15, at 441 (observing that "[mlini solutions may be
inappropriate for major problems").
231. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
232. Cf JOHN GUINTHER, THEJURY IN AMERICA 217 (1988) (arguing that the failure to
define "complexity" is a ploy of the opponents ofjury trial, who can use the vagueness
of the term to abolish the jury-trial right indirectly when they cannot do so directly). I
do not contend that the term "car," or the term "complex litigation" for that matter,
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Second, an eclectic approach provides no mechanism for choos-
ing among competing solutions. In an eclectic approach, no solu-
tion that reduces some aspect of complexity is illegitimate. Nor is
there an a fortiori method of deciding which solution is preferable.
Although we would be tempted to balance the complexities and
minimize their sum, nothing in the eclectic approach dictates that
utilitarian resolution. An approach that required a judge to adopt
the solution that comes earliest in the alphabet would be equally
valid.
Even the seemingly sensible utilitarian approach presents enor-
mous problems. First, "complexity minimization" requires a court
to adjudicate even the most "polycentric" dispute, at least as long as
it is less costly to adjudicate than to do nothing.2 33 Second, the min-
imization method might support draconian rules that are efficient,
but that hardly comport with our sense of litigative fairness.2 34 Fi-
nally, minimization requires an ability to evaluate the costs of the
necessarily must have a single meaning in all contexts. See Cook, supra note 21, at 337-
39. My minimal contention is that, in any given context, a term must have some defini-
tion independent of whatever meaning the reader chooses to assign to it. Although
even this contention is debatable, see, e.g., CARNEY & SCHEER, supra note 32, at 67-82, it is
a standard legal assumption, see, e.g., CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102 (1980). This
Article provides a definition of complex litigation to be used in the context of attempting
to discover the procedural consequences, if any, that follow from a designation as "com-
plex litigation."
Nor do I contend that enumerative lists are valueless. As this Section of the Article
has attempted to demonstrate, studying the exemplar instances of an object is often a
first step in defining its fundamental characteristics. Once the fundamental criteria of
the definition are established, it is then possible to speak of various examples or factors
that fulfill the criteria. Without such criteria, however, the examples or factors that com-
prise complex litigation cannot be segregated from those that do not. Having spent this
Section of the Article developing the enumerative list, the next task, taken up in the
remainder of the Article, is to find complexity's common criteria.
233. There are some instances in which it is not socially beneficial for parties to bring
litigation that they have a private incentive to prosecute. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 113-17 (2d ed. 1989); STEVEN SHAVELL, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 265-70 (1987). These cases are not congruent with
the cases in which there is an issue of "polycentricity" (i.e., judicial competence), for it
might be socially beneficial to resolve some disputes incompetently, and not beneficial
to resolve other cases competently.
234. For instance, in asbestos litigation, a coin flip on liability might well be more
efficient than existing adjudicatory procedures. Although the coin flip carries a 50%o
error rate, the existing system of adjudication involves transaction costs of 61 cents per
dollar spent. KAKALIK ET AL., sUpra note 14. Some minimal procedure to assure that the
plaintiff suffered injury from asbestos and a subsequent coin flip would seem to lead to
greater efficiency in the aggregate than case-by-case adjudication. The lack of reasoned
judgment in each individual case, however, would lead most of us to reject such an ap-
proach.
Of course, in the asbestos situation there might exist other alternatives, such as bank-
ruptcy or multidistrict proceedings, that are more fair and efficient than either of these
options. See generally In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415
(J.P.M.L. 1991) (transferring 26,639 actions for personal injuries obtained from expo-
sure to asbestos pursuant to the statute governing transfer in multidistrict cases); In re
Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (approving a
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various types of complexity accurately and quickly. The intangible
nature of certain costs and the inability to generate the information
required for the minimization calculus combine to make complexity
minimization more attractive in theory than in practice.
Far more satisfying than the "laundry list" would be a definition
that clarified the scope of complex litigation and established its in-
herent limitations. The challenge, then, is to meld into a single con-
cept the various types of procedural complexity, the case
management concepts so often associated with complex litigation,
the inductive observations of Chayes, and the juridical forms of
Fuller and Damaska. Each element provides an insight, a clue, to
the puzzle of complexity. Thus far, however, the form of complex
litigation has eluded all. 23 5
II. The Form of Adjudication and the Goals of Modern Procedure
The search for an encompassing definition of modem "complex"
litigation begins with the nature of modern litigation. The reason to
start here is two-fold. First, "complex" litigation is still, at bottom,
litigation, and consequently shares certain goals and assumptions
with its "routine" cousins. These common characteristics might
shed useful light on the points of similarity and departure between
"routine" and "complex" cases. Second, locating complex litiga-
tion within the structure of modern adjudication might adumbrate
some of the outside parameters of permissible responses to complex
litigation.
Modem adjudication is a blend of normative and positive ele-
ments. Normatively, modem litigation cannot contravene the in-
trinsic attributes of and limitations on the form of adjudication. 236
Nevertheless, just as the knowledge of the form of a car does not
help a person to decide whether to buy a coupe or a station wagon,
the form of litigation cannot dictate all of the choices of procedural
rule. Therefore, any procedural system makes certain choices that
are neither dictated nor excluded by the form of adjudication. 237
Those decisions are guided by the positive assumptions that a soci-
ety wishes its litigation system to meet.
The following sections describe the form of adjudication, explain
settlement of class action claims against a trust established to compensate victims of
asbestos exposure in bankruptcy proceeding to avoid case-by-case litigation by hun-
dreds of thousands of plaintiffs). My more general point-that the efficient solution is
not always the fairest in individual cases-nonetheless remains valid.
235. See Kendig, supra note 24, at 709 (stating that "[t]he reader must draw his or her
own conclusions as to what criteria or characteristics distinguish the cases in the
[MCML's complex] categories from all other cases").
236. For the time, I assume an equivalence between litigation and adjudication-that
the only legitimate function of litigation is to adjudicate a dispute. I relax this assump-
tion somewhat in Part IV, where I examine the role of courts in litigation that is polycen-
tric. See infra notes 562-66 and accompanying text; see also Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra
note 200, at 405-09 (recognizing that adjudicatory process can contain a mix of other
methods of social ordering).
237. For a discussion of the indeterminacy of formal analysis, see Unger, supra note
21, at 570-71.
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the positive assumptions that inform the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, and examine the relationship between adjudication and the
positive assumptions. The analysis is not designed to be exhaustive;
instead, I sketch a background against which the form of complex
litigation can be understood.
A. The Form of Adjudication
The classic study of the form of adjudication remains that of Lon
Fuller.23 8 According to Fuller, adjudication's essential form-par-
ticip~tion through proofs and reasoned argument-is fulfilled best
by certain procedural attributes such as adversarial proceedings,
neutral but knowledgeable arbiters, written reasons for decisions,
and retrospective application. 239 Fuller's form, however, turns out
to be inadequate on several fronts. The completeness of Fuller's
model has been challenged powerfully by the descriptive work of
Chayes and Damaska, both of whom demonstrate that adjudication
can, and does, occur in circumstances that either lack the procedural
attributes that Fuller finds so essential or else possess a high degree
of polycentrism. 240 Conversely, Fuller's model fails to exclude some
forms of dispute resolution-such as arbitration-that are not adju-
dicatory but that involve participation through proofs and reasoned
argument. 24 I Nor does participation through proofs and reasoned
argument necessarily guarantee, as Fuller believed, rationality in the
decisionmaking process. 242 Finally, the attributes that Fuller finds
essential to adjudication are in fact only means that must be aban-
doned when they fail to advance the end of rationality in party par-
ticipation and decision.243
At the same time, however, Fuller's form is not entirely mis-
guided. On its face, the exercise of reasoned decisionmaking seems
critical to adjudication. Fuller correctly emphasizes the opportunity
to participate through proofs and reasoned argument, which consti-
tutes a useful, even if not essential, aspect of adjudication. His rec-
ognition that the form of adjudication puts certain matters beyond
the bounds of legitimate resolution provides the impetus to discover
adjudication's true limits, once a form of adjudication that addresses
the criticisms of Fuller's model is developed.
The task, therefore, is to develop a form that unites the insights of
Fuller and the criticisms of his conclusion. Four attributes meet
238. See FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW, supra note 200; FULLER, THE MORALrITY OF
LAW, supra note 200; Fuller, supra note 62; Fuller, Form and Limits, supra note 200.
239. Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 381-93.
240. See supra notes 154-59, 189-95 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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these criteria and consequently define the essential form of
adjudication:
1. A dispute exists between two or more persons concerning the
allocation of an obligation recognized under existing constitu-
tional, statutory, regulatory, or other legal arrangements;
2. The claim of obligation is asserted against a person who is
required under existing principles to provide a remedy if the
claim is justified;
3. The state provides a decisionmaker who determines the obli-
gations of the defendant; and
4. The decision is reached through the application of reasoned
judgment, which is based on the consideration of the disputants'
circumstances, the relevant evidence, and the nature of the
claimed obligation.
Any decision that fulfills each of these criteria is an adjudicatory de-
cision; any decision lacking one or more of these elements is not.
The fourth element is the one most closely aligned with Fuller.
Unlike Fuller, however, this element does not insist on the parties'
right to present proofs and reasoned argument. As Damaska's dis-
cussion of the policy-implementing process before hierarchical offi-
cialdom demonstrates, parties in adjudication cannot always insist
upon the right to shape a case through presentation of proofs and
arguments. 244 Once we acknowledge this fact, Fuller's argument
that rational decisionmaking is an essential aspect of adjudication
also collapses.2 45 The fourth element consequently rebuilds the
principle of rationality on a firmer footing. Rather than requiring
party participation, this element requires rational decisionmaking:
the use by the decisionmaker ofjudgment informed by the facts and
the principles relevant to the dispute.2 46 The shift to rational deci-
sionmaking is descriptively satisfying, for it embraces not only
244. See DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 182-86, 201-04. Fuller might reply that the pol-
icy-implementing process before hierarchical officialdom described by Damaska is not in
fact adjudicatory because of this lack of party participation. Two responses are possible.
The first is that party participation does not invariably assure rational decisionmaking,
whereas the policy-implementing process before hierarchical officialdom can assure that
result. Under these circumstances, insistence on party participation seems an irrational
fetish. Second, the norm of party participation illegitimates the procedural systems used
in many parts of the world. See id.; MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, COURTS (1981) (describing the
adjudicatory systems in England, Western Europe, imperial China and traditional Is-
lamic countries). Although I do not suggest that the descriptive reality of "what is"
should necessarily determine the norms of "what should be," see Unger, supra note 21, at
571, a norm obviously inconsistent with the breadth of procedural options is suspect.
See generally Catharine P. Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A PragmaticJustificationforJury
Adjudication, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2361-63 (1990) (discussing the differences between
pragmatism and normative analysis). The recourse to existing examples of adjudication
is a logical-albeit inductive and pragmatic-methodology for finding the unifying crite-
ria of adjudication. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
245. Fuller had contended that rational decisionmaking inhered in the principle of
presentation of proofs and arguments, and thus did not need to be justified separately.
See Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 365-67. Although that argument is cer-
tainly debatable on the merits, see supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text, it clearly
falls apart once the centrality of presentation of proofs and arguments is disproved.
246. By "rational decisionmaking" or "reasoned judgment" I mean decisionmaking
that is based on the syllogistic application of facts to relevant principles (or norms) of
broad application. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE 44-45, 235-39 (1971); Melvin
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Fuller's optimal system of adversarial party participation and passive
judging but also the more inquisitorial and activist procedural sys-
tems described by Damaska and Chayes. Prescriptively, placing ra-
tional decisionmaking at the center of adjudication preserves the
role of reason for which Fuller persuasively argued and which
neither Chayes nor Damaska disputed. As the nature of the state
changes, the nature and content of the controlling law change the
methodology of decisionmaking and the result that a person might
A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89
HARV. L. REV. 637, 638 (1976) (noting that "[a]djudication is conventionally perceived
as a norm-bound process centered on the establishment of facts and the determination
and application of principles, rules, and precedents"); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Inter-
pretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 754 (1982). This type of decisionmaking has three com-
ponents. First, the "fact-finder" must be able to deduce the relevant facts through the
use of reason. Second, the "fact-applier" must be able to match these facts to the rele-
vant principles and determine the consequences. Third, the "principle-finder" must be
able to determine the proper principles that a particular set of facts involves. See Eisen-
berg, supra, at 644.
The second of these three functions is an entirely rational process; in fact-application,
there is no room for hunches or intuition. When the facts and principles are in legiti-
mate dispute, however, the first and third functions often will involve a certain intuitive
sense. As long as the fact-finder attempts to resolve the factual dispute by integrating
the evidence with the life experiences that form intuition, the resolution remains a ra-
tional one. When the fact-finder utterly ignores the evidence and resolves facts only on
the basis of pre-existing experience or intuition (for instance, by resolving the facts
against a corporate defendant in a securities case solely based on non-legal principles
such as "big companies always lie" or "big companies are rich"), the resolution of the
factual disputes will be neither principled nor rational. Shy of this extreme situation of
ignored evidence, the "life experience" bias through which evidence is viewed does not
make a factual resolution that is generally consistent with pre-existing bias an irrational
one. Similarly, principle-finding can be viewed, at least in part, as an intuitive process.
Principles are not necessarily objective, pre-determined norms; they often require intui-
tive assessment, especially when questions of fact or public policy are bound up with the
question of responsibility. See Harry T. Edwards, TheJudicial Function and the Elusive Goal
of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 837, 857-63; Unger, supra note 21, at 567-
70; Wells, supra note 244, at 2386-88. As long as the principle-finder does not base its
choice of the applicable standard solely on facts or arguments irrelevant under existing
modes of thinking, the ultimate choice is rational.
Adjudication is simply a particular type of rational decisionmaking. As the first ele-
ment of adjudication demonstrates, the particular type of principle involved in adjudica-
tion is the principle of law. See infra note 249 and accompanying text. Given the panoply
of persons (e.g., lawyers, judges, experts) and techniques (e.g., summaries and charts)
that can assist the fact-finder and fact-applier in their tasks, the failure of rational fact-
finding and fact-application in adjudication is an extremely rare occurrence. Reasoned
judgment can, however, occasionally be threatened. First, when a fact-finder is
presented with a mass of conflicting evidence that it cannot comprehend, organize, or
remember in a way that permits it to resolve the relevant disputes, the fact-finder has no
choice but to resort to pre-established bias or other legally illegitimate decisionmaking
principles. Second, when the legal principles are opaque, the fact-finder might be un-
able to discern the relevant factual issues, or the fact-applier might be unable to apply
the facts to the legal principles. Third, when persons untrained in the patterns of legal
thinking are entrusted with declaring the law or deciding mixed questions of law and
fact, the possibility of irrational law-finding exists. In a society in which the law-finders
are schooled in legal doctrine and patterns of legal thinking, the problem of irrational
law-finding is unlikely to arise in any systemic way.
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expect;247 but reasoned judgment, which gives effect to the relevant
societal and legal concerns of the state, remains the bedrock expec-
tation of the process of adjudication itself.
Unfortunately, the replacement of Fuller's attribute of participa-
tion through proofs and reasoned argument with the attribute of
reasoned judgment has an untoward side-effect: it insufficiently dis-
tinguishes adjudication from other forms of social ordering and
other decisionmaking processes. Entering a contract and voting for
legislation typically rely on the reasoned application of facts to ex-
isting legal principles, as does a decision whether to take the long
way home or a shortcut through a neighbor's property. Because the
decision in each of these cases descends from the application of a
socially or legally significant principle (that a contract is enforceable,
that the legislature should respond to the will of the majority, that
the neighbor might sue for trespass if I take the shortcut), judgment
formed after considerations of principles and facts cannot constitute
the only attribute of adjudication.
Additional attributes therefore must delineate adjudication's
form. The first of these is a dispute over the existence of an obliga-
tion under existing legal principles. Although the existence of prin-
ciples is implicit in the notion of reasoned judgment, 248 this
criterion makes explicit two distinctive aspects of adjudicatory deci-
sionmaking: that there must be a dispute concerning a "legal"
(state-sponsored and capable of being enforced by the state) obliga-
tion;249 and that the obligation must be either presently in existence
or capable of being derived through the use of reasoned judgment
247. In America, for instance, we might insist that we have "our day in court" with a
hired gun blazing away at witnesses. A Soviet citizen-at least until this past year-
might have demanded that the dispute be resolved in a way that advanced the interests
of the state. The common denominator between these disparate expectations is rational
decisionmaking. In America, with a generally laissez-faire attitude toward state interven-
tion and rules of law, rational decisionmaking requires party participation in the trial; in
the Soviet Union, with a legal system that traditionally used private disputes for public
purposes, rational decisionmaking required consideration of the state's interests. See
DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 202-04, 219-22; see also COUNCIL ON THE ROLE OF COURTS,
THE ROLE OF COURTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 90 (Jethro K. Lieberman ed., 1984) [herein-
after THE ROLE OF COURTS] (stating that reasoned decisionmaking is an essential charac-
teristic of adjudication).
248. For discussion of this point, see supra note 246 and Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra
note 200, at 365-72.
249. The concept of "legal obligation" used in this element is intentionally minimal-
istic. I do not claim that a legal obligation must be either "fair" or in accordance with
some underlying notion of natural or positive law. It is enough that the obligation in-
volve a claim that a person's liberty or property interest is held wrongly according to the
principles created and enforced by the state.
Likewise, the concept of "dispute" also is minimalistic. The only dispute necessary is
that one person seek to disgorge (or at least declare invalid) a liberty or property inter-
est held by another through the invocation of a "legal obligation" that, if applicable,
would require the transfer or elimination of the liberty or property interest. Neither the
claim of obligation nor the other person's opposition to relinquishment of the interest
must be made in good faith.
Implicit in this concept are three additional points. First, the dispute can involve
either coordinate or conflicting obligations. An example of coordinate obligations is a
claim of assault, to which the defendant asserts a claim of self-defense; each party asserts
a distinct obligation to justify its claim to the liberty or property interest. An example of
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from present legal principles or modes of analysis.2 50 This require-
ment distinguishes adjudication from social ordering based on reci-
procity, such as contractual bargaining, because the person who is
negotiating to obtain an object has no present entitlement to it.251
It also distinguishes adjudication from social ordering based on
common aims, such as legislative or rulemaking processes, because
conflicting obligations is the argument about whether negligence or strict liability princi-
ples should govern particular injury-causing conduct. In this instance, unless it is possi-
ble to adopt both, at least one (and perhaps both) of the obligations must be rejected.
Although the instance of coordinate obligations rarely creates problems of rational
"principle-finding," see supra note 244 and accompanying text, the instance of conflicting
obligations can.
Second, implicit in the concept of "state-enforced" obligations is the question of rem-
edy. Obligations that are merely state-sponsored (e.g., the national health-care platform
of the winning political party or presidential endorsement of specific policies or legisla-
tion) cannot give rise to adjudicatory claims for the simple reason that the state is unwill-
ing to put its coercive force behind the obligation. See THE ROLE OF COURTS, supra note
247, at 90; RAWLS, supra note 246, at 236. Although a state enforcement mechanism for
legal obligations implies that the ability to provide efficacious remedies is a necessary
aspect of adjudication, it is not necessary that the obligation create a single, unwavering
remedy, or that the remedy be calculated to recompense precisely the person who seeks
to disgorge the opponent's liberty or property interest. The focus is not on the right of
the plaintiff to a remedy; it is on the wrong of the defendant in acquiring and possessing
the relevant interest. Hence, the right and entitlement of the person seeking disgorge-
ment to relief is not a necessary component of adjudication; the obligations of the de-
fendant-not the rights of the plaintiff-are all that need be put into dispute. See
generally Chayes, supra note 100, at 1298-302 (discussing a decree as an order tailored to
enforce a defendant's obligations); Fiss, supra note 108, at 44-58 (analyzing remedy-
shaping as a tool to force a defendant to meet his obligations). In this respect, I depart
from those who perceive adjudication as necessarily involving a dispute about whether
an aggrieved person has a "legal entitlement." See, e.g., THE RoLE OF COURTS, supra note
247, at 87.
Finally, declaratory relief is not inconsistent with adjudication. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(1988). When a dispute over a liberty or property interest exists, it is not necessary that
the state immediately order coercive relief to disgorge that interest. Id. As long as coer-
cive remedies remain as the fallback to a declaration of obligations, see id. § 2202, the
disputants certainly can be given the opportunity to conform their conduct to the state's
declaration of responsibilities.
250. Resolution of legal obligations already in existence is the paradigmatic instance
of adjudication. See RAWLS, supra note 246, at 235-37. The more difficult issue is the
extent to which a decision can create new obligations and still be called adjudication.
See, e.g., id. at 238. The answer I suggest in the text, which admittedly draws no bright
line, is that the present, existent body of legal rules, principles, and accepted arguments
must contain sufficient data to shape a cogent and logical argument (i.e., an argument
that corresponds to the patterns of legal argumentation and analysis prevalent in a soci-
ety) for the development of new obligations. The obvious objection to this answer is its
breadth. For instance, because most existing legal rules, principles, and arguments rec-
ognize the goal of compensation, wholesale changes in the law could seemingly bejusti-
fied through the selective use of the compensation argument. There are two replies to
this objection. The first is that, under our prevalent patterns of legal argumentation and
analysis, compensation alone has never been deemed sufficient ground for the creation
of liabilities. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 4 (5th ed. 1984). The second is that various bodies of substantive law may
contain their own internal constraints (a "form") that preclude the development of new
obligations beyond a certain point. See infra note 562.
251. For a description of ordering by reciprocity, see Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra
note 200, at 357-59.
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rulemaking creates new obligations rather than declares responsibil-
ity under existing obligations. 25 2
Even when this attribute is joined with reasoned judgment, how-
ever, adjudication has not been separated sufficiently from other
modes of reasoned judgment. If I believe that present entitlements
give me a right to cut across my neighbor's property, my reasoned
decision to take the shortcut meets the first and fourth elements of
the form of adjudication. A person who has suffered harm due to
another's tortious behavior might ask a third person (for instance, a
legislature) to make good the damage; the third person's decision
likewise meets the criteria of reasoned judgment and existing legal
obligation. 253 Also satisfying these two criteria are most dispute res-
olution processes, including settlement, mediation, mini-trials, early
neutral evaluation, dispute-resolution centers, summary jury trial,
rent-a-judge programs, and arbitration. 254
The second and third elements therefore are necessary to distin-
guish adjudication. The second element-that the claim of obliga-
tion be asserted against a person who is required to make the
plaintiff whole-is necessary to distinguish adjudication from situa-
tions in which a plaintiff petitions a third person with a sense of lar-
gesse to remedy the plaintiff's loss. 25 5 The third element-that the
252. For a description of ordering by common aim, see id. The reality that a legisla-
tive or executive body frequently is involved in the creation of new entitlements and
obligations does not preclude these bodies from also engaging in adjudication. For in-
stance, a legislature can designate itself as the tribunal under which the allocation of
existing entitlements will be decided. See, e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (Impeach-
ment Clause). Similarly, an executive agency with rulemaking power also can engage in
adjudication, and an adjudicatory body can engage in rulemaking. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1988) (authorizing Supreme Court to create rules of procedure for federal dis-
trict courts); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) (upholding federal agency's
use of adjudicatory rather than rulemaking procedures). An instance on the borderline
of adjudication and rulemaking is the overruling of prior precedents. When the overrul-
ing is obvious and derivable from the direction of prior precedents, it would not appear
that the court is legislating. When the overruling occurs "out of the blue," however, the
court's result partakes more of legislation than adjudication.
253. The situation arises whenever a potential or actual litigant petitions the legisla-
tive body to amend existing law in order to make recovery either more simple or more
difficult. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa- Il to -17 (1988) (authorizing petitions against
government fund for injuries due to childhood vaccines); National Swine Flu Immuniza-
tion Program of 1976, § 2, 90 Stat. 1113 (authorizing claims against government for
liability of Swine Flu vaccine manufacturers); S. REP. No. 640, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2
(1991) (proposing cutback on existing state remedies for product liability). Although
the legislature's decision to create compensatory mechanisms or to modify existing law
often involves reasoned judgment and thus satisfies the fourth element of adjudication,
it obviously is not an adjudicative decision. On the other hand, once the legislature has
decided to enact a measure creating a new compensatory mechanism (for instance, a
vaccine compensation fund), then an obligation has been created, and a decision on that
claim will be adjudicatory.
254. See generally STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTIoN (1985) (discuss-
ing benefits and drawbacks of various methods of dispute resolution).
255. Although it is essential that the claim be pressed against a person obligated to
remedy the situation, it is not essential that the claim be prosecuted by the person who
has suffered the harm. See DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 152-53, 202-04 (discussing sys-
tems in which others might prosecute on behalf of a disinterested claimant); supra note
249. It also is not essential that the defendants in adjudication only are those under an
immediate obligation to remedy their failures of obligation; in theory, others who could
assist in the remedy can also be joined.
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state provide the decisionmaker-distinguishes adjudication from
my unilateral decision to cut across my neighbor's property. It also
distinguishes adjudication from alternate methods of dispute
resolution.
The insistence on a state decisionmaker may seem an unnecessary
fetish. Fuller, for instance, claimed that consensual arbitration was a
form of adjudication. 256 Indeed, arbitration frequently has the feel
of adjudication, especially when accompanied by rules: that govern
discovery, subpoena and interrogation of witnesses; require deci-
sions on the merits of a claim; permit reconsideration of improper
awards; and authorize adversarial party participation.2 57 Nonethe-
less, the common perception of adjudication envisions a judicial
process in which the judge and jury are agents of the state.25 8 More-
over, the first attribute of adjudication-the existence of a dispute
over existing legal obligations-implies that the decision must be
based on state-created obligations. Arbitrators, however, need not
decide disputes in accordance with state-created principles; they
may use business or ethical norms that have no counterpart in state-
created law and equity.2 59 Finally, arbitration has no method for
256. See Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 386, 392-93. Although it is not
entirely clear that he limited adjudicatory arbitration to situations in which the arbiter's
decision was binding, Fuller's examples apparently all concerned binding arbitration.
See, e.g, id. at 387, 389, 395-96, 406, 408; see also GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 254 (treat-
ing arbitration as a form of adjudication).
257. SeeUnited States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 7, 10-12 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990);
Uniform Arbitration Act §§ 7-13, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1955); AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (1964) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES],
reprinted in A DICTIONARY OF ARBrrRATON AND ITS TERMS (K. Seide ed., 1970); AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASS'N, VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION RULES (n.d.) [hereinafter LABOR
ARBITRATION RULES], reprinted in A DICTIONARY OF ARBrrRATION AND ITS TERMS (K. Seide
ed., 1970). See generally Habscheid & Schlosser, supra note 223 (discussing arbitration).
258. See THE ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 247, at 90 (stating that "the tribunal must
be a governmental entity"); supra note 223 and accompanying text; see also Burton v.
Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that "[ain arbitration hearing is not a
court of law").
259. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 257, § 42 ("The Arbitrator may
grant any remedy or relief which he deems just and equitable and within the scope of the
agreement of the parties."). Interestingly, the labor arbitration rules, also promulgated
by the American Arbitration Association, do not even require that the arbitrator's deci-
sion be "just and equitable." See LABOR ARBrrRATION RULES, supra note 257; see also 29
C.F.R. § 1404.15 (1991) (similarly expressing no standards to guide decisions in labor
arbitrations).
The distinction between the exercise of equitable discretion under the Commercial
Arbitration Rules and the adjudicatory discretion exercised by courts of equity is that
the chancellor derives his or her ability to "do justice" from the state, so that the princi-
ples of equity become an aspect of each citizen's obligation. See supra note 249. On the
other hand, the arbitrator does not necessarily look to the state or state-recognized prin-
ciples of justice to resolve the dispute.
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enforcing its rules and decisions. Although discovery can be or-
dered or an award made against a party, the party is under no obli-
gation to abide by the arbitrator's decision. 260 The principle of
reasoned judgment implies the ability to enforce the decision
reached; otherwise, the exercise ofjudgment will have been a mean-
ingless and irrational exercise.
These four elements of adjudication do little to flesh-out the de-
tailed contours of a procedural system.26' To be sure, the attributes
limit the range of procedural possibilities to some extent; for in-
stance, rules that permit decision by coin flip or by rulemaking pro-
cess do not conform to the adjudicatory model.26 2 On the other
hand, as long as each permits the exercise of reasoned judgment, a
system of notice pleading with extensive pretrial discovery and a
system of extensive fact pleading with no pretrial discovery both ful-
fill the requirements of adjudication. Similarly, nothing in the form
of adjudication implies that the system will be adversarial or inquisi-
torial, or that the decisionmaker will be passive or active. Nor does
reasoned judgment demand that procedures lead to the "best,"
most efficient, or most just resolution; all procedures that permit a
rational resolution are permissible.263
In order to develop a procedural system more fully, then, addi-
tional, positive assumptions must be made. In the following two
Sections, I explore the additional assumptions made by the proce-
dural system in use in federal district courts, and analyze which of
the assumptions are required by the form of adjudication.
260. For the general unenforceability of discovery orders see, for example, Burton,
614 F.2d 389, and De Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 321 N.E.2d 770 (N.Y. 1974), and compare
Coastal States Trading v. Zenith Navigation S.A., 446 F. Supp. 330 (S.D.NY. 1977)
(leaving open the possibility of discovery in an arbitration proceeding in exigent circum-
stances). Although the United States Arbitration Act and the Uniform Arbitration Act
provide for court enforcement of arbitration decrees, see United States Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§ 9, 13 (1988); UwF. ARBITRATION ACT §§ 14-16, 7 U.L.A. 5 (1955), the parties
ultimately must apply to the state's adjudicatory process for enforcement of awards.
261. The four criteria of adjudication intentionally are minimalistic in order to ac-
count for the array of adjudicatory systems represented by the four procedural models
in DAMASKA, supra note 169; the "public law" litigation model discussed in Chayes, supra
note 100; and the "adaptionist" or "instrumentalist" models of FIss, supra note 100, and
THE ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 247.
262. Coin flips depart from adjudication's requirement of reasoned judgment be-
cause there is no attempt to apply fact to principle. See supra note 246. Rulemaking
departs from adjudication's requirements that the claim of legal obligation be already in
existence and that the decision be based on the relevant facts of the case. See supra notes
246, 249.
263. The insistence on the use of the procedures that best fulfilled his form of adjudi-
cation was one of Fuller's errors. See supra note 226 and accompanying text. Although a
reasonable enough assumption, it is not logically required by the form of adjudication.
A Mercedes may be a better car than a Yugo, but both meet the definition of a car, and
nothing in the definition of "car" can tell us which car we should choose. Similarly, the
fact that adversarial proceedings, passive arbiters, and provision only for retrospective
relief might lead to a better system of adjudication does not illegitimate an activist in-
quisitorial system that meets adjudication's minimal norms.
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B. The Assumptions of Modern American Procedure
Although it is conceivable that a government will spew out proce-
dural rules without giving any thought to the goals that adjudication
is to accomplish in the society, it is far more likely that adjudicatory
rules will be crafted to conform to predetermined values. Like the
attributes of adjudication, these values necessarily do not dictate all
the details of a procedural system, but they make choices of specific
rules more evident. In the United States, although the procedures
among federal and state courts are hardly uniform,264 a set of seven
shared assumptions has generated a largely homogenous set of
rules whose differences (at least in comparison to Continental or
Asian systems of procedure) are far less striking than their similari-
ties. The assumptions are "case or controversy," due process, ad-
versarialism, jury trial of cases at law, post-pleading formulation of
issues, "transactionalism," and "trans-substantivism."
The first five assumptions are obvious to anyone who has sat
through a basic course in civil procedure. The "case or contro-
versy" requirement of Article III of the United States Constitu-
tion,265 together with prudential considerations of standing, 266
ripeness, 267 and mootness, 268 restrict access to federal courts to
those persons who have an actual stake in the outcome of a dis-
pute,269 and bar advisory opinions. 270 The second assumption, due
process, is the cornerstone of American procedure. The Due Pro-
cess Clause,271 first and foremost, demands that affected persons re-
ceive adequate notice and the opportunity to participate in
adjudicatory decisions that directly impinge on their rights to life,
liberty, or property; a failure of notice and opportunity to be heard
264. See supra note 11.
265. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
266. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 476-82 (1982) (discussing constitutional and prudential
aspects of standing); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (requiring action to be prosecuted by a real
party in interest).
267. See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)
(holding that an injury that is "certainly impending" is ripe for adjudication); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-18 (1976) (discussing constitutional and prudential aspects of
ripeness).
268. See, e.g., Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317-18 (1988) (requiring that a controversy
either be "actual and ongoing" or capable of repetition); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S.
395 (1975) (same).
269. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (requiring an
"actual injury redressable by the court"); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); 13
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529 (1984).
270. See, e.g., EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). Some states have relaxed this as-
sumption to allow the judiciary to issue advisory opinions. E.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2,
chap. III, art. II. These provisions do not violate the United States Constitution, but
may preclude the exercise of federal jurisdiction. New York State Club Ass'n v. City of
New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 (1988).
271. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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eliminates the preclusive effect of any earlier decisions reached in
the person's absence. 272 Second, the Clause acts as a limitation on
the territorial power of state sovereigns over the person and prop-
erty of those located elsewhere.273 Third, due process requires that
the decisionmaker use reasoned judgment in arriving at the deci-
sion.2 74 Fourth, the Clause expresses a preference for those proce-
dures that minimize the sum of litigation costs and error costs. 2 75
Finally, the Clause expresses a preference for adversarial
proceedings. 276
Even though the third assumption, adversarialism, is to some ex-
tent dictated by due process, American procedure has embraced the
adversarial model even beyond the bounds of constitutional re-
quirement. Increasingly criticized, 277 the adversarial assumption in-
sists that adjudication be controlled by the parties, who formulate
and present their version of the dispute to a dispassionate deci-
sionmaker with no prior knowledge of or interest in the dispute. 278
272. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (superseded by the Civil Rights Act of
1991, § 108, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1076); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940); COMPLEX LrrIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 2, supra note 16, § 5.05, at 105-11.
273. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), overruled by Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 206.
274. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (Black,J., dissenting);
Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947), overruled by Taylor, 419 U.S. at 522; In re
Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); Note, supra note 30,
at 910 & n.68; cf Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126 (1987) (recognizing a Sixth
Amendment right to a tribunal that was "impartial and mentally competent," but refus-
ing to allow an evidentiary hearing on alleged alcohol and drug use by jurors during
deliberations (quotingJordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176 (1912))).
275. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Obviously, as more procedural pro-
tections are provided, the cost of litigation rises. On the other hand, fewer protections
increase the likelihood of error, which has its own costs. Eldridge suggests that the deter-
mination of the process due balances the costs of additional procedures against the risk
of erroneous deprivation. Taken to its extreme, this cost-minimization concept, often
associated with the law and economics movement, vaults efficiency over all other process
values. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 21.1 (3d ed. 1986); Ar-
thur R. Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 30-35 (1984).
276. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (superseded by FED. R. CIV. P.
99); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 268-71; Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 170 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); cf Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
511 (1947) (discussing the importance of adversarial procedure to "our system ofjuris-
prudence to promote justice and to protect ... clients' interests").
277. The classic critique of unfettered adversarialism is Roscoe Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906) ("The
idea that procedure must of necessity be wholly contentious disfigures our judicial ad-
ministration at every point."), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 281 (1964). For other discus-
sions, which are by no means exhaustive of the literature, see Wayne D. Brazil, The
Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV.
1295 (1978); Warren E. Burger, Agendafor 2000A.D.-A Needfor Systematic Anticipation, 70
F.R.D. 83 (1976); Marvin E. Frankel, The Searchfor the Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. REv. 1031 (1975); Walter V. Schaefer, Is the Adversary System Working in Optimal Fash-
ion?, 70 F.R.D. 159 (1976). Dissatisfaction with overly adversarial procedure also moti-
vated, at least in part, significant changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the
1980s-changes that include new powers to limit discovery, see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1);
the creation of new sanctions provisions, see FED. R. CIv. P. 11, 26(g); and increased
powers of case management, see FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
278. See THE ROLE OF COURTS, supra note 247, at 88-93; Chayes, supra note 100, at
1285-88; Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 381-93. The Due Process Clauses of
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Although adversarialism always has been tempered by the need for
judicial power to prevent unfettered gamesmanship, the power may
be exercised only within a narrow range that keeps the playing field
level.2 79
The next assumption-jury trial in cases at law-represents an-
other constitutional cornerstone of American procedure.2 80 The
form of adjudication does not itself specify the nature of the deci-
sionmaker. The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion, like similar provisions in state constitutions, fills the void by
dividing the adjudicatory function between judges and juries. 281
the Constitution do not invariably insist on party control of proofs and arguments. See
Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332-35; JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 4, § 1.2.
279. Lord Chief Justice Hewart once described the civil judge as the person "who
merely keeps the ring." Rex v. Harris, 2 K.B. 587, 590 (Crim. App. 1927). In theory,
the judge cannot shape the issues, conduct an independent investigation into the case,
or examine witnesses; she can only sanction conduct that exceeds the rules for party
combat. See DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 220-21; Miller, supra note 275, at 19-20, 33-34;
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982). In practice, of course,
even the most adversarial of systems have permitted judges and juries to exercise some
of the adversaries' powers. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 4, § 1.2; LouISELL ET AL.,
supra note 46, at 1098-105. As a general matter, however, there is no doubt that the
litigants and their attorneys control the presentation of evidence and arguments. A
timeless description of this contest in action remains LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 395-
403 (1930).
280. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
281. The precise parameters of the relationship between judge and jury are quite
complex and vary among jurisdictions. In general terms, judges in the federal courts
decide pure questions of law in all cases, questions of fact in suits sounding solely in
equity, and some questions of fact in cases at law; juries decide all remaining questions,
including mixed questions of law and fact. There are, however, exceptions. First,
although juries are not constitutionally mandated in equitable suits, Congress may pro-
vide for them by statute or the parties may consent to their use; conversely, parties to an
action at law can waive their jury trial right. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a), 38(d), 39(c).
Second, although judges typically decide "pure" questions of law in all cases, mixed
questions of law and fact are often left to the jury in cases tried at law; and the boundary
between "law" and "fact" has changed throughout history. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra
note 4, § 7.2. But see FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) (allowing use of special verdicts). Third,
juries preempt judicial fact-finding on issues relevant to legal and equitable claims tried
in a single proceeding. Lytle v. Household Mfg., 494 U.S. 545 (1990); Beacon Theaters
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Butjudges also are entitled to intrude upon the fact-
finding process of the jury through devices such as summary judgment and judgment as
a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a), 50(b), 56. When Congress permits, judges
also can decide some of the factual issues not essential to the right ofjury trial. Tull v.
United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
States may divide responsibility between judge and jury differently than the federal
system. Some have allowed juries to hear cases in equity. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 895 (5th ed. 1989); MILLAR, supra note 2, at 39-42. States may use
more or less restrictive standards for the judge's ability to intrude on the fact-finding
process of thejury. See, e.g., Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1970). They also
may vary in their view of the power of the legislature to interfere with the right ofjury
trial. Compare Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (finding
legislative cap on noneconomic tort damages violative of Washington's right to jury
trial) with Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding no infirmity in United
States or Virginia Constitutions for legislative cap on all tort damages), unrelated certified
questions answered, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990).
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The fifth assumption of American procedure rejects the common
law's devotion to pleading as the process for the definition of issues.
Recognizing that there must be some way to narrow a dispute to the
relevant questions of law and fact, however, modem procedure re-
quires less specific pleadings, followed by an opportunity for the
parties to narrow issues and eliminate meritless claims through pre-
trial informational disclosures that "discover" the true nature of the
opponent's case.28 2 The requirement of disclosure conflicts, of
course, with the strict adversarial ethic; the resulting accommoda-
tion allows discovery of information about the factual occurrences in
the dispute while protecting attorney advice, attorney impressions,
and other materials prepared in anticipation of litigation. 285
The final two assumptions are less widely known. A reaction
against the common law's use of the writ as the unit around which to
organize a lawsuit,28 4 "transactionalism" holds that the unit around
which a lawsuit should be organized is the transaction or series of
factual events that give rise to the claim(s) of legal entitlement.28 5
Although the writ system's focus on the plaintiff's personal legal en-
titlement madejoinder of other affected parties largely unnecessary
and therefore exceedingly difficult, the transactional approach re-
quires rules that also permit thejoinder of other persons affected by
the same series of events. 28 6 Thus, transactionalism contemplates
the broad joinder of claims, defenses, and parties whenever the
event giving rise to the dispute implicates them.2 7
Finally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure aspire to be a "trans-
substantive" procedural system. Again a rejection of common law
procedure, "trans-substantivism" requires that the same set of rules
be applicable to all cases; there are no longer separate rules for tort
282. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8-10, 26-37; see, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957);
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F:2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). For theoretically more restrictive
rules of modem code pleading, see, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 3001-45 (McKinney
1991); Gillispie v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 128 S.E.2d 762 (N.C. 1963); CLARK, supra note
4, § 38.
283. The prohibition against disclosure of attorney-client information, an attorney's
mental impressions of a case, and opinions of experts informally consulted on a case are
nearly absolute, whereas the showing required for disclosure of other forms of "work
product" is high. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), 26(b)(4); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449
U.S. 383 (1981); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Ager v. Jane C. Stormont
Hosp. & Training Sch. for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1980).
284. See MAITLAND, supra note 10, at 5; supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
285. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), 13(g), 18. Under the Federal Rules, a party's ability to
join claims actually exceeds the narrow requirements of transactionalism. In some in-
stances, a party may assert in one pleading claims that do not arise out of the same
transaction or occurrence, although the court then retains the power to split those
claims off for separate proceedings. See id. 13(b), 18, 42(b).
286. See id 13(h), 14, 19-24.
287. The justifications for transactional procedure can be found in CLARK, supra note
4, § 19, at 137-48. See also Chayes, supra note 100, at 1290 (discussing the transactional
assumption); supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the demise of arcane
pleading procedures). Under the Federal Rules, if the resulting case becomes too large,
the court retains the power to pare the case down into digestible pieces. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 42(b). That power derives not from the transactional assumption, but from that as-
pect of the Due Process Clause that prefers streamlined, cost-effective procedures. See
supra note 275 and accompanying text.
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cases, contract cases, and equitable claims.288 Trans-substantivism,
which can perhaps best be summarized by the phrase "all cases
treated procedurally alike," does not require precise equivalence of
procedures in all cases; rather, it requires that the procedural differ-
ences that inevitably occur among cases not influence the outcome
of the case. Necessarily, therefore, trans-substantivism implies a
certain amount of discretion. For instance, a rule that limited a
party to ten depositions in all cases would have potentially outcome-
determinative consequences when applied in one case which has
three witnesses and in another which has fifty witnesses. Thus, this
facially neutral rule actually would violate the trans-substantive as-
sumption. On the other hand, a judicially-tailored limit of five dep-
ositions in the case with only three witnesses and a different limit of
fifty depositions in the case with thirty witnesses does not treat the
cases disparately. Given the infinite patterns of claim and partyjoin-
der possible under transactionalism, trans-substantivism appears to
work optimally with a set of "general," "loosely textured" rules in
which judges have the discretion to shape procedures to ensure that
the rules do not unduly influence the outcomes of cases. 289
Paradoxically, however, the discretion to fashion case-specific
rules also threatens trans-substantivism-not at the level of formal
rule, but at the level of rule implementation in individual cases. 290
The efficiency preferred by the Due Process Clause,29 1 the party
control of proceedings required by adversarial process, and the
widely varying purposes of different bodies of substantive law292
make the accomplishment of the trans-substantive goal even more
difficult. Therefore, although arguably required by the Enabling
288. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1, 2. For defenses and critiques of the trans-substantive as-
sumption, see Burbank, supra note 21, at 1471-76; supra note 12.
289. See Carrington, supra note 12, at 2079-84. Roscoe Pound spearheaded the drive
for judicial discretion, making it his first principle of procedural reform. See Pound,
supra note 10, at 402 ("It should be for the court in its discretion, not the parties, to vindi-
cate rules of procedure intended solely to provide for the orderly dispatch of business,
saving of public time, and maintenance of the dignity of tribunals; and such discretion
should be reviewable only for abuse.") (emphasis added). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which use the word or concept of discretion in nearly a third of its rules, see
Subrin, supra note 2, at 923 n.76, have largely been built around the concept of the
neutral, wise, and professional judge. Carrington, supra note 12, at 2082.
290. See Burbank, supra note 21, at 1474; Burbank, supra note 12, at 714-19; cf
DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 239 (noting that, in the policy-implementing process of
coordinate officialdom, "considerable uncertainty and instability are introduced into the
legal system"); RAWLS, supra note 246, at 238 (arguing that necessary precepts of formal
justice are "that laws be known and expressly promulgated, that their meaning be clearly
defined, and that statutes be general both in statement and intent"); Benjamin Kaplan,
Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2125-26 (1989) ("Is there any inconsis-
tency [between the exercise ofjudicial discretion and] the trans-substantive goal?").
291. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
292. See Cover, supra note 12.
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Act of 1934,293 trans-substantivism remains procedure's most elu-
sive goal, both because of the internal problems of developing a uni-
form yet useful set of rules and because of the external conflict with
other procedural and substantive assumptions.
The inherent tensions of trans-substantivism require a deeper ex-
amination of its underpinnings. This principle of "treating all cases
procedurally alike" is actually an amalgamation of four separate
ways of articulating the principle of "treating like cases procedurally
alike."' 294 The first way posits that two cases that are transactionally
alike should receive the same procedures. Thus, it is wrong for one
slip-and-fall to receive notice pleading, liberal discovery, and a jury,
while a second slip-and-fall receives fact pleading, no discovery, and
trial to the bench. Such disparate procedures risk different substan-
tive outcomes among legally and factually similar cases. For lack of
a better phrase, I will call this articulation of the "like treated alike"
principle "inter-transactional neutrality."
A different conception of the "like treated alike" principle is that
all cases that involve a single legal theory should receive procedures
that create no differences in substantive outcome. The assumptions
of transactionalism and inter-transactional neutrality neither require
nor preclude the application of a single set of procedures to unre-
lated and factually dissimilar transactions that incidentally invoke re-
covery under the same legal theory. Arguably a vestige of the writ
293. The Enabling Act required that the rules of procedure promulgated by the
Supreme Court be "general." Enabling Act of 1934, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 2073(a) (1988)). With the exception of the merger of law and equity-
specifically authorized by the Rules Enabling Act-the sparse legislative history of the
Rules Enabling Act does not suggest that Congress contemplated the creation of a trans-
substantive procedural code. See S. REP. No. 1049, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H.R.
REP. No. 1829, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of
1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1094-98 (1982). Among the early proponents of the
Rules Enabling Act and the members of the Advisory Committee that created the 1938
Federal Rules, there came to be a recognition that the "general" rules would be uniform
and simple, making no distinction between legal and equitable theories; but discussion
of the effect of "general" procedural rules on related cases, claims, and parties seemed
lacking. See Burbank, supra, at 1061-94; Subrin, supra note 2, at 959-61, 972-73, 977.
For a debate about whether the term "general" in the Enabling Act implies trans-sub-
stantive rules, compare Carrington, supra note 12, at 2079 (stating that "general"
presumes "trans-substantive") with Kaplan, supra note 290, at 2125 (concluding that
"general" could mean only that rules be uniform in all federal courts).
294. Both formalists and instrumentalists recognize the importance of treating like
cases procedurally alike. Rawls posits that the "rule of law also implies the precept that
similar cases be treated similarly." RAWLS, supra note 246, at 237; cf 2 THE SUMMA THE-
OLOGICA OF THOMAS AQuINAS 1018 (English Dominican Province trans. 1981) ("[L]aw is
a general precept."). Fiss likewise intimates his acceptance of the principle that "similar
communities be treated alike." Fiss, supra note 100, at 51. As Rawls acknowledges,
however, "this notion does not take us very far." RAwLs, supra note 246, at 237. Justice
does not "require[] that all communities be treated identically," Fiss, supra note 100, at
51, and it is often difficult to choose the community with which a claimant is more prop-
erly associated, see Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991). To decide
which procedural "communities" are important and which are not, it is first necessary to
articulate the different ways in which similar cases can be treated with procedural dissim-
ilarity. The second step is then to develop priorities among the different types of proce-
dural dissimilarity. See infra notes 305-08, 521-29 and accompanying text. This two-step
effort has never been attempted in the context of civil procedure.
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system,295 this application of the "like treated alike" principle opts
for common procedures; thus, any procedural differences that might
exist between a slip-and-fall and a mass tort cannot be the cause of a
victory for one plaintiff and a loss for another. I will call this appli-
cation of the "like treated alike" principle "intra-substantive
neutrality."
Taken together, inter-transactional and intra-substantive neutral-
ity point in the direction of trans-substantivism. Nonetheless, it is
possible to satisfy both assumptions with a writ-like system in which
each distinct legal theory asserted in a case receives its own system
of procedures. 296 When the adjudicatory unit cuts a horizontal,
fact-driven swath across substantive legal theories, however, it
makes little sense to retain vertical fences of separate substantive
procedures. Thus, the third aspect of the "like treated alike" princi-
ple holds that, within a single lawsuit, all claims and defenses must
receive the "same" procedures-procedures that do not result in
the disparate handling of evidence or arguments relevant to two or
more claims or defenses. Unlike the two prior applications of the
"like treated alike" principle, this application does not focus on dis-
parate results among legally or factually similar transactions; it con-
cerns itself with the potentially disparate impact of procedural rules
on the various legal theories within a single transaction. I will call
this application "transactional neutrality."
Finally, the principle of "like treated alike" can mean that all par-
ties to a lawsuit must receive procedures that do not cause disparate
outcomes. This application of the principle is related to, but differ-
ent than, transactionalism, which requires that all parties to a trans-
action be capable ofjoinder but does not dictate the procedures that
should be applied to the parties afterjoinder. It is also distinct from
295. The writ system conceived of procedures "vertically"-in terms of the form of
the plaintiff's action rather than "horizontally'--in terms of the factual events sur-
rounding the transaction. See supra notes 2-4, 284-87 and accompanying text. Once
procedure identifies the transaction as the basic unit of adjudication, there is no reason
to insist that two cases that have dissimilar facts but that coincidentally involve the same
legal theory should receive the same procedures.
296. For example, consider a set of procedural rules that demand that any contract
claim be supported by the testimony of five bishops, even though any competent evi-
dence can support a tort claim. For a products liability case alleging both warranty and
strict liability claims, these evidentiary rules satisfy the assumption of inter-transactional
neutrality, because the same rules apply to all similar contract-tort cases. They also sat-
isfy the assumption of intra-substantive neutrality, because the rules specify one set of
evidentiary rules for all cases sounding in contract and one (albeit different) set of rules
for all cases sounding in tort. Nonetheless, if a plaintiff cannot secure the testimony of
five bishops, her warranty claim will be lost on summary judgment, but her tort claim
still may survive through trial. The disparate results between the theories derive entirely
from the difference in procedural rules.
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transactional neutrality, which focuses on the procedures to be ap-
plied to the claims asserted in a case. This aspect of trans-substanti-
vism, which I will call "inter-personal neutrality," means that no
procedure that causes outcome-determinative differences among
the plaintiffs harmed in a transaction is legitimate. Likewise, there
can be no outcome-determinative differences among defendants
who participated in the transaction.
The only way to satisfy simultaneously all four aspects of the "like
treated alike" principle is to adopt, and enforce, a trans-substantive
code that treats all cases procedurally alike. Should any of the four
neutralities be abandoned, trans-substantivism would also collapse.
Just as it often is difficult to satisfy simultaneously all four neutral-
ities, it is impossible to satisfy simultaneously all seven of modem
litigation's assumptions. In a particular case, adversarial proceed-
ings might not be cost-effective; in another, jury trial of only some
claims might thwart transactional neutrality. With the exception of
assumptions of constitutional stature, which trump other assump-
tions when a direct conflict exists, modem procedure provides no
method for ordering the seven assumptions to resolve inherent con-
flicts among them. Therefore, the assumptions cannot themselves
specify a single procedural code. Instead, as experience and tastes
change, different emphases can be given to different assumptions,
and different procedural rules can be created. Because all of the
assumptions must be satisfied to some degree, the range of possible
rules is limited. Nevertheless, choices remain, and procedural tink-
ering is an expected consequence of modern procedure. 297
C. The Relationship Between the Form of Adjudication and the
Assumptions of American Procedure
Until now, I have assumed that the assumptions made in Ameri-
can procedure are entirely positive, that is, they are not dictated by
(but also not inconsistent with) the normative form of adjudication.
As the insistence of due process on reasoned judgment demon-
strates, however, some of modem procedure's assumptions also are
normatively required. 298 Therefore, the separation of normative
from positive assumptions might well be crucial to an understanding
of the form of complex litigation and the limits on its solutions. The
reason is simple: Proposals that transgress the normative (and
therefore inviolable) attributes of adjudication are not legitimate so-
lutions in adjudicatory system; whereas proposals that violate only
the positive (and therefore impermanent) assumptions of modem
297. For instance, during the 1980s the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have under-
gone a general shift in favor of efficiency at the expense of adversarialism. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 11, 16, 26(b)(1), 26(f), 26(g), 37 (g); Miller, supra note 275, at 30; Resnik, supra
note 279. Decisions interpreting the Federal Rules and the courts' inherent powers like-
wise have demonstrated, either consciously or subconsciously, a greater willingness to
weigh the societal burdens of litigation more strongly than the individual opportunity to
be heard on the merits. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427
U.S. 639 (1976); Marcus, supra note 15, at 443-44.
298. See supra notes 246, 295 and accompanying text.
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procedure remain candidates for further consideration. 299
Five aspects of modem procedure are fundamental to the form of
adjudication. First, and most obviously, that aspect of the Due Pro-
cess Clause that prefers decision by reasoned judgment3 00 meshes
with adjudication's identical requirement. The remainder of the re-
quirements of due process-notice and opportunity to be heard,
territorial limitations, efficiency, and adversarial process-are not,
however, fundamental attributes of adjudication.
Second, adjudication's requirement that a claim be brought
against a person legally obligated to provide a remedy replicates
one aspect of modem procedure's "case or controversy" assump-
tion. The "case or controversy" assumption, however, is much
broader; it also requires that the claim be brought by a person who
has suffered an actual injury.30 1 This aspect of the "case or contro-
versy" requirement finds no counterpart in the form of
adjudication. 302
The third procedural assumption of normative stature is transac-
tionalism. Transactionalism's normative character derives from ad-
judication's insistence on reasoned judgment by the decisionmaker.
If reasoned judgment is to be guaranteed, the decisionmaker cannot
be bound to accept one of the proffered positions, but must instead
have the freedom to range over facts and legal theories not
presented by the participants. 30 3 In order to provide this freedom, a
299. Of course, solutions that violate neither the normative assumptions of adjudica-
tion nor modem procedure's positive assumptions would be preferable. As Part III will
show, however, complex litigation necessarily involves a challenge to a number of these
assumptions. Hence, the sifting of essential from merely desirable attributes of adjudi-
cation is crucial.
300. See supra note 274.
301. See supra notes 265-69 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 248-52, 265-72 and accompanying text.
303. It is not necessary that the decisionmaker exercise this power in any given case;
the parties may supply sufficient information and arguments for fact-finding, fact-apply-
ing, and law-finding to be accomplished rationally. Even Lon Fuller, who was as closely
tied to the concept of adversarialism as any modem thinker, recognized that in some
(albeit limited) instances the decisionmaker was entitled to go beyond the record pro-
vided by the parties. See Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 388-89. Fuller never
justified his willingness to allow the decisionmaker some license, even though this li-
cense departs from his usual insistence on party proofs and argument. The only logical
explanation is that reasoned judgment requires the decisionmaker to make adjustments
in thinking when its rational processes lead it to find facts or legal principles advocated
by neither party. Cf FED. R. EVID. 706 (permitting use of court-appointed experts).
Once the primacy of reasoned judgment over party presentation is recognized, see
supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text, then the limits that Fuller sets on the deci-
sionmaker's power to inquire beyond the parties' presentations must also collapse. The
only formal principle for limiting the decisionmaker's investigative powers is relevance.
The decisionmaker's power to explore all aspects of a transaction necessarily does not
invalidate all rules of procedure that preclude the introduction and consideration of
evidence on nonrelevance grounds, see, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 501, 801-805, or on the
grounds of failure to comply with procedural requirements in pleadings, discovery, and
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procedural system necessarily must have the capacity to make an en-
tire factual transaction available for adjudication. Therefore, any
system that limits the decisionmaker to the resolution of particular
facts or theories fails to meet adjudication's normative commands.
Like the due process and "case or controversy" requirements,
however, transactionalism is not mandated completely by the form
of adjudication. When the dispute before the decisionmaker cannot
be resolved rationally without additional parties, the norms of adju-
dication require the joinder of other parties affected by the same
course of conduct. These instances of compulsory joinder are ex-
ceedingly rare-far rarer than the instances of compulsory party
joinder presently allowed under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.30 4 This stingy acceptance of party joinder displays adjudica-
tion's essentially conservative nature; as long as its four elements
are satisfied, adjudication lacks the inherent power to choose other
rules that lead to a "more" rational, more efficient resolution.
Next, the assumption of inter-transactional neutrality, which
posits that legally similar transactions should receive the same set of
procedures, is, at least in part, a necessary component of the form of
adjudication. The normative component of this assumption derives
from adjudication's first attribute: a dispute over a pre-existing obli-
gation. The pre-existence of a legal obligation assumes that, if one
person violates an obligation, another person acting under identical
circumstances violates the same obligation. In other words, obliga-
tions exist independently of the specific adjudicatory proceedings
that resolve them.A0 5 If differences in procedure between similarly
pretrial orders, see e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 15(a), 16 (f), 37(b)(2)(A)-(C). Incidental re-
strictions on the admissibility of some aspects of a transaction are necessary to protect
nonadjudicatory societal interests or to assure focus on directly relevant evidence. Puni-
tive sanctions for refusal to cooperate in adjudication are a necessary, albeit unfortu-
nate, power to make the adjudicatory process meaningful. See infra notes 533-34 and
accompanying text.
304. The form of adjudication requires party joinder in an adversarial system only
when nonjoinder threatens an affected person's ability to present proofs and argument
or to implement a remedy. See infra notes 429-37 and accompanying text. The Federal
Rules allow compulsory joinder in three instances: joinder of persons needed for ajust
resolution, FED. R. Civ. P. 19; interpleader to avoid multiple or inconsistent liability, id.
22; and class actions, id. 23. Statutory interpleader under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335 and 2361 is
a fourth instance. To a certain extent, these rules overlap with the instances in which the
form of adjudication requires joinder. But the Rules do not confine themselves to join-
der necessary to accomplish rational adjudication in the limited sense in which the form
of adjudication requires rationality. For a more detailed description of the relationship
between the form of adjudication and the more expansive party-joinder principles of the
Federal Rules, see infra notes 430-38 and accompanying text.
305. For a discussion of adjudication's need for principles that exist (or are at least
discernible) prior to the adjudication, see supra notes 246, 249-50 and accompanying
text; RAWLS, supra note 246, at 237-38; Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 365-81.
This view contrasts with the view of legal realists or pragmatists who believe, to use
Leon Green's phrase regarding tort law, that "we may have a process for passing judg-
ment in negligence cases," but no "law of negligence" beyond the process itself. See
GREEN, supra note 279, at 185. See generally P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism:
Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process and the Law, 65 IowA L. REV. 1249 (1980)
(perceiving that, in resolving the tension between deciding a case based on the effect the
decision will have in the future and the desire to achieve justice in particular circum-
stances, modem courts have shifted toward placing more emphasis on the latter).
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situated cases cause differences in the decision, however, no obliga-
tion can be said to exist until the procedures are established. Con-
sequently, the form of adjudication insists that the procedures used
to decide one claim of obligation be the same as procedures used to
decide other claims that are not factually or legally distinguish-
able.30 6 When similar transactions involve factual differences that
are legally relevant, however, adjudication does not insist on similar
procedures; here, the differing legal obligations permit the use of
different procedures. 30 7
For a similar reason, certain aspects of inter-personal neutrality,
which requires that the same procedures be applied to all parties to
a single transaction, also inhere in the form of adjudication. If one
plaintiff or one defendant receives the benefit of procedures not
granted to identically situated plaintiffs and defendants, then the
procedures established during the course of the adjudication would
define the obligation. This result contravenes adjudication's re-
quirement of violation of an obligation existing before the occur-
rence of the dispute. Of course, the form of adjudication does not
preclude the use of disparate procedures for parties whose cases are
legally or factually dissimilar. Thus, if the law does not recognize
product misuse as a defense in a products liability action, the claims
of one person who misused the product and one who did not cannot
306. Interestingly, this concern with equality of procedure among cases cannot be
derived from adjudication's attribute of reasoned judgment. Reasoned judgment fo-
cuses on the decisionmaker's ability to resolve an existing dispute through the applica-
tion of a universal substantive norm (or law) to fact. Thus, reasoned judgment would
require only that the second case be resolved by applying the same substantive law to
the facts. It would not insist on equivalence in procedures or outcomes.
Adjudication's embrace of inter-transactional neutrality also should be distinguished
from the entirely different question of whether a particular "procedural" rule can have
"substantive" effects. Adjudication does not deny that procedural rules influence sub-
stantive outcomes, and thus can conceive of procedural rules as an aspect of the pre-
existing obligation. From the perspective of adjudication, the precise content of the
obligation, and consequently of the procedural rules that enforce that obligation, is not
especially significant; the important matter is that procedural rules not vary in a way that
makes the obligations indeterminate or that otherwise conflicts with the norms of
adjudication.
307. Because no two cases are identical, it is always possible to find factual differences
that could justify disparate procedures. As the text indicates, however, the factual differ-
ences must be ones that the law recognizes as leading to different obligations. The
temptation to create questionable, case-specific legal distinctions (e.g., by claiming that
the defendant's obligation to use due care toward a boy during November differs from
its obligation to use due care toward a girl during May) as a means of justifying case-
specific procedural rules fortunately is limited by three notions. First, the concept of a
principle implies that rules will have application beyond a given case; second, all law-
finding must use reasoned judgment; and third, the legitimacy of the judiciary in our
society depends on a certain consistency of result. See supra notes 246, 249; see also
RAWLs, supra note 246, at 237 ("The requirement of consistency holds of course for the
interpretation of all rules and for justifications at all levels. Eventually reasoned argu-
ments for discriminatory judgments become harder to formulate and the attempt to do
so less persuasive.").
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be adjudicated under different, outcome-determinative procedural
rules created to account for the misuse. On the other hand, if the
law recognizes misuse, then procedures that lead to disparate treat-
ment are not precluded by the form of adjudication.308
These five assumptions of modern procedure are the only ones
essential to the form of adjudication. Trial by jury, efficiency of pro-
cedure, notice and opportunity to be heard, territorial power, adver-
sarialism, post-pleading issue disclosure, most of transactional party
joinder, and transactional and intra-substantive neutrality all are
consistent with adjudication's attributes, but none is compelled.
Although it could be argued that some or all of these assumptions
better fulfill the ends of adjudication than other sets of assumptions,
this assertion is just as irrelevant to the formal analysis of adjudica-
tion as a claim that a coupe is better than a station wagon is to the
formal analysis of a car. These assertions mask the reality that both
cars are still cars, and that inquisitorial, policy-implementing deci-
sionmaking is every bit as adjudicatory as the adversarial, conflict-
solving system preferred in America.
D. Summary
The foregoing "detour" through the form of adjudication and the
positive assumptions of American procedure has provided both
mandatory and desirable criteria for the adjudication of disputes.
The most significant mandatory limit on procedural rules is that the
rules must not frustrate the exercise of reasoned judgment. Other
formal limits on procedural innovation preclude rules that prevent
transactional joinder of claims or foster disparate outcomes among
factually and legally indistinguishable transactions and parties. De-
sirable procedural aims-including efficient rules; adversarial pro-
cess; and sameness of procedure among all causes of action in one
case, among all cases invoking the same cause of action, and among
differently situated parties involved in a transaction-further guide
the choice of procedural rules, but may be sacrificed in the interests
of adjudication.
III. The Form of Complex Litigation
Part II's analysis now brings the definition of complex litigation
into sharp focus. As Part I demonstrated, most of the existing defi-
nitions of complex litigation myopically describe particular manifes-
tations of substantive or procedural complexity. None of the
definitions integrates these observed manifestations, complex litiga-
tion's uncertain relationship to case management, and the insights
of Chayes, Fuller, and Damaska. In this Part, by joining these in-
sights to the form of adjudication and the assumptions of modern
308. The difference in rules might well violate the positive assumptions of transac-
tional neutrality and intra-substantive neutrality. Because neither of these neutralities
inheres in the form of adjudication, however, the form of adjudication itself does not bar
the disparate procedures.
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American procedure, I develop a universal definition of complex
litigation.
This definition contains two essential elements. First, complex lit-
igation involves the inability of a properly functioning adversarial
system to guarantee reasoned judgment, a reality that provokes a
nonadversarial exercise of judicial power designed to preserve rea-
soned judgment. This attribute, which plays out the conflict be-
tween the formal requirement of reasoned judgment and the
positive assumption of adversarial process, turns out to be insuffi-
cient as a definition of complex litigation. Also required is a second
attribute: The procedures created by the assertion of increased
judicial power clash with at least one of the four pillars of trans-
substantivism-inter-transactional neutrality, intra-substantive neu-
trality, transactional neutrality, or inter-personal neutrality.
Even as they define complex litigation, these dual attributes sug-
gest certain limitations on the use of judicial power. Frequently,
however, two or more techniques fulfill the formal demands of adju-
dication, but each does violence in different ways to the positive as-
sumptions of modern litigation. In this situation, choosing among
the permissible techniques remains a difficult decision. Therefore,
this Part closes with an analysis for selecting the techniques to re-
solve complexity's conflicts.
A. A First Glance: Dysfunction and the Modes of Complexity
The crucial clues in the search for the definition of complex litiga-
tion are those provided by Chayes and Fuller. As different as their
endpoints are, both start from the traditional-and for Fuller, legiti-
mate-model of American adjudication. Shaped by our common-
law heritage, the model depends on the participation of several
players. The first is the judge, a neutral arbiter who declares objec-
tive law, referees disputes between litigants, and enters judgments.
The next group of players is the jury. As rational, dispassionate,
and uninformed about the particulars of a case as the judge, the jury
must resolve factual disputes based on the evidence presented and
decide whether the facts adduced at trial require relief under the law
declared by the judge. A third group are the parties, whose func-
tions in litigation are limited to providing information (testimony
and documents) and complying with the judgment of the court.30 9
309. See DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 220 ("Parties fade[] into the background....").
Another function of parties is to pay the fees of their attorneys. That matter is consid-
ered in infra note 317 and accompanying text.
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At the center of the process is the final set of players: the law-
yers.310 They find the information concerning the event in ques-
tion, they decide how much of that information should be told to the
judge and jury, they choose the legal theories under which the case
will be decided, they make the arguments that inform the judge or
jury about how to decide the case. They perform these tasks by act-
ing as advocates for one side, on the assumption that truth will be
achieved through a clash of adversaries with an incentive to expose
the weaknesses in an opponent's seemingly ironclad case.31'
This model of adjudication proceeds on the assumption of neatly
defined and, for the most part, mutually exclusive roles.31 2 As
Chayes points out, however, "public law" litigation has muddied
these neat divisions. Thejudge shoulders some of the responsibility
for shaping the law and facts, asserts the right to make more of the
factual decisions, and involves herself intricately in the parties' im-
plementation of a remedy.313 Chayes' problem, however, lies in jus-
tifying this judicial usurpation at the expense of the other actors in
the litigation enterprise: the parties, the jury, and especially the
lawyers.31 4
Ironically, Lon Fuller, Chayes' intellectual nemesis, supplies the
justification. Central to Fuller's conception of adjudication, as well
as to the properly constituted form of adjudication outlined in Part
II, is a process through which decisions are made by rationally ap-
plying legal principles to evidentiary proofs.3 15 Perhaps, then, the
increase in judicial power that Chayes and others have observed
may be a consequence of the inability of the lawyers, the jury, and
the parties to fulfill their traditional functions in the rational resolu-
tion of the dispute, and the commensurate need of the judge to step
into the vacuum in order to ensure rational resolution. If that expla-
nation were true, then the increase in judicial power is entirely justi-
fied. The positive assumption of adversarial process must bend to
accommodate the unyielding norm of reasoned judgment.
To test the hypothesis that the nontraditional assertion ofjudicial
power to protect reasoned judgment constitutes an essential ele-
ment of a definition of complex litigation, we can examine the types
of situations in which lawyers, jurors, and parties become incapable
of fulfilling their adversarial tasks, and observe whether the re-
sponse has been assertion of judicial power that in fact protects ra-
tional judgment. We then can analyze whether these situations
310. See DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 220.
311. See JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 4, § 1.2; Resnik, supra note 12, at 502-07; cf
COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, supra note 14, at xiii (preface of Robert F. Hanley) (calling
the adversarial system "the finest system ever designed to resolve human conflict").
312. In reality, there is some overlap of roles. For instance, judges and jurors can
often ask some questions of witnesses, see LOUISELL ET AL., supra note 46, at 1098-105,
and judges make certain factual determinations, see supra note 281 and accompanying
text. The areas of overlap do not significantly displace the roles of the players in their
primary area of responsibility.
313. Chayes, supra note 100, at 1296-302.
314. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text.
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correspond to the types of complexity that the existing commentary
has documented. If the formal theory and the empirical observa-
tions match, then we will have found a common theme uniting the
seemingly disparate manifestations of complexity.
1. Lawyer Dysfunction: Herein of "Formulational Complexity"
The lawyer is the centerpiece of the traditional model of litiga-
tion. He formulates the evidence, the issues, and the arguments.
This formulational process occurs both before trial, when the infor-
mation about a transaction is marshaled and the legal arguments are
shaped, and during trial, when the lawyer seeks to present the infor-
mation in a persuasive fashion.
Lawyer dysfunction-the inability to perform this formulational
task assigned by the adversarial system-can arise from a number of
sources. First, the nature of information that the attorney must gar-
ner and marshal may make it impossible for the attorney to formu-
late adequate proofs and arguments. For instance, the underlying
transaction may be so wide-ranging that the investigation to obtain
all the relevant information from all potential sources prevents the
case from being prepared for trial within a reasonable period. 316
More likely, the mass of information makes the discovery process so
costly that the litigant is unable to afford to pay the lawyers to obtain
information critical to reasoned judgment,3 1 7 or the costs to other
316. By "reasonable period" I mean a period within which no evidence critical to a
reasoned decision will be lost or destroyed. For instance, if both voluminous documen-
tary evidence and the testimony of certain witnesses are crucial to the parties' argu-
ments, the need to spend time first discovering the documentary material might result in
faded memories or death. The absence of the crucial testimony makes the fact-finder's
resolution a matter of hunch rather than reason.
Given the parties' ability to perpetuate testimony and to use depositions at trial in the
event of death or lapsed memory, see FED. R. Civ. P. 27, 32(a); FED. R. EVID. 804(b), this
situation will rarely arise except when subsequently added parties object to the introduc-
tion of evidence taken before they were added. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). The more
typical, related problem of faded memories or death caused by lapse of time between the
attorney conduct and the injury is considered infra note 319 and accompanying text.
317. Every case contains internal resource constraints dictated either by the pocket-
book of the parties or by the value of the claim. In order for a case to satisfy this ele-
ment of complexity the constraints on resources must result in a strategic decision by a
party's attorney to leave untouched information critical to reasoned judgment. Such a
decision is, of course, a rare occurrence in a large case between well-financed oppo-
nents. Such decisions, however, are a frequent occurrence when one party is impecuni-
ous or when the amount of the claim is small. As will be demonstrated subsequently, the
claim of an impecunious party and the small claim are not complex litigation; more than
a threat to reasoned judgment is necessary to render a case complex. See infra PartsIII.A.5, III.B.
Nor does the mere costliness of discovery or trial make a case complex. In order for a
case to be complex due to the costliness of obtaining information, the cost must force a
party to abandon the search for critical information. Therefore, writers who have
claimed that mere cost can create complex litigation have overstated the case. See supra
note 22 and accompanying text. Moreover, by tying cost to the inability to obtain critical
information, this definition of complexity also avoids the dual problems of arbitrariness
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persons (including opponents) of revealing the information may be
so high that they can make a legitimate claim that the burden on
them justifies nondisclosure of the critical information. 31 8 Finally,
the time lag between wrongful conduct and injury may be so long
that critical evidence has been lost or destroyed.31 9 Whatever the
precise reason, the quality or quantity of information leaves an at-
torney with no choice but to enter trial with a command of fewer
than all the necessary facts and a handicapped ability to formulate
the case for reasoned decision.
A second, less frequent cause of lawyer dysfunction occurs be-
cause of the open-textured and uncertain nature of the substantive
law. When combined with liberal rules of pleading and wide-rang-
ing factual occurrences, the opacity of substantive law can make it
difficult for a lawyer to know an opponent's legal theory of the case
(e.g., "complex litigation involves discovery costs in excess of $50,000") and relativity
(e.g., "complex litigation involves discovery costs that are disproportionate to the stakes
in the case"). See supra notes 77-78, 125 and accompanying text.
318. The costs of revelation are not necessarily monetary. Revelation of some classes
of information might be detrimental to societal interests. See FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1),
(b) (3), (c) (barring absolutely disclosure of privileged material, barring conditionally dis-
closure of work-product material, and permitting use of protective orders to prevent
disclosures that will cause "annoyance, embarrassment, [or] oppression"). In other in-
stances, however, the monetary costs of revelation simply are too great to permit disclo-
sure. See id. 26(c) (allowing courts to issue protective orders when discovery is an
"undue burden or expense"); see also id. 26(b)(1)(iii) (allowing nondisclosure when dis-
covery is "unduly burdensome or expensive").
When the balance struck under these principles results in concealment of critical in-
formation, the lawyer's task of formulating issues is thwarted. But not every successful
assertion of a privilege or issuance of a protective order creates lawyer dysfunction. In
most cases, the decision to withhold information under privilege, work product, or pro-
tective-order principles does not result in the withholding of information critical to rea-
soned decisionmaking. Even when it does, the hypothesis of complexity requires the
court to be able to respond to the lack of information with a curative assertion ofjudicial
power. Both circumstances are unlikely to be present in many cases.
Nonetheless, as a general matter, tests that allow for nondisclosure of critical informa-
tion obviously are inconsistent with the form of adjudication. To the extent that nondis-
closure is based on a consideration of interests specifically protected by society, as is
typically true of privileges, the form of adjudication must yield to Fuller's ordering by
common aim, see Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 357; the dispute then be-
comes a "polycentric" one that is incapable of adjudication. See infra notes 517-19 and
accompanying text. The only way to avoid this result is to allow the norm of reasoned
judgment to override the competing interests for non disclosure. Cf Marrese v. Ameri-
can Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1159 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding in
antitrust case that non-disclosure of information should be based on a balancing of the
nature and magnitude of the hardship to each party, giving more weight to interests that
have a distinctively social value than to purely private interests), rev'd on other grounds, 470
U.S. 373 (1985).
319. The long latency period between conduct and illness places many toxic torts and
long-running commercial conspiracies into this category. According to the hypothesis
with which we are working, however, a judge must be able to remedy the lawyer's dys-
functions before a case can be considered complex. When critical information has been
lost or destroyed, there is usually little a judge can do other than bifurcate for trial other
issues for which adequate evidence exists, and then hope for a negotiated solution of
remaining issues before the trial. Cf Mullenix, supra note 69, at 564-65 (discussing tech-
nique of reverse bifurcation in which punitive damages and affirmative defenses were
tried before liability issues in asbestos class action).
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in advance of trial.3 20 That uncertainty, which frustrates the law-
yer's ability to formulate his own case for presentation, runs counter
to the assumption of perfect information which undergirds the ad-
versarial model.
A third problem, which lies in the borderland between lawyer and
jury dysfunction, arises when the lawyer believes that the factfinder
would be unable to comprehend or decide rationally the case if the
facts were fully presented, and thus, tries the case based on a "fic-
tionalized," simplified version of the transaction. Traditionally, the
adversarial model has relied on opposing counsel to bring out the
untold story; but here the opposing lawyer, fearful that the
factfinder would become lost, acquiesces in perpetuation of the
fiction.32 '
Finally, lawyer dysfunction arises from the inability of lawyers rep-
resenting the same or similar interests to develop a single, coherent,
and rational position for presentation to a decisionmaker. Although
this type of internal conflict usually would be controlled by the cli-
ent, in some instances the client may lack sufficient interest to do
so. 322 Even if the client has the interest, the competition of related
parties in the litigation to increase or decrease their share of a lim-
ited asset may preclude effective cooperation. 323 In either event,
the result, if left unchecked, is a Tower of Babel in which attorney
infighting threatens to undermine the effective formulation of a
party's case.324
320. See Kirkham, Good Intentions, supra note 14, at 202; Kirkham, Problems of Complex
Civil Litigation, supra note 14, at 498.
321. Of course, lawyers make tactical choices every day to leave an opponent's "fic-
tions" undisturbed. For instance, Judge Schwarzer quotes trial lawyer Gerry Spence as
claiming: "I have never tried a complex case.... [A]ll cases are reducible to the sim-
plest of stories.... The problem is that we, as lawyers, have forgotten how to speak to
ordinary folks." Schwarzer, supra note 143, at 576 n.6. In some cases, though, the re-
duction of grey and morally ambivalent areas into a morality play of black and white,
good and evil, necessarily requires the paring out of information inconsistent with the
litigant's "story," but highly relevant to the exercise of reasoned judgment. When the
limitations of trial make it impossible for the opponent to present valid contrary evi-
dence in an effective matter, reasoned judgment has been thwarted.
322. The classic example is the class member, who is not likely to receive much infor-
mation about the course of the lawsuit or the conduct of counsel. Even clients directly
represented by an attorney may not have the opportunity to monitor the lawyer's han-
dling of the cases of related clients. See Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts:
Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89. The same difficulties can affect defendants
with certain common interests and other divergent interests.
323. The typical instances are the limited compensatory fund-in which plaintiffs
often have an incentive to jockey their claims to the front of the pack-and the injunc-
tion-in which various groups of claimants disagree about the proper scope of relief.
This situation should be distinguished from the related problem of competition for a
fund or injunction among parties who are not all involved in the same litigation. In the
latter instance, each party's ability to present an effective case and the decisionmaker's
ability to decide each case rationally are not directly threatened. The problems raised by
related case litigation are considered in infra Part III.A.4.
324. Multiple presentations of proofs and arguments rarely will frustrate reasoned
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Translated into the terms in which the present literature and case
law have described complexity, lawyer dysfunction encompasses
pretrial complexity as well as certain aspects of trial complexity.
"Vast" discovery3 25 and legal doctrines of "constitution-like gener-
ality,"3 2 6 which are typical descriptions of pretrial complexity, corre-
spond precisely to the first two causes of lawyer dysfunction that the
hypothesis of complexity would predict. The third and fourth
causes of lawyer dysfunction-in which lawyers are unable to pres-
ent evidence effectively at trial-correspond to certain aspects of
trial complexity.a27
According to the hypothesis of complexity, however, the lawyer's
inability to perform his essential functions in the rational resolution
of a dispute does not itself give rise to complexity; rather, the re-
sponse to lawyer dysfunction must be sufficient judicial involvement
to assure reasoned judgment. The empirical evidence demonstrates
that judicial power in complex cases is in fact designed to fill the
void left by dysfunctional lawyers. The most obvious example is the
use of management techniques for the cases that the lawyers, left to
their own devices, are incapable of reducing to manageable (and ra-
tional) proportions. Thus, case-management orders may order dis-
covery in a certain sequence,328 defer discovery on costly or
judgment on an issue of liability; the two general exceptions are the extensive use of
evidence inadmissible for some (but not all) parties' cases and questioning by co-parties
which is so lengthy that it fades the factfinder's memory and reduces its comprehension.
In the area of remedy, however, the jury's difficult task to remember individual defenses
and damage claims of a large class creates a significant problem for rational
decisionmaking.
325. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
326. See SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 1-1, at 1; see also supra text accompanying note
67.
327. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
328. See FED R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3), (d); Association of Retail Travel Agents, Ltd. v. Air
Transp. Ass'n, 623 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1985); In re Greenman Sec. Litig., 94 F.R.D.
273, 285-88 (S.D. Fla. 1982). The concept of "wave discovery," in which the various
types of written discovery and depositions are scheduled to occur in stages, was a central
feature of the Manualfor Complex and Multidistrict Litigation's pretrial management plan for
complex cases. See MCML, supra note 14, §§ 0.5, 1.5, 2.2-.3. The Manual for Complex
Litigation (Second) de-emphasizes the importance of wave discovery. See MANUAL, supra
note 13, § 21.421; see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(3)(C)(ii) (Supp. 1990) (requiring courts to
consider "phas[ing] discovery into two or more stages" in complex cases).
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separable issues,3 29 restrict the duration of discovery,330 or urge in-
formal discovery.33 1 The judge may personally screen docu-
ments,3 3 2  and become involved in matters of information
management, storage, and retrieval in order to prevent cost-prohib-
itive duplication of effort.333 To remedy the problems of liberal
329. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2), (c)(4); Marrese v. American Academy of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1159 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on other
grounds, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Plummer v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local Union
130, 77 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ill. 1977); CBS v. American Soc'y of Composers, 53 F.R.D. 231
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). Compare In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 797
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (limiting discovery to one defensive issue) with In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 98 F.R.D. 557 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (ordering re-examination of earlier
discovery rulings in light of decision to expand the issues to be tried). But see In re Fold-
ing Carton Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D. 132, 135 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (refusing to limit exami-
nation on relevant issues). See generally MANUAL, supra note 13, § 21.421 (discussing
restriction of the amount of time permitted for discovery).
330. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817-
18 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); MANUAL, SUpra note 13, § 21.421;see
also 28 U.S.C. § 473 (a)(3)(C) (Supp. 111990) (requiring courts to consider development
of discovery schedule for complex cases).
331. See FED. R. Civ. P. 29; MANUAL, supra note 13, § 21.422; see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 473(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1990) (requiring courts to consider the "encouragement of cost-
effective discovery through voluntary exchange of information among litigants and their
attorneys and through the use of cooperative discovery devices"). For instances of court
encouragement or party agreement to informal discovery, see In re Del-Val Fin. Corp.
Sec. Litig., No. 90-Civ-7207, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2877 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1991) (sus-
pending discovery but allowing informal discovery to continue); Morales v. Turman, 569
F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Tex. 1983); Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.D.C. 1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 512 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Ash v.
Commissioner, 96 T.C. 459 (1991) (describing informal discovery methods encouraged
in complex tax cases).
332. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976); EEOC v. University of
Notre Dame Du Lac, 715 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1983) (en banc); In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 97 F.R.D. 427 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
333. Courts have the power to establish document depositories and master files. See,
e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4287 (D. Colo. Apr. 18, 1988); In re
Folding Carton Antitrust Litig. (N.D. Ill. Jul. 2, 1976), reprinted in SCHWARZER, supra note
54, at 223-37; FDIC v. Blackburn, 109 F.R.D. 66, 70 (E.D. Tenn. 1985); In re Greenman
Sec. Litig., 94 F.R.D. 273, 279-80, 284 (S.D. Fla. 1982); see also In re Recticel Foam Corp.,
859 F.2d 1000, 1001 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussing cost distribution of maintenance of doc-
ument depository). See generally MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 21.441, .444 (discussing the
use of document depositories). Courts also can create special courtrooms to handle the
logistics of a large-scale case. See In re SanJuan Dupont Plaza Hotel Litig., 768 F. Supp.
912, 935 n.81 (D.P.R. 1991) (describing assessment levied against plaintiffs' counsel for
construction of special courtroom for the litigation); supra note 83 and accompanying
text. Courts also have become more active in the development of computer databases to
capture and store relevant information. See MANUAL, supra note 13, § 21.446; Edward F.
Sherman & Stephen 0. Kinnard, The Development, Discovery, and Use of Computer Support
Systems in Achieving Efficiency in Litigation, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 298-302 (1979) (advo-
cating a joint information system shared by the court and all counsel). But see In re
Showa Denko K.K. L-Tryptophan Prods. Liab. Litig.-II, 953 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1992)
(reversing order of multidistrict court which assessed state and federal litigants not in
the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) proceeding and non-litigating claimants a fee that was
to be used to finance the MDL discovery).
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pleading, the judge may require (or even draft) a single consoli-
dated complaint or answer,334 order interim briefs or statements on
particular aspects of the case in an effort to force factual or legal
stipulations, 335 forbid any deviation in legal or factual theory from
pretrial submissions, 336 or strike certain claims or defenses viewed
as insubstantial.33 7 Thejudge can appoint herself, a magistrate, or a
master to supervise discovery, with an eye toward keeping the par-
ties narrowly focused on the central issues that the judge has iso-
lated for decision.338 Similarly, in order to provide guidance to
lawyers faced with amorphous law, the judge may exercise at the
pretrial stage a power traditionally reserved to the trial: the declara-
tion of applicable law. The surgical use of summary judgment3 3 9
334. See Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 521 F.2d 1354 (2d Cir. 1975); Diana E. Mur-
phy, Unified and Consolidated Complaints in Multidistrict Litigation, 132 F.R.D. 597 (1991).
335. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f); In re SanJuan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17332 (D.P.R. Dec. 2, 1988); United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314,
1343-49 (D.D.C. 1978); RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 14, at
216-24; MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 21.33, .34, .65; SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 2-
2(c)(3).
336. See Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1977); G & R Corp. v.
American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 1975); FDIC v. Glickman,
450 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1971); see also MANUAL, supra note 13, § 41.7 (suggesting model
final pretrial order which precludes use of witnesses or exhibits not listed on the order
"[e]xcept for good cause shown").
337. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b), 16(c)(1); Diaz v. Schwerman Trucking Co., 709 F.2d
1371, 1375 n.6 (11th Cir. 1983); Fox v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 694 F.2d 1349,
1356-57 (5th Cir. 1983); Holcomb v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 577, 580 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 879 (1958); Michigan Wis. Pipeline Co. v. Moore, 319 F. Supp. 753
(N.D. Miss. 1970); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg., 245 F. Supp. 889,
891-92 (N.D. Ill. 1965); see also MANUAL, supra note 13, § 21.33; SCHWARZER, supra note
54, § 2.3(a) (discussing inherent judicial authority to limit issues). But see Fidelity & De-
posit Co. v. Southern Util., 726 F.2d 692 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that "Rule 16 by its
terms does not confer special powers to enter judgment not contained in Rule 56 or the
other rules");J.F. Edwards Constr. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard Rail Corp., 542 F.2d
1318, 1323 n.5 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that court can encourage but not force factual
stipulations).
338. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b), 53; United States v.
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 123 F.R.D. 62 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (declining to expand
scope of master's reference); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 106 F.R.D. 210
(W.D. Mo. 1985), mandamus granted sub nom. In re Armco, Inc., 770 F.2d 103 (8th Cir.
1985); MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 21.52 to .53; SCHWARZER, supra note 54, §§ 3-6(D), 5-
4. For the limitations on a master's appointment, see, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); In re Bituminous Coal Operators' Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1165 (D.C.
Cir. 1991). In these cases, the court and lawyers were capable of performing their pre-
trial and trial tasks without a master's assistance. Although the courts did not rely ex-
pressly on this lack of dysfunction, its absence acts as the strongest justification for the
results in La Buy, Armco, and Bituminous. See RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLEX LITIGATION,
supra note 14, at 224-26; Brazil, supra note 15; Hazard & Rice, supra note 29; Silberman,
supra note 12.
339. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56; RECOMMENDATIONS ON COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note
14, at 226-31; MANUAL, supra note 13, § 21.34; SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 2-3(B)(3).
Compare Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (stating that "summary procedures
should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play
leading roles") with Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
596 (1986) (affirming summary judgment in antitrust case when ambiguous evidence
failed to demonstrate a "rational economic motive to conspire").
Of course, the use of summary judgment is a bit like using a meat ax to perform open
heart surgery. Judgment generally can be granted only with respect to claims for which
judgment can be entered as a matter of law. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Except through
the rarely invoked auspices of Rule 56(d), individual facts cannot be established and,
even then, declarations of existing law are not authorized specifically. A recent proposal
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and the issuance of "preliminary" memoranda of law340 can provide
the lawyers with a roadmap through uncharted legal terrain.
If the lawyers continue to have difficulty discharging their formu-
lational functions during trial, the judge's new-found power can ex-
tend beyond the pretrial process. The judge might order trial of
fewer than all the issues or fewer than all the claims.3 41 She might
require the development of stipulations, statistical summaries, or
narratives. 342 She might take an active role in questioning wit-
nesses. 343 She might cap the length of a party's case,344 or alter the
usual "plaintiff-defendant-plaintiff's rebuttal" order of trial. 345
Finally, judges can thrust themselves into internecine attorney
squabbles that threaten the orderly presentation of a party's case.
She has the power to appoint lead counsel, liaison counsel, and trial
counsel.3 46 She can create committees of counsel and set them
to allow the summary disposition of law and fact did not survive the Federal Rules' revi-
sion process. See Carrington, supra note 12.
340. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (issuing "Preliminary Memorandum" on conflict of laws and ordering further
briefing on the issue); Peterson & Selvin, supra note 106, at 239-41 (discussing use of
preliminary rulings or deliberate refusal to rule as a means of exerting pressure on risk-
averse parties).
341. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); Sanford v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 923 F.2d 1142
(5th Cir. 1991); In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
1006 (1989); COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, supra note 14, at 59-61; Manual, supra note
13, § 21.632; Mullenix, supra note 69; see also In re New York Asbestos Litig., Nos. 88 Civ.
4213-19, 4221, 4222, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8465 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1990) (denying re-
verse trifurcation because separate trials of the issues "would to an unacceptable degree
be duplicative," but allowing bifurcation on issue of punitive damages); supra note 76
and accompanying text (discussing the use of bifurcation and interim instructions to
assist jurors in complex cases).
342. See FED. R. EvID. 611(a); Oostendorp v. Khanna, 937 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1991)(upholding use of deposition summaries against rules-based and constitutional chal-
lenges), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 951 (1992); Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 712
(4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); In re Air Crash Disaster, 720 F. Supp.
1493, 1502-04 (D. Colo. 1989); MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 22.3, .5; SCHWARZER, supra
note 54, § 7-2(B)(5). For a description of the use of a special master to collect and
present to a jury statistical profiles of class members, see McGovern, supra note 20, at
660-75; Mullenix, supra note 69, at 540-45.
343. See FED. R. EVID. 614(b); In re IBM, 618 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1980); Continental
Casualty Corp. v. National Steel Corp., 533 F. Supp. 369 (W.D. Pa.), af'd, 692 F.2d 748
(3d Cir. 1982); MANUAL, supra note 13, § 22.42.
344. See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1170-72 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); REPORT ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, supra
note 14, at 535-36; see also Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 473 (7th Cir.
1984) (disapproving of "practice of placing rigid hour limits on a trial" in less compli-
cated products liability suit).
345. See MANUAL, supra note 13, § 22.34.
346. See In re Boesky Sec. Litig., 948 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1991) (describing duties of
chosen lead/liaison counsel); Vincent v. Hughes Air West, 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977);
MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1958); In re MGM Grand Hotel Fire Litig.,
660 F. Supp. 522, 526-29 (D. Nev. 1987) (describing tasks undertaken by "Plaintiffs'
Legal Committee"); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 132 F.R.D. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (detailing
reasons for choosing one law firm over other firms bidding for position as class counsel);
MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 20.2, 24.23.
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about different tasks s47
This judicial role is a necessary one: The judge is the only actor
in the litigation enterprise who can overcome lawyer dysfunction.
The attorneys obviously cannot; the limited and disinterested role
of the jury makes it an ineffective instrument for resolution of
formulational difficulties; and the parties, who might poorly under-
stand the legal process, are no more capable of performing the law-
yers' tasks than their lawyers. By default, the role of protecting
adjudication's norm of reasoned judgment devolves to the judge.
At the same time, the permissible scope ofjudicial involvement in
matters traditionally relegated to the attorneys is not unbounded.
The first obstacle is the Due Process Clause, whose preference for
adversarial process3 48 is at odds with the more inquisitorial role
thrust on the judge. Because due process also requires the applica-
tion of reasoned judgment, 349 the Clause's internal inconsistency
seems irreconcilable. A head-on collision, however, usually can be
avoided. Adversarial procedure is an aspect of due process not for
its own sake, but because it is believed to be the method that best
assures the rational resolution of a dispute; when it cannot fulfill its
function, some loosening of the strict adversarial model is re-
quired.350 Not surprisingly, the few cases that have challenged the
court's power to amend its adversarial role have found no constitu-
tional defect when the judge can overcome the lawyers' shortcom-
ings. 35 1 An even more telling piece of information is that, with all
the examples of "quasi-inquisitorial" judging collected in the Man-
ual and elsewhere, only a few cases have even raised the due process
issue.352 Therefore, although due process undoubtedly precludes
347. See In re SanJuan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., No. MDL-721, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17332 (D.P.R. Dec. 2, 1988) (appointing separate discovery counsel and settle-
ment counsel).
348. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
350. See supra note 243 and accompanying text. This analysis also is suggested by the
Supreme Court's recent refusal to protect in an absolute fashion the use of adversarial
procedures in adjudication. Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (finding con-
stitutional requirement of adversarial process before prejudgment seizure of property)
and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (requiring adversarial process prior to dep-
rivation of welfare benefits) with Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (hold-
ing preseizure adversarial hearing not required by due process) and Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding adversarial process not required prior to suspen-
sion of Social Security benefits); see also Resnik, supra note 12, at 516-20.
351. See, e.g., Oostendorp v. Khanna, 937 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1991); Brennan v. Local
Union No. 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 494 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1974); In rejoint E. &
S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 769 F. Supp. 85, 89 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (rejecting perfunctorily
claim of third-party defendants that consolidation of 700 asbestos cases denied them
due process).
352. To the extent that the proper inquiry concerning the meaning of the Due Pro-
cess Clause is a historical one, see Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032,
1046 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring), it is important to note that the federal judge in
historical equity practice possessed the powers of issue formulation now exercised byjudges in complex cases. See Subrin, supra note 2, at 918-26. There was never a success-
ful claim that these aspects of equity practice violated the Fifth Amendment.
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the judge from stepping into the lawyers' role when there is no evi-
dence of dysfunction, 353 judicial activism that remedies lawyer dys-
function without foreclosing lawyers' participation in areas where
they remain functional does not approach the outer limits of permis-
sible judicial involvement.
Therefore, this hypothesis of complexity places two significant
limitations on the judge's power to cure lawyer dysfunction. Most
obviously, she cannot act when the lawyer is able to perform his task
in the formulation of issues; to do so would violate the adversarial
assumption for a reason not dictated by the primordial principle of
reasoned judgment.3 54 Second, the power she wields must be able
to overcome the formulational obstacles in the lawyer's path. If the
panoply of procedural tools she possesses cannot effectuate a ra-
tional formulation of issues, the case is-to use Fuller's term with a
somewhat different meaning-a "polycentric" one incapable of res-
olution through adjudication. 355 Thejudge's exercise of power con-
sequently would be unprincipled.
Thus, the hypothesis that suggests "formulational complexity"-
lawyer dysfunction remediable by enhanced judicial authority over
the tasks typically expected of lawyers-validates the literature's em-
pirical observation that certain pretrial and trial features make a case
complex. 356 The hypothesis also develops inherent limitations on
the exercise of judicial power that are rooted in a theory of rational
adjudication. The issue is whether this same analysis can explain
353. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976); cf MANUAL, supra
note 13, § 22.24 ("Active involvement by the judge, however, need not and should not
alter counsels' primary responsibility for collecting, organizing, and presenting the evi-
dence."). To the extent that the Manual suggests that the judge cannot step into the
adversarial role in cases without dysfunction, it undoubtedly is correct. To the extent
that it suggests this limit to judicial involvement in cases of dysfunction, it fails to appre-
ciate the true nature of complex litigation.
354. I loosen this assertion somewhat in Part IV, in which I examine willful attorney
intransigence and the role of efficient procedure. See infra notes 532-34, 551-61 and
accompanying text. As a general matter, however, an adversarial process in which the
lawyers respect the rules of litigation and in which the costs of the process are not inor-
dinate precludes the judge's assertion of power over the adversaries' traditional func-
tions. Justification for the judicial assertion of power arises only when a properly
functioning adversarial process cannot result in a reasoned decision.
355. Fuller's conception of "polycentrism" involved situations in which the affected
parties' rights to participate through proofs and arguments could not be guaranteed. See
supra notes 207, 214-18 and accompanying text. Because my idea of adjudication is tied
to reasoned judgment rather than to party participation, see supra note 246 and accompa-
nying text, my conception of "polycentrism" involves a dispute not susceptible to rea-
soned judgment. As many disputes can be decided rationally even without party
participation, the limits ofjudicial power suggested here are considerably narrower than
those suggested by Fuller. As I will later demonstrate, however, the limits on judicial
power extend beyond Fuller's conception ofpolycentrism in certain other ways. See infra
Part III.B. Thus, although I use the same term as Fuller, my definition of "polycentr-
ism" is considerably different.
356. See supra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
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the remaining types of complexity documented in the cases and
commentary.
2. Factfinder Dysfunction: Herein of "Decisionmaking Complexity"
The second key player in American litigation is the factfinder,
whose role is assumed by the jury whenever required by constitution
or statute and demanded by a party, and assumed by the judge
otherwise.35 7 In certain instances, the factfinder may be unable to
fulfill her function of resolving factual disputes; bringing her com-
mon-sense experiences to bear on evidence, arguments, and in-
structions received; and applying the facts to the relevant legal
principles. The causes of this dysfunction are varied. First, the
factfinder may not have the intellectual capability to understand the
evidence presented, either because it is highly technical or esoteric,
or overwhelmingly voluminous or lengthy. Second, the factfinder
may have a similar inability to understand the law. A factfinder may
be expected to declare legal conclusions whose meaning and conse-
quences lie beyond her knowledge, training, or understanding. Fi-
nally, the factfinder's life experiences may be so foreign to the key
issues in the case that the factfinder cannot make the factual or legal
inferences required by the case. Factfinder dysfunction generally
corresponds to the second type of trial complexity noted in the
cases and literature-the inability of lay decisionmakers to cope with
massive or complicated evidence.358 Whatever the cause, the result
of this dysfunction is that the factfinder's decision must necessarily
be the product of guesswork rather than rational application of fact
to law. 35 9
357. See FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a), 39(b). Rule 39(b) also permits the use of advisory
juries in the event that the case is tried to the judge.
358. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. The difference is that the existing
discussion of factfinder dysfunction focuses almost exclusively on the inability of the jury
to resolve a case rationally. The concept of factfinder dysfunction also recognizes that
the traditional mode of trial can equally handicap the judgment of judges. The trial
judge's ability to order post-trial briefs or arguments, her opportunity to re-open the
record and to review evidence at a more thorough and reflective pace, and her years of
education and experience certainly reduce the number of cases that she cannot resolve
through rational application of law to fact, but some controversies still will lie beyond
her understanding. See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069
(3d Cir. 1980). But see id. at 1092 (Gibbons, J., dissenting) (questioning whether judges
are more capable of resolving complex cases); EXPEDrrlNG ANTrrtUST CASES, supra note
54, at 134-45 (same); SCHWARZER, supra note 54, § 7-2(A) (same); cf. Paul Lansing &
Nina Miley, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Commercial Litigation: A Comparative Law
Perspective, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 121, 135-37 (1991) (discussing Pennsylvania
proposal to create commercial court to try certain disputes without a jury before a spe-
cially trained business law judge).
359. See supra notes 85, 244, 246 and accompanying text. As with lawyer dysfunction,
I assume that factfinder dysfunction arises only when a competent and neutral factfinder
cannot come to a rational decision. A factfinder blinded by impairments such as intoxi-
cation or prejudice invokes other concerns and other corrective judicial powers. See Ed-
monson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); Tanner v. United States, 483
U.S. 107 (1987).
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According to the hypothesis of complexity, a case becomes com-
plex when the response to factfinder dysfunction is increased judi-
cial activism in the factfinding process.360 Once again, we find that
many cases that typically are considered complex involve precisely
this type of activism. In an effort to assert a measure ofjudicial con-
trol over the factfinding process, judges in complex cases frequently
reduce the quantity of information contained in the lawsuit through
devices such as the bifurcation of issues or parties,3 6' the certifica-
tion of class actions, 3 62 rigorous enforcement of evidentiary rules,3 63
and limitations on trial time.3 64 When a judge lacks the requisite
common-sense experience in a case tried to the bench, she has the
option to use an advisory jury.3 65  When minor procedural
changes-such as the use of interim instructions and arguments or
the use of narratives and graphic summaries of evidence-can help
the factfinder to resolve the dispute rationally, she need not hesitate
for want of power.3 66 The same is true of the court appointment of
experts3 67 or masters3 68 and the judicial inquisition of witnesses,3 69
360. As with lawyer dysfunction, the judge is often the only actor capable of rectifying
factfinder dysfunction. To the extent that the dysfunction is obvious and curable
through the adversarial presentation of more evidence, lawyers certainly can act. Often,
however, dysfunction arises from an excess of information or the consideration of facts
and law foreign to the decisionmaker. In those areas, the lawyers can be of little help.
Nor can the parties meaningfully assist the factfinder.
361. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); supra note 341 and accompanying text. Although re-
lated, there is a technical difference between bifurcation of issues or parties in the pre-
trial phase to prevent lawyer dysfunction and bifurcation of issues or parties at trial to
prevent factfinder dysfunction. The limitations of the trial process may require trial bi-
furcation in different (and generally more frequent) instances than the instances in
which pretrial bifurcation is necessary. When trial bifurcation appears necessary at the
outset of the case, it is of course entirely sensible to bifurcate pretrial proceedings for
reasons of efficiency. Such pretrial bifurcation is in no sense required simply because
trial bifurcation is necessary to assure reasoned decisionmaking at trial.
362. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). Class actions typically are not thought of as a means
to assure reasoned decisionmaking. In some instances, however, the reduction of a case
to representative claims and parties can avoid the problems of rational adjudication in-
herent in a factfinder hearing the claims of hundreds or thousands of similarly situated
persons. In other instances, of course, a class action can generate such enormous quan-
tities of information that it too can frustrate reasoned decisionmaking. In those in-
stances, class certification would be improper.
363. See FED. R. EvID. 104(a); Christophersen v. Allied Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106(5th Cir. 1991) (en banc); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 874 F.2d 307 (5th
Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd on other
grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
364. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
365. See FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
366. See MANUAL, supra note 13, §§ 22.31-.43; Schwarzer, supra note 143, at 582-85.
367. See FED. R. EVID. 706; supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also Elliott, supra
note 91, at 504-05 (advocating use of panels of scientific experts); cf. Kian v. Mirro Alu-
minum Co., 88 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (rejecting use of court-appointed legal
expert to assist jury).
368. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53. For the limitations on the use of a master at trial, see supra
note 338 and sources cited therein.
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which are more significant judicial incursions into the lawyer's tradi-
tional province.
All of these devices are designed to assure a rational factfinding
process. 370 Within certain limits, the judge also might have the au-
thority to change the factfinder from one incapable of reasoned
judgment to one capable of rational decisionmaking. The least in-
trusive of these techniques is to permit the jury to answer only spe-
cial interrogatories, thus reserving to the court the task of applying
these facts to the relevant legal principles.3 71 More intrusive means
are a vigorous use of summary judgment and the entry ofjudgment
as a matter of law.372 The most drastic intrusions into the lay deci-
sionmaking process, however, are the empaneling of a special jury
with particular expertise in the subject matter of the dispute, and
the outright denial of jury trial in favor of judicial factfinding 3 7 3
All of these latter techniques, which come into play only when the
factfinder is a jury, necessarily implicate the constitutional right to a
jury trial as well as implementing statutes that typically require jury
369. See FED. R. EVID. 611(a); Care Travel Co. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 944 F.2d
983, 992 (2d Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1289-90 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 297 (1990). Once again, the court's power to ask questions to cure
factfinder dysfunction is related to, but distinct from, the inquisitorial power to cure
lawyer dysfunction. See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
370. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., JURY SERVICE IN LENGTHY CIVIL TRIALS 37-39 (1987);
GUINTHER, supra note 232, at 214-17; Carrie P. Withey, Court-Sanctioned Means of Improv-
ing Jury Competence in Complex Civil Litigation, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 715, 715 (1982).
371. See FiD. R. Civ. P. 49(a). A related, although somewhat less intrusive, technique
is the general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories. See id. 49(b); see, e.g.,
Tol-O-Matic v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed.
Cir. 1991).
372. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment), 50(a) (judgment as a matter of law
during trial), 50(b) (judgment as a matter of law after trial). The use of summary judg-
ment to remove issues that cannot be resolved rationally by ajury is somewhat different
from (but again related to) its use as a tool to limit issues to overcome lawyer dysfunc-
tion. See supra note 339 and accompanying text. Although not explicit in the opinions,
the fear of irrational decisionmaking could explain the Supreme Court's apparent attitu-
dinal shifts from Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), to Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and from Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464 (1962), to Matsu-
shita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The fear also
can explain the more energetic use in complex cases of directed verdicts and granting of
post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. Compare
Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986) (reversing grant
ofjudgment n.o.v. on issue of causation in Bendectin case), appeal after remand, 563 A.2d
330 (D.C. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990) with Richardson v. Richardson-Mer-
rell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (upholding grant ofjudgment n.o.v. on issue of
causation in Bendectin case involving nearly identical testimony), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
882 (1989).
Of course, the use of these devices is improper unless the judge, by virtue of her
experience or the advantages of studious deliberation, can resolve a dispute rationally
when a jury cannot. When neither judge nor jury is capable of rational resolution, then
obviously a judge cannot use these powers. When a jury is capable, then the judge
ought not use summary judgment to resolve genuine issues of fact, and should enter
judgment as a matter of law only when it is obvious that the jury has failed to resolve the
factual disputes in a plausible (i.e., rational) way. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. 242 (1986).
373. Unlike the prior techniques, which simply provide a check on the passions or
prejudices of lay jurors, these latter techniques replace the lay jury with a specialized,
presumably more expert factfinder.
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pools to be comprised of a cross-section of the community. 37 4 From
the perspective of the form of adjudication, neither a cross-sectional
jury pool nor even the jury itself is sacrosanct. Both can be toler-
ated as long as they do not violate the norms of adjudication, but
when they do, the jury's membership must be changed or it must be
eliminated in favor of a factfinder who can decide rationally. From
the perspective of constitutional law and theory, however, the posi-
tive procedural assumption ofjury trial cannot be discarded so eas-
ily. Courts are not free to ignore plain constitutional or statutory
mandates. Nor can they cavalierly deny the participatory democratic
values inherent in jury service.375 Therefore, in cases in which ajury cannot be trusted to exercise reasoned judgment, the form of
adjudication and the form of participatory democracy appear to be
on a collision course.3 76
Nevertheless, the collision need not occur. The seemingly plain
language of the Seventh Amendment can be avoided through one of
two textual interpretations. The first, and less promising, avenue is
to contend that the Seventh Amendment contains a "complexity"
exception to the jury trial right.3 "7 A second avenue is to argue that
the Due Process Clause, which embodies the principle of reasoned
374. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1988) (implementing U.S. CONST. amend.
VII); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 78, 1-15 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (implementing ILL. CONST. art.
1, § 13).
375. For descriptions of the participatory benefits of a civil jury see, for example, In re
Japanese Electric Products Antitrust Litigation, 631 F.2d 1069, 1093 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting); GUrNTHER, supra note 232, at 219-31; Higginbotham, supra
note 93, at 58-60.
376. It is not clear how a direct conflict between the form of social ordering repre-
sented by participatory democracy and the form of social ordering represented by adju-
dication should be resolved. Although not expressly stated, Fuller's conclusion seems to
be that adjudication must give way to organization by common aim when the two con-
flict. The reason is that Fuller viewed organization by common aim to be one of "two
basic forms of social ordering ... [w]ithout [which] nothing resembling a society can
exist." See Fuller, Forms and Limits, supra note 200, at 357. As a third form of social
ordering, see id. at 363, adjudication would seem necessarily subservient. The ability of
Congress to remove factfinding from the adjudicatory arena, see NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and to prescribe rules of procedure and evi-
dence for civil adjudication, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988), also generally suggests
that participatory democracy is the dominant form.
377. See, e.g., Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (stating that the right
to ajury trial is determined by historical practice, the nature of the relief requested, and
"the practical abilities and limitations ofjuries"); Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469,
478 (1962) (suggesting that a plaintiff who can show that a case is "of such a 'compli-
cated nature' that only a court of equity can satisfactorily unravel" might be able to
avoid a jury trial); In re Boise Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976)
(finding that the limitations of a lay jury in a complex securities case overcame the Sev-
enth Amendment right to a jury trial); Devlin, supra note 16. Recent decisions of the
Supreme Court have downplayed the possibility of a "complexity exception" to the Sev-
enth Amendment. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (1989)
(stating that Ross's "practical abilities and limitations" language applies only to instances
in which Congress has entrusted fact-finding to an administrative agency or specialized
court); Chauffeurs Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 n.4 (1990) (same). But see id- at
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judgment, is violated when a jury that cannot deliberate rationally is
empaneled. 378 Similar legal acumen can overcome the apparently
flat statutory prohibition against special juries.3 79
The more difficult issue is whether the triumph of the form of
adjudication is the desired result. I believe it is. As an instrumental
matter, there seems to be little, if any, damage to values of par-
ticipatory democracy when a special jury is used; the special jury
simply replaces the participatory experience of six average citizens
with a participatory experience of six citizens peculiarly knowledge-
able about a topic.380 Even when ajudge decides to resolve the case
herself, the cost in terms of lost participatory benefits is minimal.
Many "public law" cases, in which the claim for citizen participation
is greatest, presently do not require juries;38 ' most of the remaining
complex cases, such as mass torts and corporate litigation, are pri-
vate disputes with a more marginal need for public participation.38 2
Given the numerous devices through which the judge can preserve
583 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that one factor in the right to jury trial is whether
"the issues . . .are typical grist for the jury's judgment").
378. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. As with other constitutional rights, see, e.g., Rich-
mond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 n.18 (1980), the conflict in constitu-
tional rights would need to be resolved through a balance, with the scales arguably
tipping in favor of reasoned judgment. See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d
1107 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (tipping balance in favor of Seventh Amendment); In rejapanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding a due process trump
on the Seventh Amendment); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979)
(finding no due process trump), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980); Kian v. Mirro .Alumi-
num Co., 88 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (rejectingJapanese Electronic arguments).
379. The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 allows the chief judge of a district
court to exclude from jury service any person who "is incapable, by reason of mental or
physical infirmity, to render satisfactory jury service." 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(4) (1988).
Although the apparent intent is only to exclude persons so infirm that they could not
adequately serve as a juror in any case, the section could be interpreted liberally to give
the judge the power to exclude unqualified persons from specific complex cases. That
interpretation would avoid any arguable conflict with the Due Process Clause. Cf.
United States v. Wellington, 754 F.2d 1457, 1468 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that there is
no Sixth Amendment right to a jury comprised of a cross-section of the community).
380. The theoretical damage to participatory democracy here would be the substitu-
tion of the rule of a technocratic elite for the rule of the common citizen. Although this
damage cannot be discounted, the rule of the common citizen envisioned in our society
presupposes that the common citizen is educated enough to participate in the societal
debate. When that presupposition is false, the claim for the rule of the common citizen
becomes a claim for the rule of the mob, a result not contemplated under the Constitu-
tion. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (james Madison).
381. For example, there is no requirement for ajury in an equitable case. See Chayes,
supra note 100, at 1292-96, 1303 & n.93.
382. I do not suggest that public participation in decisions concerning the nature of
product design or competitive markets is irrelevant, or that these decisions are an en-
tirely private matter. Nonetheless, the traditional methods by which our form of govern-
ment has channeled participation in these decisions are voting and lobbying. More
important, the present power to bring these disputes before the jury largely rests with
private parties who in most instances ultimately use other methods of private (e.g., set-
tlement) or public (e.g., summary judgment) dispute resolution. The haphazard and ad
hoc participation of certain citizens to resolve certain private questions for which no
other dispute resolution mechanism turns out to be tactically advantageous is not a form
of public participation especially worthy of protection. Cf. In re Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor: Proceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 994, 1007 (D.
Mass. 1989) (ordering advisory jury in part because of the "appropriate primacy of that
expression of direct democracy in our dispute resolution process"); Owen M. Fiss,
Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984) (arguing that the parties' power to settle,
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jury trial,38 3 the outright rejection of a jury demand should be an
exceedingly rare event that will cause no significant damage to par-
ticipatory democracy. On balance, the damage to the model of ad-
judication should juries resolve cases irrationally seems far greater
than the damage to the model of participatory democracy should
they on rare occasion be stricken.
This instrumental analysis, however, provides little comfort to the
formalist, who cannot resolve conflicts among forms with a balanc-
ing test but must instead divine the primary and subservient
forms.3 84 Under a formal analysis, however, the first question is
whether a "true conflict" exists between the forms; ifjury service is
not essential to participatory democracy, then no violence is done to
the form of participatory democracy when the jury is jettisoned to
protect the reasoned judgment essential to the form of adjudication.
Normatively, it can be claimed persuasively that a properly function-
ing adjudicatory system is an inherent part of a participatory democ-
racy, and irrational adjudication for the sake of democracy is
something of a non sequitur.385 Empirically, it is difficult to suggest
although a necessary evil to a certain extent, deprives the nation of a public resolution of
important questions).
383. For a discussion of these devices see, for example, In re Eastern & S. Districts
Asbestos Litigation, 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991); Schwarzer, supra
note 143; Sperlich, supra note 21; supra notes 361-73 and accompanying text. Among
the hundreds of thousands of cases filed in federal court in the past fifteen years, only a
handful of reported decisions have struck a jury demand. See Cotton v. Witco Chem.
Corp., 651 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); In rejapanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423, 444-49 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Memorex
Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981); In re Boise
Cascade Sec. Litig., 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976); Bernstein v. Universal Pictures,
79 F.R.D. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 75 F.R.D. 702 (S.D. Cal. 1977),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980). Of these cases, the
courts of appeal in U.S. Financial and Witco reversed the trial courts' decisions to strike a
jury demand, whereas ILC Peripherals and Japanese Electronic were ultimately decided on
issues not requiring jury involvement. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Memorex Corp. v. IBM, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981). Other federal courts have refused to strike jury demands
when the jury was capable of rational resolution. See, e.g., Soderbeck v. Burnett County,
752 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985); Pinemont Bank v. Belk, 722
F.2d 232 (5th Cir. 1984); City of New York v. Pullman, Inc., 662 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Brisk v. City of Miami Beach, 726 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.
Fla. 1989); Davis-Watkins Co. v. Service Merchandise Co., 500 F. Supp. 1244 (M.D.
Tenn. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 686 F.2d 1190 (6th Cir. 1982).
Only a few reported decisions have discussed a complexity exception to a state-cre-
ated right to jury trial. See Kenny v. Scientific, Inc., 512 A.2d 1142 (NJ. Super. Ct., Law
Div.), rev'd, 517 A.2d 484 (NJ. 1986) (striking of jury demand reversed on appeal);
S.P.C.S., Inc. v. Lockheed Shipbuilding & Constr. Co., 631 P.2d 999 (Wash. Ct. App.
1981).
384. See RAWLS, supra note 246, at 42-44 (discussing "serial or lexical" ordering of
principles).
385. See id. at 59-60, 235-39 (arguing that formal justice, which includes principled
and rational resolution of disputes, is a necessary although not sufficient component of a
just state); cf In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d at 1085 ("[T]he
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that participation in the adjudicatory resolution of disputes is a fun-
damental attribute of participatory democracy; of all the countries
practicing some form of universal democratic participation, the
United States is alone in its assurance of a jury trial in a significant
number of civil cases. 386 Furthermore, even in this country, juries
typically have not participated in the resolution of equitable suits3 8 7
or public-rights disputes entrusted to executive agencies. 388 Be-
cause these suits include some of the most politically charged issues
of the day, the right to jury trial can hardly be viewed as an inherent
aspect even of American democracy. Therefore, because the jury is
not a fundamental attribute of participatory democracy, a federal
court has the power under the form of principled adjudication to
strike ajury incapable of assisting in the rational resolution of a civil
case.
3 8 9
Again the hypothesis of complexity predicts the observed phe-
nomenon of factfinder difficulty and the responsive movement to-
ward more judicial control over factfinding. It provides a framework
Supreme Court has consistently refused to rule that preservation of civil jury trial is an
essential element of ordered liberty required of the states by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment."); THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing
that the civil jury is not an inherent aspect of representative democracy). Another inter-
esting but indirect argument against the necessity of a jury in a representative democ-
racy derives from James Madison, who argued that a representative democracy best
protects against the inevitable passions and seif-interestedness of direct democracies.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). Under this analysis, the direct participation of
citizens by "jury governance" should be viewed with a certain amount of suspicion and
even some alarm.
386. For a discussion of the fate of the jury in other countries, see VALERIE P. HANS &
NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 30 (1986); HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE
AMERICANJURY 13 n.3 (1966) (discussing criminal jury trials in various countries); Edson
L. Haines, The Disappearance of CivilJuries in England, Canada and Australia, 4 DEF. LJ. 118
(1958). One estimate is that 80% of all jury trials, both civil and criminal, occur in the
United States. HANS & VIDMAR, supra, at 31. Given that numerous countries allow crimi-
nal juries, this estimate highlights the virtual disappearance of civil juries in Western
democracies.
387. In four states-Georgia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas-there is a right
to jury trial in equitable suits. See COUND ET AL., supra note 281, at 895. Moreover, since
the merger of law and equity in the federal system, juries must decide overlapping fac-
tual issues relevant to a legal and an equitable claim. See Lytle v. Household Mfg., 494
U.S. 545 (1990); Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). Otherwise, equita-
ble cases are heard without a jury.
388. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989); Atlas Roofing Co. v.
OSHA, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
389. This power does not mean that the Seventh Amendment is a dead letter in com-
plex cases. Given the minimal criteria of rationality described above, see supra note 246,
and given the numerous techniques available to preserve jury trial, the command of the
Seventh Amendment usually can be obeyed. When that task becomes impossible, how-
ever, the court is required to determine if it (or an elite jury) rationally can resolve the
facts.
From the viewpoint of complex litigation, the constitutional dimension of the right to
jury trial makes it perhaps the most problematic of the positive procedural assumptions.
The elimination of the common jury may preserve reasoned judgment, but at the same
time it often violates one or more of the four neutralities that comprise trans-substantiv-
ism. See infra Part III.B. The simplest way to avoid this dilemma would be to abolish the
Seventh Amendment, and require all civil cases to be tried to the court. Because it is
unlikely that this solution will be adopted, the positive assumption of a right to jury trial
guarantees that the problem of complex litigation will not soon disappear from the legal
landscape.
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for resolving the constitutional debate over the right to a jury trial.
Finally, it suggests limits on the court's power to tamper with tradi-
tional factfinding and factfinders: Tampering is legitimate when nec-
essary to preserve reasoned judgment, but illegitimate either when
the factfinder is capable of reasoned judgment, or when judicial in-
terference with the factfinding process will not result in reasoned
judgment.
3. Party Dysfunction: Herein of "Remedial Complexity"
The least noticeable players during litigation are the parties,
whose role is typically confined to providing information and paying
costs and fees. At the conclusion of the litigation, however, the par-
ties become the central figures, for they implement the court's judg-
ment or decree. In three instances, the parties, if left to their own
devices, will simply be unable to implement the declared remedy.390
First, a losing party may be unable to accomplish the remedy be-
cause that party already is subject to different and inconsistent legal
obligations. Second, the prevailing parties might be beneficiaries of
a remedy that is insufficient to satisfy them all.3 9 l In this situation,
the prevailing parties' conflict of interest among themselves-and
perhaps with their attorneys as well-gives each party the incentive
to enhance his or her own claim and exclude (by lack of notice or
disputation of proof) the claims of others. Unless the prevailing
parties and their attorneys can voluntarily negotiate a resolution to
the conflict, the implementation of the remedy will come to a stand-
still. Finally, a party who is personally willing to comply with a de-
cree might require the consent of nonparties who are neither
controlled by the parties nor willing to accept the remedy. This lat-
ter category includes many "public law" cases, in which effectuation
of the remedy often depends on the fiscal backing of the legislature,
the cooperation of the bureaucratic executive, and the approval (or
390. These instances of inability to implement a declared remedy must be distin-
guished from instances in which a party simply refuses to comply with a judgment or
decree. In the former situation, an otherwise willing party is unable to comply because
of external forces. In the latter situation, an otherwise able party is unwilling to comply
because of internal beliefs. This latter situation can be handled through the use of con-
tempt. See generally 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, § 2960 (discussing judicial au-
thority to punish a contempt of court).
391. This result can arise in three ways. First, the parties' legitimate claims can ex-
ceed the available funds. Second, the costs of allocating the remedy among the parties
might consume all or most of the remedial fund, leaving the prevailing parties largely
uncompensated. Third, the attorney's demand for fees might reduce the available funds
to a point where the clients receive inadequate compensation and thus have a conflict
with their lawyer. More than one of these circumstances can co-exist in a given case.
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at least tacit acceptance) of the affected citizenry.392 When the par-
ties who must implement the remedy are unable to secure the neces-
sary approval of nonparties, the parties are unable to meet the
obligations imposed on them by the American procedural model.
Party impotence poses a threat to reasoned judgment. If the ra-
tional application of fact to law dictates in theory a result impossible
to accomplish in practice, the legal declaration is a nullity. Implicit
in the notion of reasoned judgment is the belief that the declaration
of legal obligations intended to change the status quo actually will
have that effect as long as the parties have the financial capacity to
bring about the change.393 If the declaration does not have the ac-
tual effect of changing legal relationships, then nothing has been
adjudged.
In order for a case to be remedially complex, the hypothesis of
complexity requires not only that the parties be unable to perform
their role in a way which brings the suit to closure, but also that an
increase in judicial power be the effective solution to the parties'
dysfunction. For these intractable cases, which correspond to the
problem of remedial complexity described in the existing literature
of complex litigation,394 judicial involvement in the parties' tradi-
tional role becomes essential.3 95 To protect the interests of unrep-
resented parties, courts approve the fairness of all class notices,
settlements, and dismissals.3 96 They also have set attorney fees,3 97
392. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (Alabama prison
litigation), aff'd sub. nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 915 (1978); WOLTERS, supra note 100; Sturm, The Rhode Island Prison Decree,
supra note 100; Note, The Wyatt Case, supra note 100. The problem of third-party accept-
ance is not limited to public law litigation. For instance, the settlement of a mass tort or
securities claim might require creditor or stockholder acquiescence, especially when the
remedy involves corporate reorganization. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742
(E.D. Va.), modified, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8697 (E.D. Va. July 29, 1988), aff'd, 880 F.2d
694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
393. An efficacious remedy also is implied in two other elements of adjudication: the
existence of legal obligation and the existence of a state enforcement mechanism. See
supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text. A declaration that does not oblige a party to
do something is hardly an "obligation," and would make the apparatus of state enforce-
ment superfluous.
394. See supra notes 95-112 and accompanying text.
395. Unlike lawyer and factfinder dysfunction, there is another player who often can
remedy dysfunction without recourse to the judge. The lawyer frequently mediates dis-
putes among his clients or works out allocations with other beneficiaries. He can volun-
tarily reduce or waive fees. Likewise, the opposing lawyers, who do not wish to see a
hard-fought settlement or judgment later undone, might insist upon certain safeguards
for unrepresented parties and certain guarantees of cooperation from third parties. Of
course, lawyer intervention cannot smooth out conflicts inherent in the attorney-client
relationship, and it cannot work through all problems of party or third-person conflict.
Nevertheless attorney intervention does reduce significantly the number of cases in
which party dysfunction would otherwise require judicial involvement.
396. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2), (c)(3), (d)(2), (e).
397. See MANUAL, supra note 13, § 24. For an instance in which the court dramatically
slashed attorneys' fees in order to preserve the bulk of a settlement corpus for the claim-
ants, see In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 818 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926
(1987).
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established eligibility guidelines under which people can claim com-
pensation,398 and created out of whole cloth quasi-administrative
agencies to dispense funds.3 99 Judges have placed school systems
into receivership, 40 0 ordered busing,401 and abolished impediments
to the collection of taxes needed to pay for the remedy.40 2 They
have enjoined third persons from bringing lawsuits that threaten a
remedy,40 3 and jailed third parties interfering with the implementa-
tion of a remedy. 40 4 They have appointed masters, magistrates, and
implementation committees to create remedial plans and recom-
mendations, 40 5 and enforcement apparatuses to uncover and ad-
judge violations of the settlement or judgment.40 6  They have
appeared at public forums to garner popular support for their
398. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250, 1263-66
(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 681 F.2d 1259 (11th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1247 (1984). See generally Developments in the Law-Class Ac-
tions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1516-36 (1976) [hereinafter Developments] (discussing calcu-
lation and distribution of damages in class actions).
399. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. at 1266-68; In reJoint
E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 751-54, 838-46 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(describing creation and operation of Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust and
approving significant changes); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 755 (E.D. Va. 1988), af'd,
880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). See generally Symposium, Claims Resolution Facilities and the
Mass Settlement of Mass Torts, 53 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (Autumn 1990) (describing
operation of claim-resolution facilities in asbestos, Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, and
Triana cases).
400. See, e.g., Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1042 (1977); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. 1141 (D. Mass. 1975).
401. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
402. See, e.g., Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990); Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S.
218 (1964).
403. See, e.g., In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489 (1lth Cir. 1992); In re Baldwin-
United Corp., 770 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig.,
659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 936 (1982); Edward F. Sherman,
Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507 (1987).
404. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972); cf Spallone v.
United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (reversing decision to hold third-party legislators in
contempt when the court had not exhausted efforts to assure party compliance).
405. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Landrieu, 351 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. La. 1972); Special Project,
supra note 91, at 805-09; see also Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1156-58 (6th Cir.)
(requiring experts employed to assist court in creating remedial plan to prepare written
reports to be placed in the record), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980); Mullenix, supra note
69, at 545-50, 558-64 (describing use of court-appointed expert in group trial in an
effort to determine damages in asbestos class).
406. See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 481-82
(1986); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1159-63 (5th Cir.), vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266
(5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983); Inmates of the Attica
Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12, 25 (2d Cir. 1971); Young v. Pierce, 640
F. Supp. 1476 (E.D. Tex. 1986); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 126 (E.D. Tex.
1974), rev'don other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (per
curiam); Note, The Wyatt Case, supra note 100, at 1352-69; Special Project, supra note 91,
at 824-37; cf Committee of Dalkon Shield Claimants v. A.H. Robins Co., 828 F.2d 239
(4th Cir. 1987) (refusing to require district court to appoint a trustee to operate a corpo-
rate mass-tort defendant then in bankruptcy reorganization).
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plans,407 and they even have undone and reconstituted a party's ex-
isting obligations.408
The resulting power of the courts to protect rational adjudication
through the implementation of effective remedies necessarily coun-
tenances some remedies that "may be administratively awkward, in-
convenient, and even bizarre." 40 9 The reason for this judicial
prerogative is that adjudication ultimately is not about the declara-
tion and enforcement of "rights," but about the declaration and en-
forcement of "obligations. '410 When the parties are capable of
developing and implementing the remedial consequences of a de-
fendant's legal obligation, the defendant's obligation is translated
easily into the language of plaintiff's right. When the parties cannot
implement a remedy without the intervention of the judge, however,
the dissociation of "right" and "obligation" becomes obvious. The
judge's reconciliation of the competing claims of obligation means
that some or all of the plaintiffs in complex cases will not receive the
same remedy-that is, have the same "right"-as other plaintiffs in
cases in which the parties can privately implement a remedy. Party
dysfunction forces the court to credit obligation over right, with the
consequence that, from the perspective of claimants' "rights," the
remedy often appears overly flexible and even bizarre.4 1'
As with formulational and decisionmaking complexity, "remedial
complexity" creates some practical and constitutional discomfort
for the judge. Here the specific danger is overstepping the powers
of an Article III judge through the assumption of functions for
which she has limited or no competence, 412 through the abdication
ofjudicial function or responsibility, 413 or through interference with
407. See, e.g., Bradley, 620 F.2d at 1156-58; Berger, supra note 100, at 711-24.
408. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1989), remanded, 112 S.
Ct. 1657 (1992) (discussing series of remedies already imposed on school system and
finding remnants of segregation that potentially will require remedies in addition to
those already ordered); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991); cf. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting nonparties to con-
sent decree in employment discrimination case to challenge the merits of the decree in
separate suit). But see United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968
(2d Cir. 1984) (upholding refusal of district court to allow intervention to challenge
environmental consent decree); United States v. Olin Corp., 606 F. Supp. 1301 (N.D.
Ala. 1985) (refusing to allow later claimants to challenge terms of environmental con-
sent decree).
409. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28 (1971).
410. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
411. For other discussions of the dissociation between "right" and "remedy," that do
not make the specific distinction between "right" and "obligation," see DouGLAs LAY-
COCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 241-52 (1985); Chayes, supra note 100, at 1292-302;
Fiss, supra note 108, at 44-58; Sturm, Public Law Remedies, supra note 100, at 1360-65,
1388-90. Cf Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 681 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1982)
(ordering court to consider classwide relief when individual plaintiffs are unable to
prove an entitlement to back pay awards); Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675-76 (7th Cir.
1981) (approving in principle, but denying on the facts of the case, the concept of a fluid
class recovery).
412. See generally Hoiowrrz, supra note 100 (arguing that judges possess little compe-
tence to ascertain social facts, to make social policy, or to consider social consequences
of individual decisions).
413. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 54 (1981) (White, J.,
dissenting in part); see also Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of theJudiciary, 92 YALE LJ.
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decisions reserved either to the other branches of federal govern-
ment or to the state and local governments. 414 From the viewpoint
of adjudication, these problems pose no danger; as Damaska's sur-
vey of procedural systems demonstrates, neither federalism nor sep-
arated legislative, executive, and judicial functions are inherent
aspects of an adjudicatory system.4 15 From the viewpoint of Ameri-
can constitutional theory, the problems are also more theoretical
than real. The form of adjudication does not allow unfettered judi-
cial activism. The judge can exercise her remedial power only when
parties and their lawyers are unable to bring to rational closure a
finding on the defendant's obligation, and her power will ensure the
translation of obligation into remedy. Nor can she continue her ac-
tivist role beyond the point at which parties are able to assume their
adversarial functions.4 16 She cannot engage in regulatory or legisla-
tive rulemaking to accomplish a political rather than a principled
solution to an intractable situation.41 7 Furthermore, she cannot
1442, 1462-63 (1983) (questioning long-term utility of masters in accomplishing reme-
dial goals); Fiss, supra note 108, at 56-57 (same); Silberman, supra note 12, at 2163, 2175
(arguing that ad hoc appointment of masters constitutes an abdication of the judicial
role).
414. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (questioning judicial power to order
tax levies on federalism grounds); Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (refus-
ing to uphold contempt sanctions against third-party legislators largely on separation of
powers grounds); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 ("[T]he federal courts in
devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in
managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution."); In re Fibreboard Corp.,
893 F.2d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 1990) (overturning district court's plan to try damage claims
of asbestos class on group basis because it exceeded "the scope of federal judicial
power" under the Erie doctrine, and infringed "upon the separation of powers between
the judicial and legislative branches").
415. See DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 185-99.
416. Cf Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1444-45 (1992) (holding that "a federal
court in a school desegregation case has the discretion to order an incremental or partial
withdrawal of its supervision and control" even before "full compliance has been
achieved in every area of school operations"); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630
(1990) (allowing elimination of forced busing in favor of neighborhood schools);
Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (holding that no discrimination in voluntary
school club exists after the adoption of race-neutral policies and admission procedures).
417. Because of the dissociation of right and obligation, the key inquiry is whether a
court rationally can implement or administer a defendant's obligation, not whether it
can give effect to a plaintiff's right. See supra notes 249, 409-11 and accompanying text.
As obligations typically can be implemented and administered rationally, this limitation
is rarely a hindrance to thejudge. When the choice of remedy relies on political expedi-
ency or distributive notions such as disbursement of the defendant's obligation to the
especially needy, the decision lies-in our society at least-beyond the bounds of adjudi-
cation because the choice does not descend from pre-existing legal principle. Cf In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 1987) (approving distri-
bution plan to dead and disabled class members but reversing district court's establish-
ment of a class-assistance foundation because it might expend settlement proceeds "on
activities inconsistent with the judicial function"), on remand, 689 F. Supp. 1250
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (distributing settlement funds only to totally disabled veterans and fam-
ilies of deceased veterans who could demonstrate some possibility of exposure to chemi-
cal and reconstituting class-assistance program); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig.,
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turn to judicial adjuncts unless they possess skills or knowledge that
she does not and that are crucial to the implementation or adminis-
tration of a rational remedy.4 18
These limitations should overcome concerns about the scope of
the court's powers in most complex private remedies. The exercise
of quasi-executive or quasi-legislative powers to accomplish public
remedies, however, seemingly sets the model of adjudication on an-
other collision course with the separation of powers and federalism
concerns at the heart of our representative democracy. Fortunately,
like the Seventh Amendment "collision," a derailment is unlikely
ever to occur. Separation of powers concerns arise only when the
legislature or executive is unable to comply with the constitutional
or statutory commands involved in public-law litigation. Because
the model of representative democracy assumes the faithfulness of
the executive to the legislative will of the people, and the obedience
of the legislature and the executive to the Constitution, executive
and legislative branch dysfunction casts the democracy into crisis.
When judicial power can avoid this crisis in those matters properly
subject to adjudication, the judiciary contributes positively to the
functioning of our democratic institutions.419
The conflict between federalism and adjudicative power likewise
proves false. In the first place, a combination of the Supremacy
Clause, exclusive jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction, and sovereign
immunity precludes state judges from imposing remedies that dra-
matically affect federal institutions and core federal interests.420
The short and decisive answer to the converse problem-the inter-
ference of federal judicial power in the operation of state affairs-is
744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversing district court's decision to use unclaimed set-
tlement proceeds for an Antitrust Research Foundation in view of similar existing execu-
tive branch projects); Elliott, supra note 91, at 505-07 (discussing use of administrative-
court hybrids to resolve issues of liability).
418. A court's power to appoint adjuncts with skills or knowledge not possessed by
the judge should assuage the fear that judges lack the competence to decide complicated
remedial questions. See supra note 412 and accompanying text. The court's lack of
power to appoint an adjunct unless it is critical to the primordial principle of reasoned
judgment also should deflect the criticism of an abdication ofjudicial responsibility. See
supra note 413 and accompanying text. Indeed, a judge's failure to take rational meas-
ures to turn obligation into remedy when it lies within her grasp to do so is a far greater
abdication of responsibility.
419. This argument provides a limited justification for judicial review of the constitu-
tional behavior of the other branches of government and of the states. It does not ex-
plain the need for judicial review in those cases in which the President, Congress, and
the States have no institutional inability to accomplish a remedy without judicial inter-
vention. Therefore, the broader claim of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), which legitimized review of the constitutionality of the political decisions of
other branches, ultimately must rest on other grounds. See generally JOHN H. ELY, DE-
MOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (discussing theories of judicial review); RONALD D. Ro-
TUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 1.1-.6 (1986) (same); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW §§ 3-1 to -6 (2d ed. 1988) (same).
420. See Alberti v. Sheriff of Harris County, Texas, 937 F.2d 984, 1001 n.8 (5th Cir.
1991); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 479-92
(2d ed. 1988).
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the limited nature of federal jurisdiction: Federal courts have au-
thority to interfere in matters of state interest only when the Consti-
tution and Congress authorize the interference. Because Congress
is not ignorant of the judicial powers that might be necessary to ef-
fectuate a remedy, its creation of federal jurisdiction to hear consti-
tutional or statutory claims against state officials carries implicit
authorization to use that power when state officials are incapable of
meeting their constitutional or statutory obligations. 42' Thus, the
real issue of federalism is the wisdom of allowing federal courts to
adjudicate matters of state interest; once that political decision has
been made, the model of representative democracy imposes few ad-
ditional constraints on judicial power.422
421. There are, of course, certain constitutional and statutory limitations on the use
of remedial power. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XI; 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1988); 29 U.S.C.§§ 101-115 (1988). For the most part, these limitations do not affect the court's power
in remedially complex cases. Some of these limitations may reflect the legislative deter-
mination that the obligations involved are not capable of principled, as opposed to polit-
ical or economic, resolution. See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 52 (10th ed. 1986).
Other limitations can be interpreted in a way that gives some flexibility to judges to craft
appropriate remedies. See supra notes 400-08 and accompanying text. Finally, the lack
of a rational federal remedy does not preclude the use of state courts to create a rational
remedy.
Beyond these instances, however, a clear legislative declaration that the court not use
its remedial power even when it is necessary to protect reasoned judgment is a decision
that the court must accept. This inability to use certain remedial tools means that a
subset of remedially complex cases which were in theory capable of rational resolution
cannot be resolved. The theory of rational adjudication suggests that such limitations
on remedial tools are unwise; but the form of participatory democracy requires that we
accept the popular judgment to create intentionally a class of "polycentric" disputes.
422. For the nature of the existing constraints, see supra note 421. Lack of demo-
cratic or federalist bars to the exercise of remedial power does not mean the penumbra
of these constraints is irrelevant to the judge. In order to avoid a clash between rea-
soned judgment on the one hand and democratic and federalist values on the other, the
judge presumptively should apply the least judicial power likely to effectuate the rem-
edy, and then ratchet the power up if the initial power is unforeseeably inadequate. In
the first instance, therefore, she actively should encourage party settlement or attorney
mediation of disputes. When these mechanisms fail, democratic and federalist concerns
counsel the judge to intrude upon political, economic, or social decisionmaking only to
the extent necessary to resolve a dispute over existing legal obligations, and only after
democratic processes have failed. Only when that cautious incrementalism is likely to
cause more harm than good should more coercive judicial powers be applied in the first
instance. Cf Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992) (authorizing federal court to with-
draw remedial supervision incrementally); Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (hold-
ing that district court, which slowly had taken steps to ensure adequate funding for
remedial measures, erred when it leapfrogged over another interim measure and as-
sumed for itself the power to levy property taxes, but leaving open the possibility of ajudicial levy if the legislators refused to impose the tax increase); Spallone v. United
States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (disallowing a district court's use of the contempt power
against nonparty legislators, at least until all methods aimed at party compliance had
been exhausted); Green v. School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-41 (1968) (permitting "free-
dom of choice" plans when they will be as speedy and effective as more intrusive deseg-
regation options, but generally disapproving their use because of their ineffectiveness).
Cautious incrementalism makes good pragmatic sense. Swashbuckling judicial inter-
vention is likely to generate significant negative reaction, both in the institutions subject
to reform and in the public at large. That reaction itself can result in further party
1992] 1779
The reality remains, however, that in rare matters application of
judicial power might so polarize the parties, the community or the
market that no remedy will be effective. The form of adjudication
teaches that the court cannot adjudicate these matters. A court
should struggle mightily to educate the public and to overcome the
apparently insuperable. Ultimately, though, judges involved in the
process of adjudication are not executives, legislators, or miracle
workers. Unless we are willing to allow judges to perform
nonadjudicatory tasks,423 their powers necessarily are constrained
by the demands and the limitations of the adjudicatory process.
4. Systemic Dysfunction: Herein of 'Joinder Complexity"
When combined with the curative application of judicial power,
player dysfunction provides the unifying theme for pretrial, trial,
and remedial complexity. The cases and literature, however, also
mention a fourth type of procedural complexity-re-litigation com-
plexity. Re-litigation complexity, which has an awkward and ill-fit-
ting relationship with the other three types of procedural
complexity, 424 seems at first blush to lie outside the framework of
this unifying hypothesis of complexity. Unlike the other types of
complexity, re-litigation complexity does not immediately appear to
involve the dysfunction of lawyers, factfinders, or parties; nor does
re-litigation of related cases threaten the application of reasoned
judgment in any given case.
In fact, however, the re-litigation of certain types of related cases
is simply a special instance of lawyer and party dysfunction. One of
the lawyer's primary tasks in the formulation of issues is the selec-
tion of parties and court system for the lawsuit. As "master of the
complaint," the plaintiff's lawyer initially selects the party structure
and the court.425 Within narrow parameters, the defendant's lawyer
can change these choices.426 In making these choices, both lawyers
are guided by two constraints. The first constraint, imposed by pop-
ular and judicial will, is the panoply of restrictions found in the rele-
vant constitutions, statutes, and codes of procedure. 427 The second
dysfunction and, if the reaction is trenchant enough, judicial impotence and resulting
polycentrism. Thus, the rational approach to a problem of remedial complexity usually
is less judicial power rather than more. See Fiss, supra note 108, at 54-56.
423. See infra notes 562-66 and accompanying text.
424. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
425. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 512 (1989); Caterpillar
Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 n.7 398-99 (1987); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty
Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913).
426. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 14, 19, 22, 23. For rules and doctrines that allow a
defendant to change the plaintiff's choice of courthouse see, for example, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404-1407, 1441-1450 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800
(1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 936
(1982).
427. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. amend. XI; 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-1367, 1391
(West Supp. 1992); FED. R. Civ. P. 17-24; Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v.
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constraint is the command of the adversarial ethic to represent a
client's interests zealously. 4 28 Working within the formal legal
rules, the lawyer seeks to find the combination of claims, parties,
and court that meets his adversarial obligation of securing the best
outcome for the client.
In four circumstances, these dual constraints combine to cause
either lawyer or party dysfunction. The first circumstance involves a
fund insufficient to satisfy all the claimants. When joinder of more
claimants would reduce the funds available to the lawyer's present
client(s), the lawyer's obligation to the client forbids the joinder of
additional claimants who will dilute the share.429 Although the deci-
sion not to join additional claimants does not threaten the quality of
reasoned judgment in the present case, it does threaten reasoned
judgment in the subsequent cases of the claimants not joined. For
all practical purposes, the early depletion of the fund makes the ex-
ercise of reasoned judgment in the later cases futile.430 Thus, the
tacticaljoinder decisions of the first lawyer render the formulational
function of subsequent lawyers irrelevant, and also prevent the
party from performing its assigned role of making good on the
court's later judgments.
The same threat to the quality of the judgment in subsequently
filed cases exists when the initial suit effectively determines a course
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980).
428. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983).
429. This problem of insufficient funds for purposes of '"joinder complexity" is dis-
tinct from the problem of insufficient funds that can comprise one cause of remedial
complexity. See supra note 391 and accompanying text. In the case of remedial complex-
ity, the funds are insufficient to satisfy already existing parties. In the case of joinder
complexity, the fear of insufficient funds drives one claimant to fail to join other claim-
ants who are not yet parties in the case.
It is inaccurate to assume, however, that a lawyer attempting to claim against limited
assets never has an incentive to join additional claimants who in theory will reduce the
client's available share. Although a party's gross proceeds from a settlement or judg-
ment might be reduced by joinder, the spreading of litigation costs and attorneys' fees
among other claimants might increase a claimant's net proceeds. Moreover, the threat
of ajudgment to a large number of claimants might extract a higher settlement per claim
than an individual case would. Finally, in order to maximize fees, the lawyers may have
an incentive to join additional claimants even when it is not in the best interests of the
client to do so. In each instance, as long as all claimants are joined, systemic dysfunction
will not arise. Paradoxically, however, the tactical joinder of these parties, which cures
the problem ofjoinder complexity, might then cause remedial complexity. See infra note
452.
430. The theme of practical impairment of a person's ability to present proofs and
reasoned argument runs through the joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. See FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a)(2)(i), 23(b)(1)(B), 24(a)(2). With the exception ofjoinder
required under Rule 19(a)(2)(i), however, the joinder of persons whose rights will be
impaired is in no sense required; an existing party or the potentially impaired person
must have both knowledge of the impaired person in the case, and tactical incentive to
involve that person.
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of conduct that a person adverse to the claimants must follow. 43 ' In
this situation, which typically involves claims for specific relief, the
standard of conduct for the adverse party is established effectively in
the first proceeding, and the later claimants' proofs and reasoned
arguments are practically meaningless. 43 2 From the viewpoint of
lawyer dysfunction, this scenario means that the lawyer who repre-
sents later claimants again has been barred from performing his ex-
pected role. From the viewpoint of party dysfunction, the party is
barred (here by prior court order) from performing its function of
complying with the court's subsequently issued orders.
Third, a lawyer's tactical joinder choices can create long-term dif-
ficulty for the other party's ability to participate in rational adjudica-
tion. A defendant might succeed in keeping apart cases that
independently are so costly to litigate that the opposing lawyers will
be unable to prepare their cases effectively.433 Conversely, a plain-
tiff who chooses not to join other claimants might force the defend-
ant to exhaust its resources on re-litigation of similar issues, thus
making it difficult for the defendant's lawyers to defend subse-
quently filed cases. 434
In each of these three instances, the conduct of one group of law-
yers proceeding about their task of ensuring rational yet favorable
judgment for their clients in one case threatens the ability of an-
other set of lawyers to do the same in a subsequent case. The final
way in which re-litigation can affect rational adjudication is some-
what different: A nonparty holds the key to rational resolution of
the dispute. A person whose interests would have an effect on the
relief granted might not be joined by the lawyers and might decide
not to request participation in the suit. If the absent person is nec-
essary to assure complete relief, then the joined parties will be un-
able to perform their initial roles in the discharge of the ordered
relief.435 If the absent person retains the right to challenge the
431. This aspect of systemic dysfunction is distinct from the inconsistent obligations
that can give rise to remedial complexity. See supra text following note 390. With reme-
dial complexity, a party with obligations from a prior suit may be ordered in a subse-
quent suit to perform differing and inconsistent obligations. With systemic complexity,
a party with no existing obligations may be ordered in the present lawsuit to perform an
obligation that ultimately might lead to conflicts in a later suit. These two aspects of
inconsistent obligations are therefore flip sides of the same coin.
432. The theme of assuring joinder when an earlier suit effectively establishes the
legal rights and obligations runs through some of the joinder provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)(ii), 22, 23(b)(1)(A), and 23(b)(2).
As with practical impairment, see supra note 428 accompanying text, the Federal Rules
(other than partyjoinder under Rule 19(a)(2)(ii)) do not compel parties in the first suit
to join all persons interested in a defendant's obligation; the Rules simply provide the
tools to effectjoinder when it is tactically advantageous to do so. By definition, it is not
tactically advantageous to effect joinder in cases of systemic dysfunction.
433. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle &Jac-
quelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
434. In this instance, the plaintiff's choice, which is not necessarily made with the
purpose of pushing a defendant to the brink of bankruptcy, might have that effect. The
plaintiff's choice effectively depletes the funds available for later claimants, simultane-
ously causing another type of systemic dysfunction. See supra notes 429-30 and accompa-
nying text.
435. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1).
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judgment and thus undo the rights established between the plaintiff
and defendant in the original case, then this collateral attack will
frustrate the parties' implementation of the court's initial
judgment.43 6
In all four of these circumstances, the joinder decisions are
guided by the external constraints of procedure, ethics, and self-in-
terest. These factors either prevent another lawyer from formulat-
ing the issues, evidence, and arguments in a manner that assures
and protects reasoned judgment, or prevent a party from imple-
menting a remedy. In the first two circumstances, the lawyer's dys-
function derives from the prior decisions of another lawyer who
represents similarly situated individuals. In the third circumstance,
the lawyer's dysfunction derives from the joinder decisions of a law-
yer representing generally adverse interests. In the final instance,
the dysfunction results from the decision of other interested per-
sons who refuse to join the fray, but who remain poised to upset the
results of a lawyer's labors.437
Therefore, rather than being unrelated to the other types of com-
plexity, re-litigation complexity must be seen as part of the same
fabric. Because the lawyers, jury, and parties seem unable to over-
come this dysfunction, the hypothesis of complexity suggests that
the response to the problem of "joinder complexity" should be an
increase in judicial power that wrests from early-filing lawyers and
interested non-participants the initial joinder decisions. There is
some evidence that this judicial response is occurring. Some of the
open-ended provisions of the jurisdictional and party joinder rules
are being construed (by judges, of course) to allow more sensible
436. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that Caucasian firefighters not
made parties to a lawsuit finding discrimination against African-American firefighters
could challenge the remedial decree between the plaintiffs and defendant in a subse-
quent suit). This situation should be distinguished from the mass injury case in which a
series of plaintiffs sue a defendant seriatim, with different plaintiffs achieving different
results. The subsequent plaintiffs, for tactical reasons, may have chosen not to join in
the original lawsuit, but the judgments in their cases do not upset the obligations de-
creed in the earlier cases. Only when the decision on those obligations can be re-
opened is reasoned judgment in the original suit threatened. Thus, the mass tort causes
systemic dysfunction only when it depletes either the funds available to later claimants
or the defendant's resources to defend subsequent suits. See supra notes 429-30, 434
and accompanying text.
437. The concept ofjoinder complexity does not entirely explain the joinder provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Most significant, when the judgment in
one case would not affect the lawyers' and parties' opportunity to perform their adver-
sarial responsibilities in other related cases, reasoned judgment does not requirejoinder
of related claims even when it would be more efficient to do so. But the Federal Rules
often allow joinder in this situation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20, 23(b)(3).
Of course, the form of adjudication does not expressly preclude efficiency-driven join-
der. Nonetheless, the potential of cases with large numbers of parties to cause formula-
tional, decisionmaking, or remedial complexity counsels a cautious attitude toward the
use ofjoinder devices purely for efficiency reasons. See infra note 452.
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joinder results,438 and judges have extensive powers to assure that
absent or unrepresented interests are protected from the lawyer's
ethical pressures to ignore those interests. 43 9 It is a mistake, how-
ever, to believe that the trend is uniform, 440 or that individual
judges ultimately have much power over the situation. The clear
terms of the Constitution, the jurisdictional and venue statutes, and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be avoided by creative
glosses. Judicially created procedural obstacles to rational join-
der-such as the "master of the complaint" rule, the "well-pleaded
complaint" rule,44 1 abstention rulings not designed to achieve ra-
tional joinder,442 and claim or issue preclusion rulings that create
systemic dysfunction 44 3-are unlikely to be overruled and cannot be
ignored in the meantime. The adversarial spirit is dying a far slower
death in the area of partyjoinder than in other areas of complexity.
From the perspective of the form of adjudication, the reticent ju-
dicial role in matters ofjoinder is only partially justifiable. Because
438. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 806-14 (1985); State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967); County of Suffolk v.
Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295 (2d Cir. 1990); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d
709 (4th Cir. 1989); Tafflin v. Levitt, 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), aff'd in part, 493 U.S.
455 (1990);Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986); Cook v. Boorstin,
763 F.2d 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497 F.2d 1330 (8th
Cir. 1974); In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co.,
781 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F.
Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991); In reJoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 769 F. Supp. 85 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991); In rejoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1991).
439. For instance, judges can appoint guardians ad litem, invite participation of amici
curiae, and allow permissive intervention. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c), 24(b); Hoptowit v.
Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1260 (9th Cir. 1982); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1134-36 (5th
Cir.), vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042
(1983); In rejoint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. at 772-73; In rejohns-Manville
Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.). In class actions, the judge can take additional
measures to assure that absent class members are adequately represented. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c), (d).
440. See, e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., 111 S. Ct. 315 (1990); Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle &Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969); Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973); Tashire, 386 U.S. at 537; Zurn Indus. v. Acton
Constr. Co., 847 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1988); Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173
(5th Cir. 1984); In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); Pan Am. World Airways v. United
States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).
441. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339.U.S. 667 (1950).
442. Cf. New Orleans Pub. Serv. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350
(1989) (refusing to uphold abstention in complex ratemaking case proceeding simulta-
neously in state court); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983) (holding that abstention was improper in spite of parallel state proceed-
ings); University of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 923 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1991) (re-
versing order of abstention in federal case brought by insurance policyholders even
though suit by insurance commission against same defendant was pending in state
court). With the arguable exception of University of Maryland, none of the results in these
cases is necessarily inconsistent with rational joinder, but the analysis in each case pays
insufficient attention to the command of reasoned judgment.
443. See Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (refusing to bind Caucasian firefighters to discrimination
consent decree of which they had notice but to which they did not become parties);
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (placing limitations on offensive
collateral estoppel which might permit systemic dysfunction to occur in some cases). See
generally Green, supra note 16 (discussing claim and issue preclusion rulings).
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the form of adjudication must give way to the form of representative
democracy when they clash, the judge obviously cannot twist be-
yond their terms the Constitution and the relevant statutory and
procedural rules governingjoinder. On the other hand, there is no
reason for judge-made rules to act as additional barriers to the
achievement of reasoned judgment. Nor is there any reason for
courts to defer unduly to an adversarial ethic in areas where that
ethic threatens the fundamental form of adjudication.
Therefore, the judicial response to joinder complexity must pro-
ceed in two stages: First, ensure that the courts have sufficient
power to override the tactical decisions of lawyers not to join certain
parties and of interested non-participants not to intervene; and sec-
ond, eliminate judicially established doctrines that presently frus-
trate rational joinder. Thus, related cases pending in different
districts or divisions of a single court system must be capable of con-
solidation in one courtroom; related cases pending in different
court systems must also be capable of consolidation into one forum;
and interested nonparticipants must be either forced into the law-
suit through compulsory joinder or precluded from ever asserting
their claims.4 44 Thereafter, those aspects ofjurisdictional doctrines
that are prudential (like the well-pleaded complaint rule, complete
diversity, abstention, and standing) must be interpreted by the court
in a manner that permits a consolidated resolution in cases of dys-
function.445 Nor can the parties' selection of courts and parties be
given any deference by means of "master of the complaint" and
other unduly restricted notions of the judicial role in shaping claims
444. The legislative and procedural proposals of the American Law Institute's Com-
plex Litigation Project have sought to achieve these three objectives by allowing more lib-
eral consolidation of cases already in the federal system, see COMPLEX LITIGATION
PROJECr Draft No. 1, supra note 14, §§ 3.01-.09; by allowing cases in the federal system
to be transferred to state court and cases in one state court to be transferred to another
state court, see COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 3, supra note 129, §§ 4.01-.02; by
providing in most instances for removal to federal court of state actions related to a
pending federal case, see COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 2, supra note 16,§§ 5.01-.03; and by empowering courts to preclude re-litigation of issues that were re-
solved in a proceeding of which a nonparty had notice and an opportunity to be heard,
see icL § 5.05. Nevertheless, because the Complex Litigation Project ignores the role of rea-
soned judgment in the definition of complexity, see supra notes 117-32 and accompany-
ing text, its proposals run two risks: joining cases in which reasoned judgment can be
exercised even withoutjoinder; and not joining cases (for reasons of efficiency, comity,
or respect for party autonomy) in which joinder is essential to reasoned judgment. The
latter risk directly and obviously threatens reasoned judgment; the former risk does so
when efficientjoinder results in formulational, decisionmaking, or remedial complexity.
See supra note 437; infra note 452. Indeed, although the proposals of the Complex Litiga-
tion Project are a necessary part of the prescription forjoinder complexity, their curative
powers may end up being used-with occasionally fatal consequences-on the wrong
patients.
445. There is, of course, no need to amend the present scope of these doctrines in
cases that do not pose problems of complexity.
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and party structure.446
Realistically, implementation of the first step can be accomplished
only through the federal courts. No state acting alone can overcome
the constitutional handcuff of personal jurisdiction. 447 The devel-
opment of voluntary uniformity among fifty states on the rules of
partyjoinder, transfer, and consolidation is highly unlikely.448 Even
if agreement on the rules were possible, the lack of a single appel-
late authority to iron out idiosyncratic interpretations of the uni-
form rules would make the uniformity more theoretical than real.
Furthermore, in order to package an entire case, state courts would
need to have the authority to adjudicate disputes that now lie within
the removal or exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court.449 In con-
trast, the federal courts possess none of these flaws. Nationwide
service of process, already available in some areas, can be ex-
panded. 450 A single ultimate tribunal and a largely uniform body of
rules are already in place. Federal courts can hear complex cases
without sacrificing the prudential reasons that Congress believes
federal courts should have exclusive or removal jurisdiction, and
federal judges have familiarity with the federal questions often in-
habiting complex litigation. Therefore, although it is not necessary
that the case actually be handled by the federal court, it is necessary
that the federal courts have the power to decide the proper forum
for the case.451
446. See Freer, supra note 16. Unlike Professor Freer, however, I do not contend that
the judge should possess case-shaping powers in cases that present no issues of systemic
dysfunction. The broad claim to overthrow the "master of the complaint" doctrine or to
permit judicial case-shaping in all cases is not compelled by the form of adjudication. In
fact, because it violates the adversarial assumption, this broader claim must be rejected
as long as we profess the adversarial ideal. See supra notes 274-79 and accompanying
text.
447. The federal courts, of course, could constitutionally develop a rule of nation-
wide service of process. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1988); Amendments to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 134 F.R.D. 525, 603-05 (1991) [hereinafter Amendments] (describing pro-
posal of Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to amend Rule 4 to allow na-
tionwide service of process in federal question cases).
448. The States presently demonstrate a plethora of procedural variation on matters
both large and small. See Oakley & Coon, supra note 11, at 1367; Subrin, supra note 11,
at 2000. Proposals to permit transfer of related cases from federal to state court and
among state courts are still on the drawing board. See COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT
Draft No. 3, supra note 129, §§ 4.01-.02.; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAwS, UNIFORM TRANSFER OF LITIGATION ACT (1992).
449. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, 78aa (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338, 1346, 1441-1452
(1988). See generally 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 269, § 3527 (discussing
federal court jurisdiction).
450. See supra note 449. Interestingly, the Supreme Court declined to amend Rule 4
to permit nationwide service of process in federal question cases when given the oppor-
tunity to do so in 1991. See Amendments, supra note 449, at 525 (choosing not to forward
to Congress a proposal to create nationwide service of process in federal question
cases). Even nationwide service of process for federal question cases, which would en-
tangle the courts in a host of "pendent personal jurisdiction" issues, does not go far
enough in eliminating this aspect of systemic dysfunction.
451. Cf Thermtron Prods. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976) (holding that, in
routine case not involving dysfunction, federal court could not remand a removed case
to state court merely because it would be resolved more efficiently there). In contrast,
an excellent example of a federal court using its power to package a case in state court is
Tafflin v. Levitt, 865 F.2d 595 (4th Cir. 1989), aff'd in part, 493 U.S. 55 (1990). In Tafflin,
an insolvent savings and loan was thrown into receivership in state court. Depositors
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Thus, the form of adjudication strongly counsels the assumption
of greater case-shaping power by federal judges when systemic dys-
function appears. 452 But this assertion of power, which obviously
comes at the expense of the lawyers who now perform the tasks, also
comes at the expense of state courts in which the cases would other-
wise be brought.453 The specter of federal judges grabbing power
at the expense of state courts is problematic for two reasons. First,
as federal courts become the haven of multiparty, multiclaim litiga-
tion, state courts will likely become the repository of car accidents,
simple breach of contract claims, and landlord-tenant disputes. Sec-
ond, assertion of federal power over most multiparty, multiclaim lit-
igation will severely tax the federal court system because many of
these cases also are likely to involve other aspects of lawyer,
factfinder, or party dysfunction.
and other claimants, most of whom were not diverse from the defendants, filed their
claims in the receivership proceeding. A small group of creditors, however, sought to
beat everyone to the available assets by filing federal question (securities fraud and
RICO) claims in federal court. The district court dismissed the securities claim over
which the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction. It then found that state courts had
concurrent jurisdiction over the RICO claim, and decided to abstain from hearing the
claim under Burford abstention. Id. at 600 (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943)) (noting that abstention is proper when hearing the case would impact upon the
state government's rightful independence). The Fourth Circuit affirmed, and the
Supreme Court affirmed on the concurrent jurisdiction issue to which it had restricted
its writ of certiorari.
Given the inability to join all parties in federal court because of the lack of complete
diversity, the district court's procedural maneuvering evidenced a wise use of power to
prevent systemic dysfunction. The district court, however, was able to effectuate ra-
tional joinder only because no securities claim lay within federal jurisdiction and be-
cause of an interpretation of Burford abstention that seems to conflict with the Burford
analysis subsequently adopted in New Orleans Public Service v. Council of the City of
New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350 (1989). The only long-term solution to the problem posed
in Tafflin would be to eliminate the complete diversity gloss on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in
instances of systemic dysfunction, and then to give the courts the power to assure join-
der of all claimants in federal court. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the Federal
Courts Study Committee, which generally recommended the elimination of federal juris-
diction in several areas, advocated expanded jurisdiction for federal courts to handle
complex cases. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrrEE, supra note 16, at 38-50, 55-59,
81.
452. Of course, the aggregation of large numbers of claims to avoid systemic dys-
function might cause formulational, decisionmaking, or remedial complexity. To the
extent that the threat to reasoned judgment posed by these types of complexity can be
solved through the exercise ofjudicial power, there is no violation of the form of adjudi-
cation. Cf In re Eastern & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380, 1385 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing techniques used to avoid factfinder dysfunction after consoli-
dation of 64 cases for trial). When the solution to joinder complexity causes another
form of dysfunction that cannot be cured by judicial power, however, the court is in a
true dilemma-no technique can assure reasoned judgment. For discussion of this
problem, see infra notes 517-20 and accompanying text.
453. For reasons similar to those discussed with remedial complexity, this assertion
of power does not directly offend the notion of federalism inherent in the Constitution:
When Congress has granted a federal court the authority to adjudicate a case, it has
impliedly given the federal judge the power to resolve the dispute rationally. See supra
notes 421-22 and accompanying text.
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These problems illustrate two weaknesses of formal analysis.
First, formal analysis is relatively indifferent to the indirect effects,
substantive and otherwise, that rational adjudication will have on
state courts.454 Second, rational adjudication assumes that the
judge can execute perfectly her assigned functions. 455 At a practical
level, however, these concerns largely are ameliorated by the con-
servatism of the form of adjudication. The form does not require
that federal courts eliminate judicial rules inhibiting partyjoinder in
all cases; the rules must be abandoned only in the four limited cir-
cumstances that create lawyer or party dysfunction. The court also
cannot act unless it will be effective in ending dysfunction; consider,
for example, a case that can be resolved rationally only with thejoin-
der of international parties not subject to American process. 456 Fi-
nally, the "minor league" effect on state courts should be moderate
as long as Article III precludes federal assertion ofjurisdiction over
multiparty state law disputes involving citizens of only one state.457
Thus far, however, Congress and the federal courts have largely
failed to accept the invitation to reform joinder concepts to lessen
"joinder complexity." 45 3 For the other three modes of complexity,
the hypothesis of dysfunction and application of remedial judicial
454. The pressure that this skewed distribution of cases may place upon substantive
state law has received little attention in the literature, and certainly merits deeper explo-
ration. For a further perspective on the problem, see infra notes 508-09 and accompany-
ing text.
455. One tempting possibility-the use of ad hoc judicial officers such as masters-
encounters significant practical and theoretical difficulties. See supra note 413 and ac-
companying text. Another possibility-an increase in the number of federal judges and
magistrate judges-risks an undesirable dilution of the federal bench. FEDERAL COURTS
STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 16, at 8, 12; CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAG-
ISTRATES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 174-78 (1990). The final possibility-the elimination
of certain substantive areas (such as diversity cases, prisoner civil rights petitions, or
Social Security appeals) from the federal docket-might expose politically valuable
rights to executive branch whim or exacerbate the tendency to make state courts into a
"minor league."
456. Cf Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984)
(holding that state court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tion with limited business contacts in the state); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Ta-
shire, 386 U.S. 523, 537 n.18 (1967) (noting possible problems of obtaining personal
jurisdiction over Canadian citizens injured in bus crash in the United States).
457. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
458. Congress has occasionally acted; for instance, it enacted a multidistrict litigation
transfer plan in 1968, see Act of April, 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988)), and it recently authorized supplemental
jurisdiction over pendent claims and parties, see Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-650, § 310(a), 104 Star. 5113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. 1992)).
Other suggestions to ease the existing joinder restrictions have been overlooked. See,
e.g., MULTIPARTY, MULTIFORUM JURISDICTION ACT OF 1991, H.R. 2450, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); AMERICAN LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1968).
Similarly, the Supreme Court initially permitted more sensible joinder results in the
1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Amendments to Rules of
Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 383 U.S. 1029, 1042-51 (1966). The
Court subsequently has taken a narrow reading of the existing jurisdictional and joinder
rules on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Temple v. Synthes Corp., 111 S. Ct. 315 (1990);
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286 (1980); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Synder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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power largely is descriptive of existing practice; the crucial question
is whether judges are exceeding the inherent limitations on their
power. Forjoinder complexity, the evidence of present dysfunction
exists, but the remedial application of judicial power that the hy-
pothesis suggests to be appropriate has been fitful, and thus remains
largely a matter of prescription. In the area of partyjoinder, the full
and proper limits of the judicial power available under the form of
adjudication have not been achieved.
5. Necessary but Insufficient Complexity
The hypothesis of complexity-which holds that an essential attri-
bute of complex litigation is lawyer, factfinder, or party dysfunction
remediable by an assertion ofjudicial power-initially appears valid.
Descriptively, it accounts for and partially justifies the movement to-
ward the increased power of federal judges. Prescriptively, it sug-
gests some limits upon that power, and also points in the direction
of additional changes (mostly in the areas ofjurisdiction andjoinder
rules) that have recently been made or that presently are being
debated.
Indeed, all of the paradigmatic complex cases-cases such as the
AT&T antitrust litigation,45 9 the Agent Orange product liability litiga-
tion,4 6 0 and the Kansas City school desegregation suit' 61-involve
these attributes. Nevertheless, a crucial question still remains:
whether all cases that possess these attributes are complex. If they
are, then a sufficient definition of complex litigation has been devel-
oped, and the limitations already identified are the only limitations
on judicial power. If other attributes are essential to the definition,
however, those attributes might reveal further limitations on judicial
power.
In fact, other attributes must be essential. It cannot legitimately
be claimed that every case in which the court comes to the aid of an
actor unable to perform its adversarial function is complex. Take,
for example, a simple car accident involving three fact witnesses
(plaintiff, defendant, and police officer) and two experts (the plain-
tiff's physician and the defendant's Rule-35 examiner462). Assume
that the defendant is penniless, and thus cannot afford the costs of
defense. In a sense, these facts involve lawyer dysfunction, because
the defendant's impecunious state frustrates her lawyer's ability to
marshal and present evidence. The dysfunction could be remedied
459. United States v. AT&T, 461 F. Supp. 1314 (D.D.C. 1978).
460. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 689 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D.N.Y.
1988).
461. Missouri v.Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
462. See FED. R. Civ. P. 35(a) (allowing one party to obtain a physical or mental exam-
ination of another party on a showing of good cause).
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through the application ofjudicial power: the suspension of all dis-
covery; the issuance of bench subpoenas for trial; the court appoint-
ment of an expert medical examiner; and the judicial interrogation
of witnesses on behalf of the defendant. Certainly the procedures
would be novel, perhaps even wrong-headed, but the case is at bot-
tom still a simple car accident. Under the present hypothesis of
complexity, however, this use of judicial power to cure dysfunction
would make the case complex.
Similarly, consider a trucking company that causes harm to two
plaintiffs in unrelated incidents. One plaintiff is injured when one of
the defendant's trucks runs a red light; a second plaintiff is harmed
when the defendant defaults on a contract without excuse. Assume
that each plaintiff is harmed in the amount of $1,000,000, but that
the total assets of the company are only $1,500,000. Here the law-
yers will be precluded from joining the case by procedural rules
(joinder of parties here is precluded because their injuries do not
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence 46 ) and ethical con-
siderations (joinder would reduce the client's share of the pro-
ceeds4 64). The court arguably could effect joinder, either by
ordering consolidation of the cases, 465 or by placing the company
into a receivership. 466 The court then could distribute the assets in
a fair way. Although this nontraditional use of judicial power to
overcome systemic dysfunction suggests that the case is complex,
this conclusion intuitively does not seem correct as long as each of
the bifurcated cases poses no internal problems of dysfunction. 4 7
These hypotheticals demonstrate that the dual characteristics of
dysfunction and curative judicial power do not adequately describe
complex litigation. A moment's reflection on the facts of these cases
reveals the significant difference between them and paradigmatically
463. See id. 20(a). Rule 20 allows joinder when "any question of law or fact" is com-
mon to the plaintiffs whose rights "aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or
series of transactions or occurrences." Id. The plaintiffs' respective rights to the full
payment of their claims are arguably a common question of law that "arises out of" the
occurrence of the defendant's possible insolvency; thus, Rule 20 could be interpreted to
allow joinder. This reading of Rule 20, however, seems far more broad than the most
generous readings given the Rule up to now, see Mosley v. General Motors Corp., 497
F.2d 1330 (8th Cir. 1974). In any event, Rule 20 still would require the consent of the
parties, at least one of whom would have little incentive to join a case that will reduce the
expected judgment by $250,000.
464. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983).
465. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (authorizing a court to consolidate "[w]hen actions in-
volving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court"); Duke v. Uni-
royal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1420-21 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 429 (1991);Johnson
v. Celotex Corp., 899 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 297 (1990).
Even assuming that a question of law is common to the cases, see supra note 465, Rule 42
cannot be used as a device for the court to effect joinder if one of the plaintiffs has not
yet filed suit or has sued in state as opposed to federal court. See Pan Am. World Air-
ways v. United States Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1975).
466. See FED. R. Civ. P. 66; 12 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 76, §§ 2982-2985.
467. Indeed, if this intuition were not true, then every bankruptcy case in which as-
sets are insufficient to satisfy all the creditors within a particular priority would be com-
plex. Bankruptcy cases, however, are not among the types of litigation typically
considered to be complex. See supra notes 54-60, 62 and accompanying text.
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complex cases such as Agent Orange and AT&T.468 In the hypotheti-
cals, judicial power simply righted a sinking ship in a manner that
assured that the nature and quality of the evidence-and thus the
opportunity for reasoned judgment-were preserved. The dispa-
rate procedural treatment of the cases did not result in outcomes
that were substantively different than the cases of similar persons
with similar types of claims. 46 9
Perhaps the same is not true of the paradigmatic complex cases,
in which disparate procedural treatment accorded some claims or
parties threatens to treat similar claims and parties dissimilarly. If
true, this distinction suggests another crucial element in complex
cases. Until now, this Article has demonstrated that complex litiga-
tion develops from the collision between the norm of reasoned
judgment and the positive assumption of adversarialism. It might
be that complex cases also involve a collision with another assump-
tion of American procedure: the trans-substantive assumption that
all like cases will be treated procedurally alike.
B. The Consequence of Complexity: Treating Like Cases Unalike
To explore whether complex litigation in fact involves a conflict
with trans-substantivism, it is important to recall the four compo-
nents of trans-substantivism: inter-transactional neutrality, which
requires that parties in different transactions with similar legal
claims be accorded the same procedures; intra-substantive neutral-
ity, which requires that all cases involving a single substantive theory
receive the same set of procedures; transactional neutrality, which
requires that all substantive theories implicated by the factual occur-
rence at issue receive the same procedures; and inter-personal neu-
trality, which requires that each person (plaintiff or defendant) in a
transaction receive the same procedures as all other similarly situ-
ated persons.470 The following analysis illustrates that, in complex
468. See supra notes 459-61 and accompanying text.
469. The reason that this statement is true in the first hypothetical is evident; the
evidence available for decision is the same in all of the cases. In the second hypothetical,
the reason the use of aggregation procedures like consolidation or receivership does not
lead to disparate results is two-fold. First, assuming that the defendant had no other
creditors, the same aggregative result achieved through the assertion of judicial power
would be achieved through one plaintiff's invocation of bankruptcy proceedings. Sec-
ond, the focus of formal adjudication is upon obligation, not right. See supra notes 248-
52 and accompanying text. Obviously, the defendant's obligation to pay for its wrongs
cannot exceed its available assets. Hence, although the aggregation of the claims leads
to different rights for the plaintiffs (each receiving $750,000 rather than the first tojudg-
ment receiving $1,000,000 and the second to judgment $500,000), the aggregation does
not change the defendant's ultimate obligation to pay $1,500,000 for its wrongs.
470. See supra notes 288-97 and accompanying text.
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litigation, the assertion of judicial power required to avert dysfunc-
tion threatens at least one of these four neutralities. It also illus-
trates that, because some aspects of these neutralities are essential
attributes of the form of adjudication, the judge's power to assure
reasoned judgment is more constrained than the hypothesis of com-
plexity has previously suggested.
1. Disparate Treatment of Parties Involved in Similar Transactions
The first assumption of trans-substantivism, inter-transactional
neutrality, is that two or more plaintiffs with similar claims of legal
obligation arising from two separate transactions will not receive
procedures that cause the nature and quality of the evidence avail-
able to the decisionmaker to differ.471 Should the nature and quality
of evidence vary between the claims, then the disparate procedures
risk disparate substantive outcomes for the same legal obligation.472
In cases typically regarded as complex, there is evidence that the
procedures used by judges to remedy dysfunction are in fact causing
outcome-determinative differences among different sets of similarly
situated parties. A classic instance is asbestos litigation involving
the same factual scenario: the exposure of workers to many differ-
ent asbestos products. Among the procedural techniques used to
resolve this scenario have been individual plaintiff trials,473 consoli-
dated and class action trials in which certain issues have been tried
on a class-wide basis or the claims of certain bellwether plaintiffs
have been litigated to conclusion, 474 and now multidistrict proceed-
ings.475 Some asbestos cases have involved masters; some have
not.476 Some have employed burden-shifting devices; some have
471. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
472. The point of inter-transactional neutrality is not that procedural rules should
have no substantive consequences; it is that the substantive consequences of procedural
rules must be predictable and uniform among all transactions involving the same legal
and factual patterns. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
473. For a history of the early individual trials, see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIS-
CONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985).
474. See, e.g., In re Eastern & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 772 F. Supp. 1380 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (describing consolidation of state and federal cases and their separation
into two trials of 64 and 15 claimants); In rejoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 769 F.
Supp. 85 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that inter-district consolidation of federal cases
was permissible). For a history of various bifurcation experiments in class actions pend-
ing in the Eastern District of Texas and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, see Mul-
lenix, supra note 69, at 500-09, 557-65. See also REPORT ON ASBESTOS LmIGATION, supra
note 14, at 17-22.
475. In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
476. See In reJoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 F.R.D. 434 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(appointing settlement master for federal and state asbestos cases); McGovern, supra
note 20, at 660-75; McGovern supra note 15, at 478-91; Mullenix, supra note 69, at 540-
45.
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not.477 Some defendants have used bankruptcy process to forge set-
tlements; some have not.478 Indeed, some judges and commenta-
tors have praised procedural experimentation among similarly
situated cases as a means of finding better methods to dispense
justice.479
Because the focus of the judge, the lawyers, and the parties is on
the rational resolution of the case at hand, the failure to consider
the inequitable consequences of one case's procedure on other,
transactionally unrelated cases is understandable. This oversight,
however, raises a conflict with the assumption of inter-transactional
neutrality-an assumption that is also normatively grounded in the
form of adjudication when there are no relevant legal or factual dif-
ferences among cases. 48 0 When parties in similar transactions have
claims or defenses that are factually and legally identical, therefore,
the judge's adjudicatory power to select a procedure to remedy dys-
function is limited not only by the considerations of reasoned judg-
ment already discussed, but also by the need to assure that the
procedure chosen to assure reasoned judgment does not as a practi-
cal matter establish legal obligations that vary among identically sit-
uated parties.48 '
In many instances, this limitation on procedural innovation is un-
likely to affect the court's power. First, many procedural innova-
tions will have no effect ultimately on the nature and quality of
evidence available for adjudication. A judge in one complex case
might order discovery in waves, and another judge in a similar case
might limit the amount of time for depositions. If both methods of
477. Compare Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986)
(refusing to burden-shift) and Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co., 764 F.2d
1480 (11 th Cir. 1985) (same) with Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453 (10th Cir.
1988) (using a burden-shifting device).
478. See In re joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 747 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1991) (noting that 12 asbestos defendants have gone into bankruptcy, while others have
used different techniques to cope with the burdens of litigation).
479. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. at 423 & n.10
(assigning asbestos cases to judge Weiner in part because of "his track record of accom-
plishment and successful innovation"); Weinstein, supra note 17, at 21-42; see also Mul-
lenix, supra note 69, at 569-74 (approving generally of disparate innovations developed
to try two asbestos class actions). Interestingly, Damaska's model predicts this type of
experimentation in complex American litigation. DAMASKA, supra note 169, at 239 (not-
ing that, in the absence of a strong judicial hierarchy in America, "[d]ifferent judges can
each set off on a different voyage of discovering best solutions").
480. Adjudication's formal reliance on pre-existing obligation as the basis of decision
means that cases that are legally and factually identical must receive the "same" (i.e., not
outcome-determinative) procedures. When there are some legally relevant factual dif-
ferences among transactionally alike cases, however, the form of adjudication does not
insist on the use of the "same" procedures; but the non-normative assumption of trans-
substantivism still does. See supra notes 305-07 and accompanying text.
481. Cf SEC v. Elliott, 953 F.2d 1560, 1573 (11th Cir. 1992) ("If relevant facts differ,
then the law will treat the claimants differently. Thus, it is incorrect to say the law pre-
fers one claimant if that claimant's situation differs in a legally cognizable way.").
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case management lead to disclosure of the same evidence, these
procedural variations probably will not alter a party's legal obliga-
tions. Second, the form of adjudication does not mandate that par-
ties in similar transactions, but with dissimilar legal or factual
positions, receive identical procedures. Consider, for instance, two
neighborhoods polluted by releases from two separate factories.
Assume that the only relevant differences among the cases are that
the residents in Neighborhood A are not guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, whereas the residents in Neighborhood B are guilty; further
assume the law of the relevant jurisdiction recognizes contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to liability. If negligence were the
residents' only viable claim, and if there were some evidence of con-
tributory negligence, the two trial courts legitimately might estab-
lish different, outcome-determinative case management plans for
each case. Because the legal obligations of the defendants are not
identical, the form of adjudication does not insist that the proce-
dures enforcing the obligations be the same.
The normative component of inter-transactional neutrality will,
however, have an effect in at least two circumstances. First, assume
that before the residents file suit, the state legislature abolishes con-
tributory negligence as a bar in toxic tort cases. Now the trial court
in the second case would no longer be justified in crafting a case-
management plan that deviates from the management plan estab-
lished for the first case. Although there is a factual difference be-
tween the cases (negligence on the part of one set of residents), the
law no longer recognizes that defense as an aspect of the defend-
ant's obligation. The form of adjudication countenances different
procedures only when the factual differences are legally relevant.
Second, in order to assure no variation in the nature of the evidence
available to the decisionmaker, all subsequent cases that are legally
and factually identical to the first case must accept the management
blueprint of the first court.
In combination, these two limitations necessarily lead to a certain
conservatism in the area of procedural innovation. Of course, this
straitjacket is easier to announce than to enforce. The initial prob-
lem is that this limitation seemingly locks all subsequent judges in
the relevant jurisdiction48 2 into the procedural framework built by
the first judge to enter an area. The only "solutions" to this prob-
lem are, first, to share information about dysfunctional cases and
curative techniques with all judges,48 3 and second, to develop and
482. Because there is no expectation in our federal system that the legal obligations
under state law be uniform, one state can adopt a set of procedures that will cause a
different outcome for a dysfunctional case arising under that state's law than the out-
come of a dysfunctional case arising under another state's law. When federal obliga-
tions are at stake, however, all courts, federal and state, would need to ensure that their
later procedural choices do not cause different impacts than the procedural choices of
earlier cases.
483. See REPORT ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 14, at 36-37; Mullenix, supra
note 69, at 573-74; cf. 28 U.S.C.A. § 479(b) (West Supp. 1991) (ordering the Judicial
Conference to make available to the district courts recommendations on ways to im-
prove litigation management and dispute resolution services).
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promulgate specific rules for the various types of complex litiga-
tion-rules that describe in detail the range of procedural options
and the innovations that are precluded. 484 Although these are in a
sense the goals of the Manual for Complex Litigation, the Manual falls
well short of the mark. Instead of a procedural roadmap describing
the permissible and impermissible methods of attacking particular
types of complex litigation, the Manual is a compendium of useful
techniques. 485 The reason for the Manual's failure to make the diffi-
cult and necessary procedural choices lies in its decisions to ignore
the definition of complex litigation and to focus instead on the effi-
cient resolution of individual cases.
The form of adjudication demands a more systematic analysis of
outcome-affecting procedural techniques. In developing that analy-
sis into a series of specific rules, however, conflicts with other as-
pects of the trans-substantive assumption might arise. It is to these
remaining assumptions that we must next turn.
2. Disparate Treatment of Parties Involved in a Single Transaction
A second aspect of trans-substantivism is inter-personal neutral-
ity. Under this assumption, all plaintiffs and all defendants in a
transaction should receive comparable procedural treatment that as-
sures that litigant-specific procedural variations cause no disparity
in substantive outcome.486 In complex litigation, instances of pro-
cedural discrimination among plaintiffs or defendants are somewhat
rare, but they do exist. For instance, some Bendectin 487 plaintiffs re-
ceived a multidistrict trial in which the issue of causation was trifur-
cated and significant limitations were placed on the access of
plaintiffs to the courtroom; they lost their case before a jury.4 8 8
Other plaintiffs who opted out of the multidistrict proceeding re-
ceived a full, non-trifurcated proceeding, where, depending on the
evidentiary rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony and the
484. Curiously, the failure of judges to recognize and heed the demands of inter-
transactional neutrality, see supra note 479 and accompanying text, has actually been a
boon to this task. With the amount of procedural innovation attempted by judges in
recent years, the drafters of more specific rules should have a good sense of the breadth
of possibilities, their relative efficacy, and their effects on substantive rights.
485. The second half of the Manual does develop some specific thoughts about the
handling of six substantive areas of complex litigation. See MANUAL, supra note 13,
§§ 33.1 to .6. This section, however, suffers from a lack of specificity, rarely stating a
concrete and preferred set of procedures and never considering the effect of varying
procedures on the substance of the parties' obligations. Cf 28 U.S.C.A. § 479(c) (West
Supp. 1991) (requiring creation of a manual designed to develop solutions for problems
of cost and delay in federal civil cases).
486. See text accompanying notes 294-96.
487. In re Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006
(1989).
488. See id.
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judges' perception of the strength of that evidence, they have en-
countered both victory and defeat.48 9 The same procedural varia-
tion can occur among defendants. For instance, in the Triana DDT
litigation, which involved thousands of plaintiffs, the plaintiffs' cases
against two defendants were separated. The litigation involving one
defendant, the chemical manufacturer, was managed by a master,
who chose to select twenty random members of the class for full
trial and created a novel system of information disclosure. That suit
ended with a $15,000,000 class settlement. 490 The litigation involv-
ing the other defendant, the owner of the land on which the manu-
facturing took place, was managed by the judge, who bifurcated the
case by legal issue and adopted traditional discovery methods. After
trial, the defendant in the second litigation prevailed. 49 1
These types of procedural disparity within a transaction suggest a
conflict with inter-personal neutrality. Of course, when disparate
procedures do not affect the outcomes of the cases of particular
plaintiffs or defendants, no conflict exists. Different procedures,
though, are frequently not outcome-neutral. Individual trials gener-
ate different outcomes than group trials: The group is more likely
to recover, but will receive less money than the plaintiffs who are
successful in individual trials.492 Likewise, the use of masters, novel
information disclosure devices, issue bifurcation, and a host of other
procedural techniques can mean that different evidence is available
to the decisionmaker, with different outcomes likely.
The analysis is precisely the same as the analysis developed for
inter-transactional neutrality. Like inter-transactional neutrality, in-
ter-personal neutrality has both a normative and a positive compo-
nent: When there are no legally or factually relevant distinctions
489. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991);
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990); Ealy v. Richard-
son-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 370 (1990); Brock v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir.), modified, 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.
1989) (per curiam), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1046 (1990); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrill,
Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell-
National Laboratories, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987); Oxendine v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 506 A.2d 1100 (D.C. 1986), appeal after remand, 563 A.2d 330 (D.C.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1074 (1990).
490. See In re Redstone Arsenal DDT Litig., No. CV-86-C-5313-NE (N.D. Ala. Dec. 7,
1986) (approving allocation and distribution plan); Olin Agrees to Settle Alabama DDT Case,
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1986, at Al5. In a prior settlement, the same defendant agreed to
pay $24 million and provide health care to a prior group of plaintiffs, and further agreed
to clean up land contaminated by its chemical. See Olin Agrees to an Unprecedented Cleanup,
WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1983, at A6.
491. Floyd Wilhoite v. United States, No. 84-C-5894-NE (N.D. Ala. July 29, 1986).
The author was lead trial counsel for the United States in the case. Professor McGov-
ern's implications that the two cases were coordinated for settlement and trial, see Fran-
cis E. McGovern, The Discovery Survey, 51 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 41, 46 (Autumn 1988),
and that the United States Army was involved in the settlement, see Francis E. McGovern,
The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 61, 63 (Autumn 1990), are
both erroneous. The United States declined to participate in Professor McGovern's case
management plan or in the settlement of the case. Further, the cases were not coordi-
nated for trial; rather, the trials were scheduled to occur on different issues more than
six months apart from one another.
492. See Kenneth S. Bordens & Irwin A. Horowitz, Mass Tort Civil Litigation: The Impact
of Procedural Changes onJury Decisions, 73 JUDICATURE 22 (1989).
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among individual claims of obligation, the form of adjudication
requires the same procedures; but when relevant distinctions exist,
the same procedures are not required.493 When parties to a trans-
action have factual differences that are legally relevant, the court is
not required by the form of adjudication to adopt the same proce-
dures. Thus, the court's use of different procedures against the
chemical manufacturer and the land owner, who had differing legal
obligations, violated only the positive component of inter-personal
neutrality. When no factual or legal differences are discernible,
however, the court is precluded by the form of adjudication from
providing different, outcome-determinative procedures to different
parties to a transaction. Thus, the disparate, outcome-determina-
tive procedures adopted in the Bendectin cases, in which the defend-
ant's obligation was identical toward the claimants, violated the
form of adjudication and consequently exceeded the courts' adjudi-
catory authority. 494
Like inter-transactional neutrality, inter-personal neutrality puts a
cap on procedural innovation, for it commits all judges who handle
subsequent cases to accept the same procedures utilized by the first
judge. Here again, the creation of a procedural manual which dis-
tributes information and addresses the range of proper procedures
in particular cases will help to alleviate the problem.495 In contrast
to inter-transactional neutrality, however, the judge has available
other techniques that can eliminate the use of disparate procedures
in significant numbers of cases: consolidation and joinder. When
all of the apparent claimants and defendants already are involved in
litigation, consolidation puts the entire case in the hands of a single
judge who can assure that the forbidden or undesirable effects of
outcome-determinative procedure do not occur. When some claim-
ants or defendants are not yet involved in litigation or cannot other-
wise be consolidated, the court should consider the use of joinder
devices such as a class action or issue-preclusion doctrines to en-
force the use of outcome-neutral procedure. 496
493. See supra notes 308, 480-81 and accompanying text. When I use the term "same
procedures," I do not mean "identical procedures," but rather procedures that cause no
outcome-determinative differences in the nature and quality of evidence available to the
decisionmaker.
494. Because each state is free to impose its own product liability obligations on a
drug manufacturer, there is no reason that a court deciding a Bendectin case under Cali-
fornia law would need to adopt the same procedures as one deciding a case under Loui-
siana law. See supra note 484. Once a case from a particular jurisdiction was placed in
the multidistrict proceeding, however, the form of adjudication requires that plaintiffs
who opted out of the consolidated Bendectin trial, as well as all subsequently filed cases
decided under the law of that jurisdiction, receive the same procedures as those ac-
corded the plaintiffs in the multidistrict proceeding.
495. See supra notes 483-85 and accompanying text.
496. Thus far, the Supreme Court has not looked favorably on the use of suchjoinder
17971992]
Indeed, the desirability of inter-personal neutrality provides a
powerful additional argument in favor of the elimination of restric-
tive jurisdictional and party joinder rules. 49 7 It also suggests a spe-
cial legitimacy for class actions, which should be a favored device to
avoid disparate treatment of numerous parties claiming under a
legal obligation arising from the same transaction.
3. Disparate Treatment of Parties Claiming Under a Single Legal
Theory
As different as they might otherwise be, an asbestos case and a car
accident share one feature: a common theory of liability.498 The
assumption of intra-substantive neutrality holds that both cases
should be resolved with the "same" procedures. 499
The necessary assertion ofjudicial power in cases of dysfunction
and the lack of such an assertion in "routine" cases500 almost invari-
ably invokes the concerns of this assumption. If an individual is run
over by a blue bus of unknown ownership, she must prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant's blue bus did the
dirty deed; but when an individual is a member of a large group of
persons injured by a chemical of unknown manufacture, the defend-
ant often bears the burden of avoiding liability.50 1 An individual in-
stance of discrimination is resolved by negotiation or trial; a mass
instance often invokes a panoply of masters and novel settlement
techniques.50 2 A simple, two-party contract dispute leads to full dis-
covery and a short trial; a massive commercial dispute leads to con-
solidation of parties, bifurcation of issues or claims, and staged
trials.503 Similarly, substitution of judge for jury, limitation of trial
devices, and has shown no sensitivity to the effects of its decisions on the form of adjudi-
cation or the positive assumption of inter-personal neutrality. See, e.g., Temple v.
Synthes Corp., 111 S. Ct. 315 (1990); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
497. For additional and somewhat different reasons to eliminate the restrictive rules,
see supra Part III.A.4. Of course, class action and otherjoinder devices cannot be used
when they would render a case incapable of rational resolution. See supra note 452; infra
Part III.C.
498. In most jurisdictions the common theory will be negligence.
499. An asbestos case is also likely to contain product liability and warranty claims
not present in the car crash at the corner. The assumption of intra-substantive neutral-
ity requires only that the negligence theories in each of the two cases be treated proce-
durally alike; it does not require that the same procedures be used to resolve the other
legal theories. See supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
By "same procedures," I again mean only that the procedures not result in outcome-
determinative differences in the information available to the decisionmaker. See supra
notes 480, 493.
500. By "routine cases," I mean only that the cases do not involve any of the four
types of dysfunction-formulational, factfinder, remedial, or systemic--discussed supra
Part III.A.
501. See Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453 (10th Cir. 1988); Sindell v. Abbott
Lab., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factind-
ing at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REv. 521 (1986).
502. See MANUAL, supra note 13, § 33.55.
503. See id. §§ 33.1, 33.3, 33.4.
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time, limitation of discovery, summaries of testimony, and mass tri-
als in which the histories of individual claimants are only perfuncto-
rily or statistically presented all are likely to affect the decision in the
case, and all of them are used primarily in cases of dysfunction.
Therefore, the procedural innovations used to ameliorate dysfunc-
tion often result in a different nature and quality of evidence among
routine and dysfunctional cases invoking a single theory.
Unlike the conflict between the form of adjudication and inter-
transactional neutrality, however, the clash with intra-substantive
neutrality creates no normative difficulties. Nothing in the form of
adjudication requires that factually different cases involving the
same legal theory be treated procedurally alike. 50 4 Because the as-
sumption of "like legal claims treated alike" is entirely positive, and
because the judge's need to protect reasoned judgment is norma-
tive, the intra-substantive assumption must give way when a judge
can protect reasoned judgment only by violating the intra-substan-
tive assumption.
The lack of formal limitation does not mean, however, that a
judge is free to discard intra-substantive neutrality as a considera-
tion. It remains a positive assumption of procedure, to be followed
whenever possible. Consideration of intra-substantive neutrality is
especially important because of the Rules Enabling Act, which com-
mands that procedural rules not abridge, enlarge, or modify sub-
stantive rights.505 Although the Enabling Act does not on its face
mandate intra-substantive procedure, 506 Congress' sensitivity to the
doctrinal consequences of procedural rules nonetheless requires
that judges respect, to the greatest extent consistent with the needs
of adjudication, the intra-substantive assumption. Thus, a judge
faced with a choice of two procedures that will remedy dysfunction
should examine them to see if either technique will generate differ-
ent outcomes among cases with the same legal theory. If one tech-
nique creates intra-substantive differences and one does not, then
504. See supra text following note 308.
505. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988).
506. The Act technically prevents only judicial rulemaking that affects substantive
rights; it does not address the substantive consequences that occur in individual cases
because of thejudicial use of facially nonsubstantive rules such as bifurcation, or the use
of a special master. See id. Moreover, some of the powers of federal judges to cure
dysfunction, such as the development of issue-preclusion doctrines, derive from sources
other than the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Federal Rules of Evidence to which
the Rules Enabling Act is limited. See id. § 2072(a). Finally, the Act's concern that sub-
stantive rights not be abridged, enlarged, or modified appears to have been intended, at
most, to bar rules that altered an entire body of doctrine. The related but less obvious
problem of creating substantive rifts among cases invoking a single doctrine appears to
have escaped legislative scrutiny. See supra note 293.
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the judge's prima facie choice should be the procedure that guaran-
tees similarity of treatment within a legal theory. 507
So far, it appears that courts and commentators have paid insuffi-
cient attention to the question of intra-substantive neutrality.
Although some people have expressed fears that trans-substantiv-
ism ought not to be readily discarded, 508 only a few judges and
scholars have questioned the effect that variant procedures for com-
plex cases ultimately will have on the substance of a particular body
of law; and no one has ever examined the dangers systematically.509
4. Disparate Treatment of Claims Within a Single Transaction
The final articulation of the "like treated alike" principle, transac-
tional neutrality, requires a court to accord the same procedural
treatment to all the substantive theories within a single transac-
tion.5 10 A court should not, for instance, apply fact pleading to a
civil rights claim and notice pleading to a factually overlapping tort
claim arising out of allegations of unconstitutional prison condi-
tions; nor should it allow full discovery on one claim and no discov-
ery on another.
Presently, there is little evidence that judges are treating individ-
ual legal theories in complex litigation disparately; indeed, of the
four neutralities, this is the most likely to be respected in dysfunc-
tional litigation.5 1' From the viewpoint of the form of adjudication,
however, a court could, as a general matter, treat different theories
disparately; transactional neutrality is an entirely positive assump-
tion of American procedure. 512 Thus, any manual considering the
specific rules to be applied in specific types of dysfunctional cases513
507. The prima facie analysis is refined infra notes 521-29 and accompanying text.
508. See Carrington, supra note 12, at 2069; Hazard, supra note 12, at 2237.
509. For brief discussions of the problem, see In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706,
711-12 (5th Cir. 1990); Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Burbank, supra note 21, at 1471-76; E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judg-
ing and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 327-29 (1986) (arguing that
managerial judging can improve substantive justice under specified conditions); Subrin,
supra note 2, at 985. Typically, however, cases adopting and commentators advocating
novel procedures to resolve complex cases never overtly consider the substantive conse-
quences of their procedural proposals. See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453
(10th Cir. 1988); COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, supra note 14; MANUAL, supra note 13.
510. See supra text following note 296.
511. One of the few instances of discrimination among claims is the heightened spec-
ificity of pleading that courts require for some theories in a complaint, but not for
others. See In re First Chicago Corp. Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 1444, 1453 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
see also Heller v. NCNB Corp., 768 F. Supp. 167 (W.D.N.C. 1991) (dismissing federal
securities fraud claim but declining jurisdiction over, rather than dismissing, related
state law fraud claim); Wilkes v. Heritage Bancorp., 767 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Mass. 1991)(same). See generally Marcus, supra note 15, at 443-44 (discussing the revival of fact
pleading in certain legal theories). It also is possible to treat one person's claims against
different defendants in disparate ways; that point has been discussed in supra notes 490-
91 and accompanying text.
512. See supra text following note 308. There is one qualification on this rule: Once a
court has settled on the disparate procedures to handle the various issues raised in a
particular piece of litigation, the assumption of inter-transactional neutrality would re-
quire every subsequent case involving the same factual and legal scenario to treat the
claims in the same fashion. See supra notes 470-85 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 483-85 and accompanying text.
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need not be constrained by the belief that all legal claims within a
factual controversy be resolved simultaneously or even under proce-
dures that assure that a similar quality of evidence is available for all
the claims. Even as judges must cultivate greater respect for the
effects of their management powers on related transactions and par-
ties, 5 1 4 they must worry less about the effects of their powers on the
legal theories and claims joined in a single action.
C. Complexity's Decision Tree
It is now possible to provide a formal definition of complex litiga-
tion: Litigation in an adversarial system in which the judicial power
necessary to overcome the dysfunction of the lawyers, the jury, or
the parties results in procedural disparities that cause substantively
disparate outcomes among similarly situated parties, claims, or
transactions. The definition contains three essential elements. The
first element is dysfunction-the inability of the lawyers, jury, or
parties to fulfill the responsibilities for rational adjudication as-
signed to them by the adversarial system. The second element is
curative judicial power-the ability of the judge to establish proce-
dures that remedy this dysfunction and thus allow rational adjudica-
tion, albeit in a manner inconsistent with the adversarial model.
The third element is that like cases are treated unalike because of
the tendency of the selected procedures to cause the nature and
quality of evidence, and consequently the substantive outcome, to
vary (1) among persons who have experienced the same or similar
factual occurrences, (2) among cases seeking recovery under the
same legal theory, or (3) among legal theories constituting a party's
claim or defense.
Because this definition was developed against the backdrop of a
normative and positive theory of adjudication, certain limitations on
the exercise ofjudicial power also have been suggested. In this sec-
tion, I summarize the analysis that a court facing an apparently com-
plex case should adopt in choosing particular techniques.
1. Acting Only When Dysfunction Exists
The first step of the inquiry is to identify the nature of the dys-
function. Given the positive preference for adversarial process, the
court cannot take a more active role as long as the other players can
perform their tasks adequately enough to assure reasoned judg-
ment. Although, under my definition, this conclusion is implicit in
the court's determination that a case is complex, I raise it again here
for two reasons. The first is to emphasize that the court must limit
its activism to those tasks that lie beyond the powers of other players
514. See supra notes 473-81, 486-494 and accompanying text.
1992] 1801
to perform rationally; for example, an instance of lawyer dysfunc-
tion during the pretrial phase does not justify judicial activism in the
remedial phase. Rather, each application ofjudicial power must be
justified separately. Second, judicial intervention cannot be justified
simply on the basis that it will result in "better," or more efficient,
procedures. Although efficiency is one assumption on which our
procedural system turns, it is not normatively required,51 5 and it is
not necessarily entitled to ascendancy over the other non-normative
assumptions of procedure.51 6 Our commitment to adversarialism
contains a certain inefficiency. Until we discard the adversarial as-
sumption, it is an inefficiency we must respect-up to the point, at
least, at which it threatens rational adjudication.
2. Ensuring a Judicial Remedy-Discarding "Polycentric" Techniques
and Cases
In order to be true to the form of adjudication, no technique
adopted by a court can violate adjudication's normative terms. The
preceding analysis has shown that judicial techniques have the spe-
cial potential to violate three of these normative terms: reasoned
judgment; that aspect of inter-transactional neutrality that requires
that persons in similar transactions who present legally and factually
indistinguishable claims and defenses receive equivalent proce-
dures; and that aspect of inter-personal neutrality that requires that
persons in a single transaction who present legally and factually in-
distinguishable claims and defenses receive equivalent procedures.
Thus, the court cannot select any technique that fails to facilitate
reasoned judgment or any technique that treats persons with legally
and factually identical cases in procedurally disparate ways.
Significantly, these requirements are cumulative: Even if a tech-
nique facilitates reasoned judgment, it must also pass muster under
the two neutralities, and vice versa. For instance, the separation of a
mass tort into individual plaintiff trials might be a logical method to
avoid irrational judgment, but its use would be barred by the as-
sumption of transactional neutrality ifjudgments in the earlier trials
bankrupted the defendant and left later, identically situated parties
without a remedy. Conversely, the use of a class action, which can
successfully avoid the problems of inter-personal neutrality, 51 7
might create problems of formulational, decisionmaking, or reme-
dial complexity that cannot be overcome even with the use of other
judicial techniques. In these situations, both separation and class
action must be rejected.
This analytical sifting might mean that no technique will survive
the normative gauntlet. When that situation occurs, the case can no
longer be resolved through adjudication. The case is-to use
Fuller's term with a somewhat different meaning-"polycentric."
Unlike Fuller, who pegs polycentrism to the inability to resolve a
515. See supra text following note 308.
516. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
517. See supra notes 496-97 and accompanying text.
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controversy through reasoned proofs and arguments of the dispu-
tants, 518 I do not view the adversarial presentation of proofs and
arguments as being crucial to the form of adjudication. Instead, the
ability of the decisionmaker rationally to apply facts to law is crucial,
as is respect for the pre-existing distribution of legal obligations
among factually and legally indistinguishable parties. If a court can-
not tailor procedures to accommodate these essential attributes,
then it cannot adjudicate the case. 519
In many cases, however, at least one technique survives the nor-
mative screening. If only one technique survives, the court's choice
is easy. Frequently, more than one technique (or combination of
techniques) will satisfy the formal requirements of adjudication.
When that result occurs, the form of adjudication is incapable of
choosing among those techniques. 520 The analysis thus moves to a
third step-the consideration of our procedural system's positive
assumptions.
3. Treating Like Cases Unalike-Choosing Among Imperfect Remaining
Techniques
By definition, the techniques that survive the initial screening can-
not simultaneously satisfy all of the positive aspects of trans-sub-
stantivism: intra-substantive neutrality, transactional neutrality, and
those elements of inter-transactional and inter-personal neutrality
that allow legally dissimilar parties to be treated in a procedurally
dissimilar manner.5 21 It also is obvious that different techniques will
violate different assumptions, and will do so to different degrees.
Therefore, the question is whether there are other orderings of
principles that can establish priorities for the selection of particular
techniques.
Two orderings are possible. The first is to select from among the
remaining available techniques the procedure which, although dis-
carding none of the other positive assumptions of procedure, is the
most efficient-that is, least costly in terms of the sum of error costs
and implementation costs. This preference for efficient procedure
518. See supra notes 200-18 and accompanying text.
519. A separate question is whether the court can even entertain a polycentric case.
Because nothing in the form of adjudication requires that adjudication be performed by
an organ of government exclusively devoted to the task, there is no formal objection to
the court's non-adjudicatory resolution of polycentric cases. For further consideration
of this point, see discussion in infra notes 561-65 and accompanying text.
520. See supra text following note 308.
521. If a procedure is capable of satisfying each of these positive neutralities, then the
third element of the definition of complex litigation ("like cases treated unalike") has
not been fulfilled. Therefore, the case is not complex.
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can be derived, of course, from the Due Process Clause,522 the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 3 and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.524 The second is to assign a "pecking order" among the
positive neutralities, sift out the techniques that violate the pre-
ferred neutralities, and apply efficiency analysis only among those
techniques that lie on the same stratum.525 For example, assume
that the pecking order is that intra-substantive neutrality is most im-
portant, followed in order by inter-transactional, transactional, and
inter-personal neutrality. Then the procedures that violate none of
the first three neutralities but violate the last neutrality would be
preferred; if more than one procedure violated only this last neu-
trality, then the most efficient would be chosen. Likewise, if all tech-
niques violated at least one of the first two neutralities, then the
technique(s) that violated the transactional assumption would be
preferred, with the most efficient technique chosen from the avail-
able group.
The obvious difficulty of the second methodology is the develop-
ment of a principled ordering. On the one hand, intra-substantive
neutrality lies within the penumbra of the Rules Enabling Act;526 on
the other hand, the positive aspects of inter-transactional and inter-
personal neutrality lie in the shadow of their normative aspects. 527
Neither participatory democracy nor the form of adjudication dic-
tates the pre-eminence of any neutrality. Nor can any of these
assumptions claim priority over other positive procedural as-
sumptions, such as the preference for efficient procedure. Indeed,
because efficiency of process is more clearly derived from the Con-
stitution and the legislative and judicial rulemaking surrounding ad-
judication than any of the three neutralities, 528 an attempt to
establish a "pecking order" of positive procedural assumptions
would certainly put efficiency in the pre-eminent position.
Under either methodology, therefore, a court facing a complex
522. See supra notes 271-76 and accompanying text.
523. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 1.
524. FED. R. EVID. 102.
525. For a further discussion of the use of serial or "lexical" ordering of conflicting
principles, see RAWLS, supra note 246, at 42-44.
526. See supra note 506 and accompanying text.
527. See supra notes 480, 493 and accompanying text.
528. See supra notes 520-24 and accompanying text. The deference owed in our de-
mocracy to the Due Process Clause is evident. A similar deference is owed to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence. Congress has delegated the task of
promulgating the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence to the Supreme Court,
and retains the right to review and amend all proposed amendments. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2072(a), 2074(a) (1988). Congressional review of the Rules is not perfunctory; when
displeased with proposed revisions, Congress has either precluded their implementation
or itself legislated the rule. See, e.g., The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96 Stat. 2527 (codified as FED. R. Civ. P. 4); Act of
Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (approving rules of evidence proposed
by the Supreme Court and empowering Supreme Court to amend rules of evidence
subject to congressional approval); Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9
(annulling rules of evidence proposed by the Supreme Court). Therefore, the explicit
choice of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence to adopt efficiency as a primary goal
makes efficiency a positive assumption of the first order.
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case must choose the most efficient procedure that violates no nor-
mative component of adjudication. The penumbral preferences for
the positive neutralities associated with trans-substantivism are not
entirely irrelevant to the efficiency calculus. The harm that any tech-
nique causes to the positive aspects of trans-substantivism are costs
of the use of a particular technique, and must therefore be factored
into the efficiency equation. Although none of the positive aspects
of trans-substantivism is entitled to an absolute preference, a tech-
nique that does not violate these assumptions should be chosen
over one that does when the other costs of the two techniques are
roughly comparable.
However the efficiency balance comes out, the chosen technique
inevitably will cause some disparity among similarly situated parties
and claims. Like cases will not be treated alike. Whether the dis-
crimination occurs within one transaction, among similar transac-
tions, or within a single legal theory, there will be procedural
discrimination. The only issue is whether that discrimination will
cause "horizontal stratification"-separate procedures for cases in-
volving a single legal theory-or "vertical stratification"-separate
procedures for persons and claims involving a similar factual
pattern.
As long as identically situated parties are treated alike, neither
form of stratification violates the narrow, formal requirements of ad-
judication. But this necessary stratification does violate the aspira-
tion of fairness we claim for our adjudicatory system. Irreducible
injustice may thus explain the often-expressed view that complex
cases are not suited to the judicial process;5 29 after all, the allocation
of benefits and burdens among persons seems a peculiarly legisla-
tive matter. With the exception of the polycentric cases, however,
courts still can adjudicate. Faced with a dilemma of injustice that
cannot be resolved in the context of any individual litigation, the
courts must slog ahead until they receive a legislative reprieve.
IV Complex Litigation and the Future of Civil Procedure
The definition of complex litigation that this Article has proposed
also provides a useful perspective on several matters that lie at the
heart of procedural debate today. These matters include the move-
ment toward case management; the proposals to create non-trans-
substantive rules; the wisdom of an equity-based and discretionary
system of procedural rules; the arguments to move away from ad-
versarial process; the relevance of wealth maximization as a defining
529. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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principle of our procedural system; and the politicization of the ju-
diciary. 530 In applying the lessons of a formal analysis to these is-
sues, it is useful to recognize that the definition of complex litigation
proposed in this Article divides cases into four categories. The first
is "routine" cases: cases in which traditional adversarial procedure
rationally resolves disputes with no harm to American procedural
values. The second category comprises, for lack of a better word,
"complicated" cases: cases in which the lawyers, the factfinder, or
the parties are unable to fulfill their appointed tasks in the tradi-
tional model, but an assertion ofjudicial power in a matter usually
left to the dysfunctional player again permits rational resolution
with no harm to trans-substantive values. The third category is
complex litigation, which differs from complicated litigation because
the assertion of judicial power creates a conflict with the trans-sub-
stantive principle that like parties, claims, and legal theories should
be treated procedurally alike. Last come the "polycentric" cases, in
which no judicial technique simultaneously can ensure rational reso-
lution and the like treatment of legally identical parties. Although
each of the first three categories of cases can be resolved through
adjudication, the last category cannot. 53 1
A. Case Management
In the past decade we have witnessed the growth of literature dis-
cussing the wisdom of managerial judging.5 32 Both supporters and
detractors speak with a certain religious fervor about their positions.
The form of complex litigation suggests that both sides are correct,
at least in part.
The simple reality is that the function and propriety of case man-
agement differs in each of the four categories of cases described in
this Article. 533 In polycentric cases, case management is inappropri-
ate because judicial management is incapable of readying a case for
530. See infra notes 532, 537, 542, 548-50, 554-55.
531. Cf SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1127 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that, at that time, no one had "yet spelled out definitive, reliable criteria on
which to determine clear boundaries for 'simple,' 'complex but not too complex,' and
'too complex' "). This Article has set out those boundaries. The Federal Circuit's "sim-
ple" cases correspond to the category I call "routine" cases; its middle category of
"complex but not too complex" contains the cases I call "complicated" and "complex";
and the category of cases that are "too complex" corresponds to the cases I call
"polycentric."
532. See, e.g., COUND ET AL., supra note 281, at 802-11; LoUISELL ET AL., supra note 46,
at 1223-37; Elliott, supra note 509, at 306; Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to
Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 505, 505-07 (1984); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal
Judge as Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L.
REv. 770, 770-73 (1981); Peckham, supra note 15, at 255-67; Resnik, supra note 279, at
376-80; Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 248-50; Subrin, supra note 2, at 989-91.
533. Although he does not attempt to describe which cases deserve which treatment,
Professor Elliott also has recognized that the need for case management varies among
different types of cases:
[I]t should be clear that not all cases are alike; some present far more com-
pelling circumstances for managerial judging than others. Similarly, not all
techniques that are loosely grouped under the rubric "managerial judging"
are equally appropriate or defensible. To improve the quality of managerial
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adjudication. In complicated and complex cases, managerial judg-
ing is essential; only through more active judicial involvement in the
litigative enterprise can the dysfunction of other players be cured
and rational adjudication assured. In routine litigation, however,
there is no dysfunction to cure. Until we amend our preference for
adversarial process, the general claim that case management is ap-
propriate or necessary for these cases therefore is wrong.
There is an exception to the general rule against case manage-
ment in routine cases. First, the form of complex litigation has as-
sumed that forces external to the lawyers, jurors, and parties have
made it impossible for them to perform their adversarial obliga-
tions. There also are instances in which these players might wilfully
refuse to perform their tasks-for instance, by refusing to provide
documents, by asking harassing questions, by ignoring the relevant
facts and law, or by recklessly failing to comply with a court's orders.
When they occur, these failures of passion, prejudice, spite, or ex-
cessive adversarialism require judicial correction. The type ofjudi-
cial management necessary to overcome these problems, however,
is different from the management necessary to assure reasoned
judgment.53 4 Although some of the techniques might overlap, the
different purposes of case management in the four types of cases
suggest that case management is not all of a piece, and the applica-
tion of management techniques cannot be broadly justified apart
from the precise reason that case management is deemed necessary.
The disparate functions of case management debunk several com-
mon beliefs. The first is that the Federal Rules' movement toward
case management is a beneficial, or at least benign, development. 535
In fact, the Rules' claim for case management is at once over-
drawn-for case management is both futile in polycentric cases and
unnecessary in routine cases with no willful dereliction of players'
duty-and underdrawn-for the Rules give judges no guidance
about the goals case management should be serving in a given case
or the best methods of achieving those goals. Second, proper analy-
sis belies the notion that any case management technique has uni-
versal validity; the case management inquiry must be sensitive to the
judging, we need to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the char-
acteristics of cases that make them appropriate candidates for particular
managerial techniques.
Elliott, supra note 509, at 333-34.
534. I do not mean to suggest that problems of willful disobedience cannot occur in
complicated and complex litigation; on the contrary, the high stakes in many compli-
cated and complex cases make disobedience a strong possibility. See Sofaer, supra note
80, at 722-23. This type of disobedience, and the judicial response to it, should never be
confused with the separate issue of dysfunction.
535. See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 509, at 307; Flanders, supra note 532, at 507; Miller,
supra note 275, at 12; Peckham, supra note 15, at 254; Simons, supra note 135.
1992] 1807
precise nature of the willful or unavoidable dysfunction that gener-
ates the need for management. Finally, the analysis demonstrates
that efficient procedure alone does not justify case management.
The skirmish over case management must be seen as a part of a
larger battle between the positive procedural assumptions of adver-
sarialism and efficiency. Until one of the assumptions is abandoned,
they will remain in conflict, and the balance certainly can be tipped
to one side or the other at any given time.536 But the burden of
justifying a movement away from adversarial process when the pro-
cess is capable of performing its function is far greater than the bur-
den in complex or complicated litigation; and the movement away
from adversarial process ultimately rests on different and far weaker
ground when there is no normative reason to depart from adver-
sarial proceedings.
Thus, the examination of complex litigation's form reveals that
case management-at least as it is presently conceived and dis-
cussed-is no panacea for the problems of litigation. At the same
time, there is no reason to fear case management once its proper
scope and function are understood.
B. The Value of Trans-Substantive Procedural Rules
Of late, a call for the creation of special procedural rules for vari-
ous types of cases has been afoot.537 The usual reason given is, to
paraphrase Maurice Rosenberg, that Cadillac-style procedures are
not needed for bicycle-sized lawsuits. 538 Unlike the writ system,
which created procedures that vertically separated cases on the basis
of their doctrinal form, this new movement seeks to separate cases
horizontally on the basis of size or complexity. The wisdom of cre-
ating these divisions, which served as the starting point for this ex-
ploration into the form of complex litigation, remains hotly
contested. 539 Two matters, however, are clear. First, procedural
stratification requires that the trans-substantive assumption of mod-
ern American procedure be forsaken. Second, the consequence of
horizontal stratification will be the establishment of a new writ sys-
tem. Admittedly, the forms of actions will be transactional ones,
rather than writs based upon a particular substantive theory. But
writs they will be.
As should now be obvious, a formal analysis of complex litigation
dictates that some relaxation of the trans-substantive ideal will need
to occur in order to accommodate the peculiar problem of complex
cases. That relaxation, however, must occur on terms far different
than the terms typical of the present debate. The only circumstance
536. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
537. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON MASS TORTS, supra note 14; RECOMMENDATIONS ON
COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 14; REPORT ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION, supra note 14;
REPORT ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 14; Burbank, supra note 2 1, at
1474-75; Burbank, supra note 12, at 717-21; Silberman, supra note 12, at 2175-78.
538. Rosenberg, supra note 1, at 247.
539. For varying views on the value of trans-substantive procedure and its alterna-
tives, see supra note 12; Burbank, supra note 21, at 1471-76.
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that justifies a departure from trans-substantive procedure is the
existence of dysfunction curable by judicial activism. A court typi-
cally should not opt for a non-trans-substantive technique when a
technique that still respects the trans-substantive assumption exists,
and must not do so when the technique violates one of the norma-
tive aspects of trans-substantivism. Put another way, the court gen-
erally should not make a complex case out of a complicated one,
and cannot make a polycentric case out of a complicated one. Fi-
nally, the non-trans-substantive technique ultimately chosen must
cause the least damage possible-considering not only the monetary
costs of the procedure but also the harm to the trans-substantive
ideal.
Until now, no one proposing special rules for complex cases has
suggested these limitations on non-trans-substantive procedure. To
a large extent, this failure results from the reluctance to define
"complex litigation" adequately and the subsequent inattention to
the four separate assumptions that comprise trans-substantivism.
Indeed, the universal belief of those advocating non-trans-substan-
tive procedure seems to be that procedural stratification will be hor-
izontal-rules will be developed to separate big cases according to
the legal theories and factual circumstances of each case. The reali-
zation that there are four pillars of trans-substantivism calls this be-
lief into question. The more sensible resolution might be to induce
outcome-determinative differences among claims or among legally
and factually dissimilar parties involved in a single transaction.
The sacrifice of trans-substantive aspirations should be seen as an
unfortunate but necessary evil in complex cases. The exact terms of
that sacrifice, however, require a more fine-tuned exploration than
the present literature has undertaken.
C. The Role of Equitable Discretion
As recent scholarship has made evident, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were based largely on the rules of equity then prevailing
in the federal courts. 540 The Rules were designed to minimize the
consequences of technical miscues, to allow full disclosure of avail-
able evidence, and to imbue the district courts with sufficient discre-
tion to avoid the gamesmanship inherent in an adversarial system
geared to victory rather than truth.5 41 Increasingly, the wisdom of
that choice has come under attack, typically because of the cost and
delay that result from the uncertainty and expense associated with
540. See Burbank, supra note 21, at 1468-70; Chayes, supra note 100, at 1289-92; Rich-
ard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 725 (1989); Subrin, supra note 2, at 982-
91.
541. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 277, at 281-82; Subrin, supra note 2, at 922-25.
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the loosely textured Federal Rules. 542 A close cousin of the move-
ment away from trans-substantive rules, this movement demands
greater predictability and precision in our procedural system. 543
To a certain extent, the form of complex litigation supports less
flexible procedures. As mentioned above, a logical and beneficial
response in complex litigation would be the creation of a manual
detailing fairly routine procedural courses for particular types of
complex cases. 544 At the same time, however, the form of complex
litigation suggests that a general retreat from loosely textured, eq-
uity-based rules would be wrong. In complicated cases, the court
must possess the discretion to innovate in order to overcome dys-
function. In routine cases, in which dysfunction is not a problem,
more specific rules might create dysfunction that does not presently
exist. We need only remember the example of the dysfunction
caused by present jurisdictional and party-joinder rules to imagine
the problems that would be engendered by a hard-and-fast rule al-
lowing only twenty interrogatories and five depositions, 545 or by re-
quiring judgment for an opposing party in the event of some
technical imprecision in the pleadings. 546 As more specific rules
cause the problems of dysfunction to rise, the number of compli-
cated cases in which the court would need to exercise discretion in
order to protect reasoned judgment also would rise. Likewise, un-
duly specific rules in routine cases only seem to increase disparate
outcomes among parties, claims, and transactions, thereby creating
new categories of complex litigation where none exist now. There-
fore, because discretion must remain a necessary component of the
procedural system to provide flexibility in complicated cases, the
perceived benefits of highly specific rules for routine cases are diffi-
cult to find. The costs of more specific rules, on the other hand, are
evident.
Of course, the precise contours of the discretion presently al-
lowed under the Federal Rules is not compelled by the form of com-
plex litigation. The Rules certainly could provide more guidance to
542. See, e.g., JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 50; Marcus, supra note 540, at 774-76; Sub-
rin, supra note 2, at 982-87, 1001.
543. The relationship between non-trans-substantive rules and more predictable
rules is obvious: As rules become more particularistic and rigid, they are likely to have
differing effects on different substantive theories. The relationship is not, however, a
logically necessary one.
544. See supra notes 483-85, 495, 513 and accompanying text.
545. COMMriTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Questionable Local Rules, in
REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT at 96-99, 109-10 (1989) (finding that limitations
on the number of interrogatories and the number or length of depositions conflict with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). For examples of such rules, see N.D. GA. R. 225-
2(b) (limiting length of deposition to six hours without leave of court); E.D. VA. R.
11.1 (A) (limiting interrogatories to 30 per party unless good cause for additional inter-
rogatories is shown); id. 11.1(B) (limiting depositions to five per party unless good cause
for additional depositions is shown); N.D. W. VA. R. 2.08(h) (limiting interrogatories
and requests for admission to a cumulative total of forty without the opposing party's
consent or leave of court).
546. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Pepper, 1 LD. Raymond 38 (1695) (judgment given for
plaintiff because defendant pleaded lack of negligence as a justification rather than
pleading it as a part of the general issue).
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channel discretion-for instance, presumptive limitations of ten
depositions or fifteen interrogatories. 547 The court's equitable obli-
gation, however, cannot be foreclosed entirely. Nor should its dis-
cretion be limited so severely that rules of pleading, discovery, and
trial create new obstacles to lawyer, jury, and party. Although some
fine-tuning is certainly possible, the form of complex litigation sug-
gests that the Federal Rules have struck an acceptable balance be-
tween rule and discretion.
D. The Future of the Adversarial System
A fourth movement holding some academic sway is a call for the
lessening of the adversarial nature of our adjudicatory process. 548
Many of the specific measures attacking aspects of the adversarial
system remain on the drawing board, 549 but others have gained cur-
rency.550 From the viewpoint of the form of adjudication, these con-
cepts cannot be dismissed out of hand. Nothing in the form of
adjudication requires adversarial process. Indeed, strictly adver-
sarial adjudication turns out to be useful only in routine cases not
involving a willful refusal of a player to assume his or her adversarial
function; in complex, complicated, and those routine cases involv-
ing willful disobedience, the adversarial allocation of roles is an im-
pediment to the task of adjudication.
I am not, however, suggesting a mad embrace of nonadversarial
procedure. Any other procedural system, whether it be inquisitorial
or cooperative, must undergo the analysis developed in this Article
for adversarial procedure. The analysis must begin by examining
the roles that the various participants in a procedural system are
assigned. Then we must search for those cases or instances in which
each of the participants will be unable to fulfill his or her assigned
function in the task of ensuring reasoned judgment-that is, look
for instances of dysfunction. We must see if a re-definition of par-
ticipants' roles can overcome this dysfunction (just as judicial in-
volvement overcomes dysfunction in complicated and complex
cases). We must finally examine whether this re-definition violates
547. See Preliminary Draft, supra note 75, at 107, 111-12, 118, 122 (proposing limita-
tions of 10 depositions not exceeding 6 hours duration and 15 interrogatories, but al-
lowing additional discovery with leave of the court).
548. For some of the literature expounding on the vices of the adversarial system, see
supra note 277. The movement to lessen adversarialism is bound to two other present
procedural phenomena: the rise of the case-management movement, see supra notes
532-536 and accompanying text, and the concern for the efficiency of process, see infra
notes 551-61 and accompanying text.
549. See, e.g., Preliminary Draft, supra note 75, at 87-106 (requiring mandatory disclo-
sure of information).
550. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26(b)(3), 26(g). Although none of the rules out-
laws adversarialism, each makes it more difficult for the lawyer to operate with the au-
tonomy characteristic of a purely adversarial process.
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fundamental norms of adjudication or causes unacceptably high
damage to the positive expectations we bring to a procedural system
(i.e., uncover the types of cases that are polycentric and complex),
and compare this endpoint with the endpoint of adversarial process.
This analysis might well declare that adversarial process truly is
the "best" engine for the accomplishment of the normative and pos-
itive objectives of our adjudicatory system. At this point, however,
the analysis has not been performed. The jury is still out on the
wisdom of adversarial procedure.
E. The Law and Economics of Procedure
Although the law and economics movement has not gained the
ascendancy in civil procedure that it has in other areas, procedure
has not escaped it altogether. Coase's theorem, from which the eco-
nomic analysis of law descends, assumes that, in the absence of
transaction costs, any legal rule is efficient. 55 1 Among the most sig-
nificant of these transaction costs are the costs associated with the
prosecution and defense of a lawsuit.552 In general terms, there-
fore, the more costly the procedure, the less likely an efficient out-
come. 553 To the extent that society desires to achieve the efficient
(wealth-maximizing) outcome, it must shape its procedural system
to achieve the greatest reduction in the costs of procedure consis-
tent with the overall reduction of costs to their lowest level.554 The
reply to economic analysis typically has been the assertion that eco-
nomic analysis is morally or politically illegitimate. 555
The form of adjudication suggests that, at least in the area of pro-
cedure, some middle ground is appropriate. As a positive matter,
there is no doubt that courts are motivated increasingly by concerns
of efficiency, 556 but it would stretch truth to the point of fiction to
claim that the only concern ofjudges and lawyers when they create
particular procedures is efficiency.557 As a normative matter, effi-
ciency is not an essential element of adjudication, and must stand
551. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
552. In tort cases, for instance, the prosecution and defense of cases comprise 50%
or more of the total expenditures. JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986). Other transaction costs in adjudication
would include the cost of maintaining the judiciary and the cost of errors. See id. at 6-8
(estimating that the costs of adjudicating tort claims are $0.5 billion, or approximately
one to two percent of the total expenditures in tort litigation); POSNER, supra note 275,
§ 21.1.
553. See SHAVELL, supra note 233, at 265-70; POLINSKY, supra note 233, at 113-17.
554. Cf GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (contending that transac-
tion costs should be factored into the development of tort doctrines that result in lowest
total cost to society).
555. See, e.g., Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil
Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2179 (1989);Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 2219 (1989); Resnik, supra note 12; c Elliott, supra note 511, at 326-29 (arguing
that a justice perspective can support procedures that lead to the efficient result). See
generally Unger, supra note 21, at 573-76 (relating the critiques of objectivism and
formalism).
556. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 471-482 (West Supp. 1992); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976); supra notes 549, 555.
557. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (requiring the Federal Rules to be interpreted to accomplish
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silent when inefficient procedures are necessary to protect either
reasoned judgment or adjudication's other essential attributes.
Although efficiency is not a normative concern of adjudication, it
is hardly irrelevant to the choice of procedure. As a positive as-
sumption of American procedure, efficiency must be considered
whenever two or more procedures are permissible under the form
of adjudication. In routine cases, in which neither reasoned judg-
ment nor the remaining attributes of adjudication are threatened,
efficiency and adversarialism would appear to be the dominant and
co-equal assumptions, thus allowing any efficient procedure that
uses the adversarial process as its baseline to be chosen. In compli-
cated cases, the procedure that most efficiently protects reasoned
judgment would be preferred. 558 In complex cases, as we have
seen, the same is true: The most efficient procedure that does not
create a conflict with a fundamental norm of adjudication should be
selected.559 Thus, courts may not listen to the siren song of effi-
ciency when it urges the disparate treatment of factually and legally
identical parties and claims. Nor, in other instances of trans-sub-
stantive violation, can the efficiency equation consider only the ele-
ments of error and procedural costs on which economic procedural
analysis has always focused; it must also factor in the systemic costs
associated with the disparate treatment of similar (but not identical)
claims, parties, and transactions.
In each of these three types of cases, a pure theory of wealth max-
imization would chafe at having to share the stage with or be the
understudy to other procedural values. It is certainly true that the
result under a pure efficiency analysis and the formal analysis devel-
oped here will not always be identical.560 Although the formal defi-
nition of complex litigation grants economic analysis a substantial
thejust and speedy-as well as the inexpensive-resolution of cases). Indeed, in spite of
the holding of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Due Process Clause has
never been interpreted to mandate that the most efficient process be used in adjudica-
tion; if it were so interpreted, many of the Federal Rules would likely be unconstitu-
tional. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1054 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("A harsh or unwise procedure is not necessarily unconstitutional.").
Rather, the Clause has been used in a very different fashion: to invalidate those proce-
dures that depart from the adversarial model without increasing the efficiency of the
outcome. Compare Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105 (1991) (finding that pre-judg-
ment seizure of real property without adversarial hearing violated due process) with
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant & Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (finding no due process violation in
pre-judgment seizure accomplished without adversarial hearing). Thus, the Due Pro-
cess Clause has been far more protective of adversarial procedure than an efficiency-
driven model of procedure would allow.
558. The proof generally would proceed along the lines discussed in supra notes 522-
29 and accompanying text, except that the court would not need to assign a value to the
departure from trans-substantive principles. The reason, of course, is that complicated
cases do not involve a departure from those values.
559. See supra notes 522-29 and accompanying text.
560. See supra notes 528-29 and accompanying text.
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role in the determination of procedure, the drafters of the Federal
Rules had the order of the adjectives right when they declared that
their goal was to assure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action. '561
F. The Politics of Procedure
The final consequence of modern procedure has been the increas-
ing injection of courts into political and social issues. The formal
analysis of complex litigation offers three insights into the relation-
ship between politics and procedure. The first is that there is noth-
ing inherently illegitimate about the entry of the judiciary into
politically sensitive issues. There obviously comes a point-the
point of polycentrism-when disputes can no longer be resolved
through adjudication's dual insistence on rational application of fact
to pre-existing legal entitlement and like treatment of identical par-
ties and claims. There is as well a separate point-the point of rep-
resentative democracyw-that adjudication cannot transgress. 5 62
Nonetheless, most of the highly charged controversies in which
courts have been placed fall somewhat short of these points. When
the adversarial system fails, adjudication does not hesitate to collec-
tivize the disputants, to bureaucratize the judiciary, to enervate the
lawyers.
Given the political nature of the controversies, a second, issue
arises: whether the legislature or the judiciary should be asked to
make the choice of procedural rule. The form of adjudication cer-
tainly does not preclude legislatively, rather than judicially, enacted
rules of procedure. In complex litigation, for which I suggest the
creation of case-specific manuals to guide judges, the legislature is a
logical institution to make those choices for three interrelated rea-
sons. First, no procedural code can be politically neutral. Second,
561. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
562. These two limitations can overlap. As the jurisdictional and joinder limitations
imposed on federal courts demonstrate, the restrictions that the legislature places on the
judiciary's ability to handle complicated suits can create polycentric cases. See supra
notes 441-46, 458 and accompanying text.
There is, in addition, a third limitation on a court's ability to adjudicate a dispute: the
illegitimacy of certain procedures when measured against the form that defines a partic-
ular substantive area. For instance, the form of tort law might be viewed by some to
require individual rather than massjustice. See ErnestJ. Weinrib, Understanding Tort Law,
23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485 (1989); see also Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54
F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (refusing to certify class action because its use would be
inconsistent with policy underlying the Truth in Lending Act); Kenneth W. Dam, Class
Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 61
(1975) (arguing that class actions could lead to inefficient overenforcement). But see
David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing IndividualJustice by Collective Means, 62
IND. LJ. 561, 563 (1987) (arguing for collective adjudication). I have not considered
substantive limitations on procedure in this Article, but it should be obvious from the
preceding analysis that, should they exist, substantive limitations constrain procedural
choice as significantly as the attributes of adjudication and the requirements of represen-
tative democracy. These limitations also increase the possibility of polycentrism, for
they make the realization of rational, trans-substantive procedure more difficult. Cf
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT Draft No. 1, supra note 14, at 3 (stating that substantive
aspects of certain bodies of law contribute to complexity).
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the legislature has particular competence in the allocations of bene-
fits and burdens among citizens who, by definition, will be dispa-
rately treated. Third, the model of representative democracy (to
which the form of adjudication is subservient) prefers that decisions
concerning the extent of social obligations be made by elected
representatives.
Nonetheless, legislative enactment of procedural rules is hardly
required, and might even be suspect for two reasons. The resulting
procedural code might well be a code for the politically powerful.
Second, in the process of political horse-trading, the legislature is
more likely to be insensitive to the normative and positive require-
ments of adjudication than the judiciary, and thus more likely to
adopt politically acceptable procedures that violate these require-
ments. Although the first critique is of no moment to the form of
adjudication, for its "like treated alike" principle worries about for-
mal procedural equality rather than distributive equality, 563 the pos-
sibility that a legislature might ignore the formal elements of
adjudication risks the creation of broad categories of polycentric
cases. Therefore, the balance between legislative and judicial
rulemaking to cope with the problem of complex cases is even, with
neither branch of government possessing clear institutional superi-
ority to make the difficult-and frankly political-choices of proce-
dural rules for complex cases.
The final insight concerns the recent upsurge in arguments for
removal from the judicial system of cases that are complicated, com-
plex, or polycentric. 5r4 Although I would defer to the legislature's
judgment to remove them from the judicial process, the form of ad-
judication certainly does not require such drastic measures for com-
plicated and complex cases. Complicated cases can be handled
comfortably within an adjudicatory framework once we appreciate
that an adjudicatory process is not necessarily an adversarial one.
Although complex cases present additional problems for adjudica-
tion, their inherent unfairness cannot be ameliorated by legislative
action. Because legislative or administrative resolution can at best
substitute one form of discrimination against like claims or claim-
ants for another, the claim for legislative or administrative resolu-
tion of complex cases is not compelling.
Nor is the claim for nonjudicial resolution of polycentric cases
compelling. Courts already perform significant nonadjudicatory
563. Lack of concern with distributive effects of procedural rules remains a weakness
of the formal analysis of adjudication-a weakness that can be countered only by a sense
of noblesse oblige and the limited guarantees of due process and equal protection. See
supra note 454 and accompanying text.
564. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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functions,565 and judges are not necessarily worse than legislatures
or administrators in resolving matters that are not susceptible to
reasoned judgment or that require that legally identical parties be
disparately treated. Admittedly, matters not susceptible to reasoned
judgment should, in our constitutional system, initially be within the
province of the representative branches of government. On the
other hand, the claim of the judiciary to superiority seems especially
strong if the only reason that a case cannot be adjudicated is the
inability to handle similar transactions similarly.566 When trans-sub-
stantivism is at stake, courts can be especially creative in developing
case-specific procedural rules that assure reasoned judgment.
If it is empowered to handle a polycentric case, however, a court
has no reason to hide behind the fiction of adjudication. Our proce-
dural rules assume that adjudication is possible. When polycentr-
ism makes adjudication impossible, there is no a priori reason to
adopt any adjudicatory procedures unless they make sense. For a
court handling a polycentric case, the sky is the procedural limit.
Conclusion
Twenty-three years ago, the Manualfor Complex and Multidistrict Lit-
igation opened with the observation that "[tihere are no inherently
protracted cases, only cases which are unnecessarily protracted by
inefficient procedures and management." 567 The Manual's denial of
a fundamental form of complex litigation and its acceptance of utili-
tarian analysis to solve problems of "protraction" have been echoed
many times since its first publication. That approach stands in sharp
contrast to a formal analysis of complex litigation, an analysis that
finds meaning for and limitations on complex litigation within the
normative nature of adjudication and the positive aspirations of
procedure.
The lesson of this Article is that it is possible to develop a formal
description of complex litigation that meaningfully distinguishes the
complex from the routine. I do not contend that the definition is
unwavering for all purposes. Instead, I have sought to find an an-
swer only to the question of whether, for purposes of developing
separate procedural rules for complex cases, the term "complex
case" can be defined. 568 Had the answer to this question been
"No," then all the myriad solutions proposed to redress the ills of
"complex cases" would have been futile. Instead the answer was
565. For instance, the judiciary develops new rules of procedure and evidence
through an administrative, rulemaking process. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988). It also
can act as a lobbyist before the legislature on judicial matters, and it can make policy
proposals for the future direction of the judiciary. See REPORT ON ASBEsTos LITIGATION,
supra note 14.
566. For empirical observations that judges are also astute political operators who
can accomplish the resolution of controversies not readily susceptible to reasoned judg-
ment, see Chayes, supra note 100, at 1307-09; Fiss, supra note 108, at 53-55.
567. MCML, supra note 14, at xi.
568. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
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"Yes," although the true meaning of the term also has called many
of the "solutions" for complex litigation into doubt.
The formal analysis of complex litigation is nonetheless somewhat
limited. Its definition is more evocative than crystalline; the con-
cepts of player dysfunction, curative judicial power, and "like
treated unalike" lack the technical precision required for easy trans-
lation into legal rule. Moreover, the formal analysis of complex liti-
gation, which adumbrates the relevant considerations and
limitations, still leaves unanswered the question of the case-specific
solutions to complex litigation's dual problems of judicial power
and unequal treatment.
The question is unanswered, perhaps, but not unanswerable.
Four directions remain open. One is the abandonment, in either
some or all cases, of our experiment in uniform (trans-substantive)
procedural rules. A second is the abolition, again either in some or
all cases, of adversarial process and its replacement with a new
model of adjudication. A third is the substitution of a nonadjudi-
catory legislative or administrative process for the present judicial
process. Finally, the status quo can be maintained. Each option has
significant drawbacks, some of which have been explored in this Ar-
ticle. But the difficult work of comparing the options against each
other remains.
In spite of its limitations, the form of complex litigation provides
the framework for further analysis. As important, the form provides
a coherent perspective from which the future of procedural reform
can be viewed. Complex litigation is not exclusively--in fact not
even primarilya-about case management or the joinder of numer-
ous parties. Ultimately, complex litigation is the story of a proce-
dural system wrestling with the unavoidable unfairness its rules have
caused. It is this quest for unattainable justice that gives complex
litigation both its fascination and its peculiar bite.
1992] 1817
